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BIOGRAPHICAL SUMMARY: Frederick P. Lowrey 
Fred Lowrey, the oldest of Frederick D. and Leila Lowrey's six children, was born on November 11, 
1911 in Honolulu. He grew up in Manoa and was educated at Punahou School, Phillips Academy and 
Harvard University. 
In 1934 Lowrey started as an inventory clerk at Lewers & Cooke, where his father, and grandfather 
before, served as president. He left in 1936 to attend Harvard Business School. On his return to 
Lewers & Cooke, he served in various capacities, including personnel department manager, manager 
in charge of operations, manager in charge of government sales, and corporate secretary. 
With the growing possibility of war, Lewers & Cooke increased its inventory, bought war-risk 
insurance, and set up a block-warden system. On December 7, 1941, anti-aircraft shells damaged the 
Lewers & Cooke headquarters, lumberyard, and warehouse. No one was hurt, but it was the 
beginning of major changes for Lewers & Cooke as private construction diminished and military 
construction boomed. 
After the war, Lowrey was appointed vice president of Lewers & Cooke in 1953 and president in 
1956. In 1966, when Lewers & Cooke merged with U.S. Plywood, Lowrey resigned from the U.S. 
Plywood subsidiary companies but stayed on as president of Lewers & Cooke, Limited, a holding 
company. He retired in 1968 after overseeing the merger of Lewers & Cooke, Limited with 
Dillingham Corporation. 
Fred Lowrey married Janet Meyer in 1937. He has a son and four daughters. Over the years, Lowrey 
has been involved with the Outrigger Canoe Club, city planning commission, Young Men's Christian 
Association, Honolulu Chamber of Commerce, Rotary Club of Honolulu, and other community 
organizations. 
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Tape Nos. 22-9-1-92 and 22-10-1-92 
ORAL HISTORY INTERVIEW 
with 
Frederick P. Lowrey (FL) 
February 13, 1992 
Makiki, O'ahu 
BY: Warren Nishimoto (WN) 
WN: This is an interview with Fred P. Lowrey, on February 13, 1992, at his home in Makiki, 
O'ahu. The interviewer is Warren Nishimoto. 
Okay, why don't we get started. 
FL: Sure. 
WN: You know, Mr. Lowrey, why don't we start by having you tell me when you were born and 
where you were born. 
FL: Okay. I was born on November 11, 1911, which means my birthdate is 11-11-11, so I'll have 
a hard time forgetting that (laughs). 
WN: Was that planned at all? 
FL: Pretty hard to plan. 
(Laughter) 
FL: Pretty hard to plan, I suspect. 
WN: I knew someone who was a 10-10-10. 
FL: Really? 
WN: Yeah. 
FL: I'll be darned. 
WN: So now I'm looking for a 12-12-12. 
FL: Great, great, great. You'll probably find one. My father and mother had been married very 
early in 1911. I came along pretty soon after they were married. They were married in Santa 
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Rosa, California, where my mother lived, and then went down to the Grand Canyon for a 
honeymoon, then came right to Honolulu. And I guess by the time she got to Honolulu-well, 
not by the time she got to Honolulu, but within a month or two afterward, why, she knew she 
was hapai. I guess they decided when they first came not to buy a house right away. They 
stayed with my grandfather and grandmother, who lived at Lunalilo and Victoria Street. At 
that time, they had about half a block in there. It was right mauka of the W. R. Castle place, 
and it was kitty-corner from the Wickman house, and it was right below where the-oh god, 
can't think of the name of it. Anyway, (his son, Stanley Kennedy) started the Hawaiian 
Airlines, his family had a place in there. Anyway, Jim Dole (and his children) lived about a 
block away from there, and there was a large group of people lived in that area. 
Anyway, I was born in that house, in November of that year. They had already drawn plans 
for a house up Manoa. They'd bought a piece of property on what was then called Jones 
Street, later renamed because (people) didn't like the name Jones (laughs). And so they named 
it Alaula, which I understand in Hawaiian means running east and west, or running toward 
the sun, or something like that [lit. , early dawn light]. Anyway, it runs off Manoa Road, and 
it's parallel to East Manoa Road, one block makai. And they had plans for-the house wasn't 
finished at the time that I was born, so I was born down in the Lunalilo Street house. And 
then, very shortly after that though, and I'm not sure exactly when, certainly by the first of 
the following year, the family moved up Manoa, and I moved up there with 'em. And I lived 
up there on Alaula Way for all of my life, up to the time that I went away to college. And as 
a matter of fact, after coming back from college, and not knowing just what I wanted to do, 
and being unmarried at that time, I lived with them and paid 'em rent for a year and a half 
that I was there before I decided to go back to business school. When I came back:, I was 
married at the end of the time that I was at business school, which was in September of '37. 
And so when I got back: here, around November of '37, why, I'd written to my mother and 
father to see if they could find a house for us, and they found a house up in Nu'uanu. Geez, 
I've forgotten the name of it (Coelho Way). I could take you there, but I can't remember the 
name. Anyway, it was about halfway up Nu'uanu Valley, on the left, you turn off on one of 
those little lanes that runs in there. Nice, nice little place, and good location. And we were 
there for some months, and then I moved back: into Manoa into another house (on upper 
Manoa Road) before we started to build our own house up on the top of Maunalani Heights. 
But I'm getting ahead of .. . 
WN: Okay, tell me something about the house in Alaula Way. 
FL: This was an interesting house, it was built on the side of the hill, which was fairly steep 
there, so it had a fairly big basement in it. You had a quite a long flight of stairs, cement 
stairs going up to the first floor. And the first floor originally had a living room and then a 
sort of a separate living room that was joined to it, and a front entrance hallway that you went 
into through the front door. That was to the right on the mauka side. To the left was the 
dining room. And then there was a door into a pantry, and then into the kitchen from there. 
And then there was what we call the back hall, where, oh, we ate breakfast there sometimes, 
or grabbed an extra meal there and so on. And that house stayed the same for quite a few 
years. This was built in, say, finished in 1912-it wasn't really modified or expanded until 
about sometime in the late twenties, maybe '26, '27, '28. And then the living room, the two 
sort of parts of the living room were merged into one big room. And then they built a big 
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lanai [lanai] along the back. I guess my dad and mother had always had in mind that they 
wanted to add on to the back side, what we call the back side of the house, which would have 
been the 'Ewa side. And so as kids, my family were always very-well we had our chores to 
do around the house, and-which were, a lot of 'em were for free. In other words, this was 
our contribution. But on the other hand, if we did other jobs that they wanted us to do, why, 
then they'd pay us. Twenty-five cents an hour, or twenty cents an hour, something like that. 
And so they wanted the back of the house dug out. We were on top of a cinder cone there in 
Manoa Valley, and so it was relatively easing digging. And the material could be wheel-
harrowed-you'd dig it out, and shovel it into a wheelbarrow, then wheelbarrow it out and 
dump it. And the slope of the land was such that we could then create a terrace, flat terrace 
that went way out into the back. I guess the terrace must have been, oh, a hundred feet long, 
and so on, and the back of it-the hill was steep back there-so that the back of it must have 
been, oh, twenty or twenty-five feet high. And then we got into rock, quite a bit of rocky 
area so we couldn't go much deeper. And we did that as kids, and I remember my next 
brother to me was just two years younger, so we did a lot of that work. We didn't do it all. 
The family had other people come in, and do some work from time to time. 
WN: When you said chores, what kind of chores did you do for free? 
FL: Well, there was always our own room. There was always our own room that had to be kept 
up. And ... 
WN: Did you each have a room? 
FL: No, no. Let's see, my father and mother had a bedroom. And then there was a little bedroom 
alongside of them, which was always kept for the youngest, the baby in the family, and 
seeing there were six of us, why, that was pretty well taken (laughs) by others. So I don't 
ever remember living in that or sleeping in that room. There was another big bedroom on the 
second floor, and then what we call the big sleeping porch, which was out over the kitchen. 
And I think three of us lived out there. There was my brother, John, who came along next, 
and then Dwight was next. And then I had two sisters. We had to split up that way. So I 
guess the girls got the bedroom, and we kept the sleeping porch, and so on. When that was 
done, we added an extra bathroom in there, so that the girls had their bathroom, and we had 
ours. But the house was never enlarged very much, but it was, you know, ample. 
WN: Was it two stories? 
FL: Well, in a way, it was three stories, because it was built on the side of the hill, so there was a 
big basement. There was a large basement in it. The laundry was down there, and, you know, 
this was the days before washing machines. I can remember when we first bought a washing 
machine. So the laundry was originally done in tubs, and there were these great, big tubs that 
we had. And then there were long lines in the basement, in order to dry the clothes, inside 
the house and so on. I guess there were clotheslines outside, too. 
Then we had enough land surrounding it, so we always had a garden. And grew a lot of our 
own vegetables there, flowers. And there was lot of room for recreation. We had a, what we 
called the sand house. It was small structure with a roof on it and then a lot of sand in it. And 
this was great for small kids to play in, you know, as soon as they got to be one or two years 
439 
old, they'd go down and play in the sand there, and that sort of thing. And then we had other 
types of things. My family was always very good about our recreation-type facilities. For 
instance, they let us-we had to do it ourselves, usually. But for instance, they let us build a 
pit for high jumping and pole vaulting, and then, you know, we'd go down and buy the 
sawdust and the rice husk to put in there, to mix in the place, so we had our own high 
jumping and pole vaulting area. I was never very good at pole vaulting. 
(Laughter) 
FL: Or high jumping, I guess, probably. But my brother was not too bad at it. The neighborhood 
around us at that point had some fairly large homes, so that there was some fairly big areas, 
and they were always very good about letting us use those areas. So we played touch football, 
or baseball, and so on, often on other people's property. 
WN: Was the neighborhood mostly Haole? 
FL: At that time, I think so. The family that lived next door to us was Charlie Hemenway. You 
know him from the lOOth Infantry [Battalion], or the 442nd [Regimental Combat Team], I 
guess. He was a professor at the University of Hawai'i, and then went to A & B [Alexander & 
Baldwin], and then became, later, president of Hawaiian Trust Company. And he was always 
sort of a second father to me, wonderful guy, wonderful man. He had one son who 
unfortunately got pneumonia when he was about sixteen, seventeen, and died, and this was a 
terrible shock to him. I can remember being with him the day or two before, and I knew he was 
pretty sick, and he just never recovered from it unfortunately. But we-we were, well, he was a 
year or two older than I was, why, we were very friendly, so we did things together a lot. 
And there were a lot of other neighbors. We had the Hemenways on one side, there was a 
family named Sutton on the other side. He was an officer at Von Hamm-Young Company. 
Across the hill, on the other side, was Judge Lindsey, who had two children, both of whom 
have died. He was a chief justice of the Supreme Court here for years . Then, on the makai 
side was the Guard family. I don't know whether you know Jackie Guard-there were several 
Guard kids. 
WN: Guard? Did they go to Punahou [School]? 
FL: Yeah, they all went to Punahou. 
WN: Was that one-well, one of the Kingston Trio was a [Dave] Guard. 
FL: Well, that's (not) the same family. Let's see, there was a-I think there was a girl was the 
oldest, and I think she lives on Maui now, I've forgotten what her married name is. So you 
asked whether the neighborhood was largely Haole, I would say at that time quite definitely. 
Quite definitely. We were probably a, what, a mile or two from Punahou, and so we either 
rode our bikes to school, or we walked to school, generally, although there was a streetcar 
down on Manoa Road, and you could take the streetcar right to Punahou. But I remember 
walking a good part of the time. 
WN: And so most of the kids who lived there went to Punahou? 
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FL: No, not necessarily. There was a Burkland family. I don't know whether you know Reynolds 
Burkland. He was at A & B, and then did quite a bit of volunteer work at the Bishop 
Museum. I think he's pretty much fully retired from that now. And I, I don't remember their 
going to Punahou. I think they went to Roosevelt [High School]. So I think we had quite a 
mixture of kids there, and not all of them Punahou, by any means. 
WN: Tell me something about your grandfather [Frederick J. Lowrey], what you remember about 
him. 
FL: Well, he was really a wonderful man. He came down here-his sister had come down to 
Honolulu when she was sixteen years old. They were born in Pittsfield, Massachusetts. Why 
they left Pittsfield and moved to Oakland, California, I don't know, except I think it was too 
cold for 'em in Pittsfield. And they were looking for warmer weather. They may even have 
bad this, what I call Raynaud's reaction. It's family type of, hereditary type of an affliction. I 
know several of my cousins have it, so I know it's in the family. So I can, I'm drawing out a 
wild conclusion, but I suspect that they didn't like the cold and wanted to move. 
So, anyway, they moved to California from Pittsfield, Massachusetts, probably in the late 
fifties, 1850s, or maybe, probably, the sixties. And at the age of sixteen, my grandfather's 
older sister, her name was Ida, I-D-A, got a job, almost like a nanny, taking care of four 
young children who were coming to Honolulu with their parents. And their parents, the father 
and mother, were wise enough to know they were gonna be on this ship for three or four 
weeks, on the trip down here, and so they hired her, on some basis, to come down here with 
'em, and she took care of the kids. And they stayed here for something like six months, so 
she got to know a lot of the local people. My family were staunch Congregationalists, and of 
course, the missionaries down here were staunch Congregationalists, so she got to know a lot 
of the kids of them, probably went to the Congregational church here and all. And I guess 
among those that she met was W. R. Castle. She went back to California and was there for a 
couple of years. Then be got to be college age, and he went to Yale to college, I believe. 
Maybe Harvard, I'm not sure, one or the other. And then went to law school at Harvard, and 
then went to Columbia. This got to be along about 1875, and they were married. They had 
kept up a friendship from that time. The two of them had met down here, because he going 
back and forth to college would have to go through Oakland and take the train from Oakland, 
and I suppose they saw each other every time, or often when they went through. 
Anyway, they were married in Pittsfield, Massachusetts in '75, and he at that time had 
finished college. He had also gone to Columbia, to law school, in addition to Harvard, I 
think. And had a job with one of the law firms in New York, and that's why he couldn't get 
away to come back to Oakland to marry. So he got her to go to Pittsfield, where they had 
friends, and she had friends, and I guess there were some relatives still there, and they were 
married in Pittsfield, and then went back to New York. And they hadn't been back in New 
York for more than two or three months, when he got a letter from King [David] Kalakaua, 
as I remember this, asking him to come down here and be his attorney general for the 
Kingdom of Hawai'i. And he accepted it. And so they came down here to live, this is 1875. 
WN: What kind of contacts did he [W. R. Castle] have with King Kalakaua, prior to that? 
FL: I think that probably his father knew King Kalakaua. And the Castle family, as well as a lot 
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of the others, were, I guess, close to the royal family . (Many of the missionaries and other 
well-educated people held prominent cabinet positions in the Kingdom of Hawai ' i.) 
WN: Through the contacts with his mother, Ida, and his father? 
FL: Well, W. R. Castle, that's William Richards Castle, was the one who married Ida, and it was 
his father who probably knew Kalakaua, and Kalakaua, of course, may have known (W. R.) 
as a kid, and so on. I just don't know. I've asked some of the grandchildren. There's one 
grandchild here of that family still living, and I've asked him, but he knows nothing about 
that history, so I've never been able to fill in on that. 
WN: Okay, go on, sorry. 
FL: Anyway, W. R.-that's William Richards and Ida Lowrey Castle-came back here to live in, 
sometime before the middle of 1875. And she kept writing letters back to the family in 
Oakland, saying what a wonderful place it was, and what the opportunities were here, and so 
forth and so on. So my grandfather decided, gee, maybe this was the place to come to. He 
had finished grade school and had gone to, what at that time they called sort of a business 
school, which was almost like, sort of two years of high school, and he never finished high 
school, but he did fmish business school, and then had a job in San Francisco as a 
bookkeeper, as I remember it. And she kept writing, saying, "Come to Honolulu." 
So he wrote and indicated that he was willing to come and they offered him a job at Castle & 
Cooke, originally, but by the time that letter, which took four or more weeks to get back to 
the coast, and then his reply, which took another couple of weeks to get here, the job had 
been filled. In the meantime though, he started to Honolulu and got here, found that the job at 
Castle & Cooke was filled, so he looked around town and found a job at Lewers & Cooke. 
So he started in as a bookkeeper at Lewers & Cooke in 1879. And we know the exact date he 
started, because you can see his writing starting in the journals at Lewers & Cooke, and these 
journals are all out at the Bishop Museum. He was a person, apparently, who liked to keep 
records. He was a whiz at figures. He could take a column of figures, and go down it like 
this, and add it up, and come out (chuckles). As a matter of fact, I can tell you a story, that 
when Lewers & Cooke bought their first adding machine, he wouldn't trust it. 
(Laughter) 
FL: He made 'em do it manually, Oaughs) until he would trust an adding machine. And later on 
of course, why, he gave up doing it. But he just had one of those minds that could handle 
figures and so on that way. So anyway, he comes down here in '79, starts work, and then a 
year or two after that, a girl who I think he had known in Oakland, but we don't have much 
record on this, was called by the Kawaiaha'o Seminary to come down and teach at 
Kawaiaha'o Seminary, which was a school that the missionaries had set up through 
Kawaiaha'o Church, and so on. So she came down here and taught at Kawaiaha'o Seminary 
for a couple of years, and then Punahou apparently decided that she would be good at 
Punahou, and so she was hired away from Kawaiaha'o to Punahou, and became a second-
grade teacher at Punahou, and also was assistant principal of the lower school at Punahou. 
And then she and my grandfather were married, must have been in the early eighties then. I 
don't have that date in my memory. But now to get back to my grandfather, we had, the 
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family had a quite a close relationship, and they would come up to our house. They had a 
car, we didn't have a car until 1917 or '18, I think, my family was able to get a (Buick), first 
automobile. So they would come up and see us on Sundays, and that sort of thing. And then 
my grandmother got very interested in the things that later turned into the Outdoor Circle, 
and she was one of the ones who started the Outdoor Circle, was the president of it for the 
first, I think, five years. (She was also on the City Planning Commission.) 
WN: What was her name? 
FL: Her name was Cherilla, C-H-E-R-I-L-L-A, Cherilla Lillian Lowrey. 
WN: Okay. 
FL: And her maiden name was Storrs, S-T-0-double R-S. And to get back to my grandfather, 
why of course, I would see him down at Lewers & Cooke, if I were down there with my 
father, and would see him. They bad a chauffeur who they may have sent the car up and 
picked us up and we'd go down there for lunch, and so on. And then, in those days, you 
know, you didn' t have radio, you obviously didn't have TV, so you were always doing other 
types of things for recreation, and so on. And one of the things that the family liked to do 
was to go on picnics. And I can remember many, many picnics to all parts of this island, 
way, way back, when cars were completely open. You know, long before the days of glass on 
the cars, and if it rained, you had these side things you had to pull down, or put around to 
keep the water from coming in. 
And I can remember long trips to Waimanalo, and boy, the roads in those days were 
something. And the road to Waimanalo was very different from the road to Waimanalo today, 
went down different, went in back and down. But the beaches were wonderful, and there 
were some wonderful places to eat down there. The Waimanalo [Sugar] plantation, to protect 
the sugarcane from the winds, built a windbreak of ironwood trees, and that ironwoods trees 
were a wonderful place to go down for a picnic, because it was shady and so on. And I can 
remember several picnics down there. I can remember picnics down at Sunset Beach, and I 
remember it was so hot down there at times, you'd go in and you'd get under the bridge that 
went across the streams, and we'd eat in under there because it was so much cooler than 
trying to be out in the sun, and so on. 
And then another place that we drove to several times was Waimea [Bay] Beach, and those 
are the ones that just happen to come to mind. 
WN: Those are long hauls. I mean ... 
FL: They were. 
WN: ... in those days. 
FL: They were long, they were ali-day trips. You started out early in the morning, you didn't get 
back until dark. And the roads weren't all that good, they weren't paved in a lot of cases. 
And then as I got older, why, sometimes when my family would go off to the Mainland, and 
take the younger kids, they'd leave John and me, who, we're the two oldest, they'd leave me 
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with my grandfather. My grandmother died very suddenly in 1918 of a massive stroke, and so 
we lost her at that time, so I can remember staying with my grandfather. He was a very strict 
person, but with a strictness, he always had a twinkle in his eye, and he was always, you 
know, he was a very interesting (and gentle) person. I had a great admiration for him. 
(Even though it is now sixty to seventy years since these particular discussions took place, 
they are quite vivid in my mind.) 
(One of my first and foremost impressions of him is how careful he was about money 
matters. He was very strict in the sense of making us realize the responsibility of 
money-what we did, how we used it, and so on. For instance, he taught me my first lessons 
about the use of debt. He made the remark that all debts are always repaid. He meant by this 
that if the borrower does not repay the lender who loans the money, then the money is not 
repaid and the lender pays the bill to balance his account. In other words, the lender loses 
what he loaned. He pays the loan. And therefore, all loans are always repaid. This was one of 
my first lessons in money management and it has stuck with me ever since. And it is why 
when I was at college and started reading about Keynesian economics, I was very reluctant to 
accept the Keynesian theory and really never have and feel that it is why we have gotten 
ourselves into so much trouble since the 1930s when [President Franklin D.] Roosevelt started 
to use it.) 
(My grandfather was full of stories of old Hawai'i and so we got many glimpses of this through 
him. He also had one of the early electric runabouts here. It was an open car, electric, and the 
intriguing thing to me was that it didn't have a horn on it like most automobiles but had an 
electric bell on it. For some reason, this was always interesting to me.) 
(Another very clear recollection I have is his telling about how they paid the bills in the early 
days. Paper money and banks weren't all that normal, and while a lot of transactions were 
handled that way, a lot more were handled by cash. And he at Lewers & Cooke felt he 
wanted most of the bills to be paid by cash and he described the way that they did it. They 
put either gold or silver coins in a wheelbarrow and went around from place to place and paid 
their bills that way. This was a very interesting memory of the days from late 1880s when he 
started until banking and checking and so on became a lot more acceptable.) 
(Many of his stories also were related to the Lewers & Cooke sailing vessels. Lewers & 
Cooke, being in the merchandise business and bringing in a significant part of the lumber, 
had to have transportation, and in its early years had no ships of its own so had to charter or 
get space aboard a ship to bring its lumber in. But then sometime in the sixties or seventies, 
they bought a barkentine ship by the name of Hope, H-0-P-E. She, however, burned in 1889 
and so was lost, and Lewers & Cooke was in a problem. Fortunately, however, several of the 
partners of Lewers & Cooke had-and some, perhaps, nonpartners-had contracted with a 
company in Seattle to build first the Robert Lewers and a year or so later, the Alice Cooke. 
These were four-masted sailing ships with a fore and aft rig and were very adaptable to the 
Hawaiian trade. Running before the wind to Hawai'i but having to beat back the windward 
were more efficient than the square-rigger type vessels that more often had been used. The 
Robert Lewers was, I believe, delivered in 1889, and the Alice Cooke was delivered in 1891. 
They were pretty much sister ships with the exception of the rigging of the spanker 
mast-that's the last of the four masts. The Robert Lewers had a gaff rig, but the Alice Cooke 
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was rigged with a fore and aft, but no gaff, but had then what was called a ringtail topsail, 
which gave her the full sail complement of the Robert Lewers, but she was easier to handle 
running before the wind, was easier to bring her about.) 
(As the First World War began to come about, the American Hawaiian Steamship Company 
which supplied Hawai'i with a lot of its materials either had to or did withdraw some of its 
ships from Hawai'i, leaving Hawai'i with an inadequate shipping capacity. So, Lewers & 
Cooke, in 1913-by the way, the company at that time only had eighty employees, giving you 
some idea of the size of the company at that time-but the company bought a three-masted 
schooner by the name of Repeat. She was called a baldheaded schooner in that she had no 
topsails. She was much smaller than the other ships, the Robert Lewers and the Alice Cooke, 
but she was able to enter many of the smaller lumber ports on the Pacific Coast and did a 
great job for the company during the war. The Repeat was sold during the latter part of 
World War I, leaving the company with just the two four-masted sailing schooners, the 
Robert Lewers and the Alice Cooke.) 
(I think I showed you paintings of the two that are on my wall here. I was fortunate in being 
able to pick these up from Champion Paper Company when they liquidated all their operations 
in Honolulu and have enjoyed them ever since. They have always been very meaningful to me 
because as a little kid I used to see these pictures on the wall. And one of the things the 
family was always interested in was the movement and the arrival of these ships because it 
meant the arrival of new inventory for sale and talks with the captain and other crew members 
who we, in a way, got to know.) 
('The ships were a great asset to the company during the years that they ran, but there were 
major problems. At one time one of the captains was swept overboard in a storm and lost at 
sea. And there were other accidents aboard the ships, which were, of course, problems. The 
Robert Lewers sailed from the time she was delivered in 1889 until approximately the early 
twenties, when she unfortunately tried to get into the Straits of Juan de Fuca and was not able 
to make headway against the storm. The tug had been called and came out to try and pick her 
up, but the tug was never able to get a line aboard her and she ended up on the rocks on the 
southwestern coast of British Columbia, Vancouver Island, and was a complete wreck. All the 
crew were saved, but the vessel was a complete loss. The Alice Cooke continued to sail until 
about the middle twenties when unfortunately she ran into a very severe storm off the 
Columbia River and the port of Astoria and was severely damaged to such an extent that the 
company had the ship towed to Astoria and she was never used to haul lumber again but was 
sold to an Alaskan ship cannery and used as a barge platform.) 
(In the meantime, after the war, needing a greater lumber capacity, the company bought a 
used four-masted schooner, the Commodore, in about 1920 or '21, and the Commodore was 
quite a bit larger than either the Robert Lewers or the Alice Cooke, carrying approximately a 
million-and-a-half feet of lumber against the million feet that the other two had carried. And 
the Commodore operated successfully all during the twenties and into the early thirties. But 
beginning in the thirties with labor problems starting and stevedore problems on the Pacific 
Coast in the Pacific Coast ports, it got more and more difficult to be sure whether we could 
get lumber, number one, and if we got it aboard, when we would get it to Honolulu. About 
1935 the company decided to give up the last schooner, the Commodore, and she was sold to 
the Matson Navigation Company, and the company then used Matson to bring in all of their 
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lumber from the Pacific Coast with the following exception. There were ports from northern 
California through Oregon and Washington that were where the bar and the channel going 
into the lumber loading docks were so shallow that the Matson lumber ships could not get in . 
So, arrangements were made with barge companies to go in, pick up the lumber, and then a 
tug would pick up the barge and bring the barge to Honolulu. This was done to some extent 
but was never a great part of the lumber trade coming into the Islands, as far as Lewers & 
Cooke was concerned. Later on, other companies used barges to a greater extent.) 
(Finishing up with the schooners, on a more personal note, my father tells the story that one 
of his early boyhood recollections was a party given aboard the schooner Alice Cooke in 1891 
after her arrival in Honolulu on her maiden voyage. The party was given by Mr. and Mrs. 
Clarence M. Cooke for their daughter Alice for whom the ship was named. Alice Cooke later 
married Philip E. Spalding, who was at one time a vice president of Lewers & Cooke before 
leaving Lewers & Cooke and moving over to C. Brewer & Co., where I think he stayed until 
his death many years later.) 
(Two other personal recollections, which may be of interest. Believe it or not, my brother 
John and I saw our first snow and ice aboard the Commodore. This may be hard for you to 
believe, but what happened was that the lumber would be cut and stored in the Pacific 
Northwest. And in the wintertime with the weather well below freezing point, the lumber got 
extremely cold. And then it was loaded aboard the schooner in this very cold condition. Then 
it might snow during the operation. So that when the ship arrived here and they took off the 
deck cargo, why, that had probably thawed out during the thirty days or so at sea coming 
down. That was about the average time it took. Some trips were as slow as twenty-three or 
-four days, and some might last as long as thirty-five to thirty-six days. Anyway, the deck 
cargo would thaw out, but when they broke into the hatches and started to unload the cargo 
below deck, why, there was some snow and some ice. And so, here were two little Hawaiian 
kids, my brother and I, we'd go down there to see the ship and visit and see how the 
unloading was coming along. And below the decks, here was snow and ice. So this was our 
first experience of seeing that, at least on the ground. We might have seen it at a distance on 
Mauna Kea or Mauna Loa, and so on.) 
(Just one other piece of information. In the summer that my father or the time that my father 
told me that he could no longer cover any further costs on my college, I guess was after my 
first year, I looked around to see what I could do about earning my way through. And it 
seemed to me that it was going to be pretty difficult job to do, and I thought, well , the better 
thing to do at that time was to come back to Honolulu and try and get some sort of a job 
here. So, we drove across the continent, which only cost us twenty dollars the way we did 
it-dividing up the cost amongst four guys-and then I was able to get transportation from 
San Francisco to Seattle on a freighter and that cost me, as I remember it, twelve dollars. I 
went down to Tacoma where the Commodore was loading and had already made arrangements 
for me to come down as a working hand, ship's boy or something, anyway, to be of some 
help. And so I helped out during the loading process around Tacoma. Also spent quite a bit of 
time in the mill that was cutting the lumber for the vessel so that I learned something about 
logging and lumber operations of milling and so on, and the loading of the vessels. And then 
I came down aboard the Commodore. We finished loading late on a Friday, as I remember it. 
And on a Saturday, we called for the tug to pick us up in the morning. And we had to test the 
compasses and so on, so the tug moved us around various places as we tested the compass to 
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make sure that they were all right. And then the tug hauled us from there up Puget Sound 
past Seattle and then out the Straits of Juan de Fuca. And very late that Saturday afternoon, 
probably four or five o' clock, the tug cut us loose about thirty miles off Tatouch Light, which 
was the marking point for the south shore of the Straits of Juan de Fuca.) 
(So we were under sail at that point and started out, hopefully, to Honolulu. But that night 
was a dead calm and (chuckles) the dead calm continued for one full week. And the following 
Saturday night, we could still see Tatouch Light, which meant that we had moved in and out 
with the tides for seven days and made no progress whatsoever toward Honolulu. Fortunately, 
however, the winds came up that night and we were off to Honolulu and had a pretty good 
trip until we got off the north coast of Moloka'i, north of Kalaupapa, at which point we ran 
into another case of no wind. Of course, Lewers & Cooke in Honolulu knew the ship was 
there and they (chuckles) at this point needed the lumber bad enough so that they sent a tug 
out to pick us up. And it was a very enjoyable moment to have the Mikioi or whichever one 
of the other tugs it was come alongside and have Jack Young, who was skipper of the tug, 
wave to us and get their line aboard and tow us from Kalaupapa into Honolulu.) 
(I don't seem to have any recollection as to just how long that took, but it was a fascinating 
trip to be aboard one of these schooners and see how they operated. They had no power 
whatsoever aboard except a steam winch which could be used to haul sails up and down and 
that sort of thing if necessary. We had no cold storage. The iceboxes were filled with meat 
and so on, but they were such that they only lasted for about three days. And then, all of our 
fresh meat was gone and we lived on salt pork and salt meat, beans, and other cereals and so 
on for the trip. It's really interesting what you can do with some of those products and make 
very worthwhile and enjoyable meals out of them. I learned to like beans and have always 
liked them since as a result of that trip. But it was a real experience to see how lumber was 
brought down in the old days. And of course, at that time, we still were using the 
Commodore, but it was only a few years later that the labor problems and other considerations 
made it worthwhile to sell her. Another very important consideration in selling the 
Commodore was that she brought in a million-and-a-half feet, which was a significant part of 
our year's sales. And if she made four trips a year, which was the best that she ever did, 
why, our lumber came in in four chunks during the year, which made handling inventory 
extremely difficult and it meant we would run out of certain things and also it was harder and 
harder at that time to find mills in the Northwest who could take the Commodore and fill her 
from their docks. So that when you added the inventory problems, the unknown delivery 
problems, and the labor problems, and so on, it made it probably very wise that the company 
sold the Commodore within a year or two after that trip that I was fortunate to go on her.) 
But anyway, coming back to my grandfather, I remember spending one part of one summer 
with him, my brother and I, John and I. And it was a very interesting summer because it gave 
me a very different perspective on-instead of a father, you had a grandfather back and a lot 
more history involved and so on. He was a really wonderful gentleman. He was very 
interested not only in Lewers & Cooke, but (in all aspects of the world). I think he was one 
of the original stockholders and started O'ahu Sugar Company. I know W. R. Castle, who 
was his brother-in-law and they lived next door to each other, was instrumental as one of the 
founders of 'Ewa Plantation and I think my grandfather had something to do with O'ahu 
Sugar Company. I know he was an officer of it and director that time. 
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And also, he had something to do with the Waiahole tunnel. Because I've seen pictures of the 
opening of the Waiahole tunnel, which brought water through the mountains. It was the first 
tunnel that was put through-well, I guess it's the only tunnel through the mountains-still 
operating. And the only way you could grow sugar on the O'ahu [Sugar Co.] lands was to get 
water. And so this was the whole reason for putting that tunnel through. And these guys, they 
took fantastic risks. I don't think you and I would even consider. Imagine going out and 
drilling a puka through the mountains to get water to start a plantation. I don't know the 
history of all of that. It's all probably been written up many times, but anyway, he always had 
interesting stories like this to tell us. 
WN: Did he spend a lot of time at Lewers & Cooke? 
FL: Did he? 
WN: Yeah. 
FL: Oh, he stayed there until practically the day he (could not walk any longer). He gave up the 
active title. . . . No, let me rephrase that. He gave up his responsibility for the active 
management about 1928 and my father was made manager, but my grandfather was still 
president. My father was vice president and manager at that time. And then .... I'm not sure 
when he retired as president. Maybe in this book . . . 
WN: They have. . . . 
FL: It's in that book. 
WN: Well, 1903 to '41. And your father took over in 1941 as president. 
FL: You're right, you're right. So he must have .... Sometime around 1928 or '29, he gave up 
the, more or less, the active management to my father, but he stayed on, as you say, you're 
right. It's in this book here, too. This is the same one that you saw the other day. 
WN: It's One Hundred Years of Building in Hawai'i. 
FL: Yeah, yeah. 
WN: Okay. Let me turn the tape. 
END OF SIDE ONE 
SIDE TWO 
WN: (Taping distorted.) So, you started Punahou [School] from the time you were . . .. 
FL: I started Punahou when I was five years old, so it must have been around fall of 1916 or fall 
of 1917. And in the first grade, we were-Bishop Hall was still where the first grade was at 
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that time. And I can remember very well the room where I first went to school there. We 
stayed in that building until, let's see, first , second, third, fourth , fifth , sixth grade. So 
through all six grades, we were in that Bishop Hall. That building now has been completely 
torn down quite a few years ago and there' s another building in its place now. 
Seventh grade was up where the present elementary school is now. It actually was an old-1 
think it was part of a dormitory system. In those days, lot of the kids lived on the plantations 
around. They couldn't come in every day. No transportation. All the kids on the neighbor 
islands, there were no schools to go to there that would prepare them for college and so on in 
the way they apparently wanted to be. And so Punahou had a large dormitory system, one for 
girls and one for boys. And the boys' part was later given up about the time that, I guess, I 
went into seventh grade because seventh grade was up at this other .... I can't remember the 
name of the dormitory at the moment. And the girls' dormitory was kept for many years after 
that 'cause it was still in existence when I finished high school at Punahou. So I was there for 
seventh and eighth grade, maybe ninth, and then we moved down to Pauahi Hall, which has 
now just been renovated, for, I guess, ten, eleven and twelve. And then there were a couple 
of surrounding buildings there that have been tom down. They were all wooden buildings at 
that time. They've been torn down and new modem buildings have been put in. 
So, those were my high school years. They were reasonably happy years with a good group 
of guys. The athletics were great. I never was an athlete in any way, but I went out for track 
and cross-country, I guess. And gee, I don't remember all, but I do remember that I never 
was good enough to take a win or place and so on. Ginley Crozier-! don't know if you 
remember the name or not. Ginky Crozier was the track coach at Punahou in those days. He 
decided that having three or four places was bunk, so he always ran his meets where there 
were twelve places that counted. (Chuckles) So the guys who were as good as twelfth, at least 
they felt they'd won a place. I never even won a twelfth place, I once came in thirteenth. 
(Laughter) 
WN: Just missed out. 
FL: (Laughs) Just missed out. But those were really happy years. School was always kind of 
tough for me. My grades were never all that good. I did well in math. English was difficult. 
Latin, French, and English were really difficult. I remember my college board grades were 
horrible, except in math. In math, in geometry, I got a 90-those days, they marked on the 
basis of 100. Now, they mark on the basis of 800 or something. So I remember getting a 93 
on my college board in geometry. When it came to algebra, I found that algebra and I didn't 
get along together very well. (Laughs) I wasn't as good in algebra. But then we got into solid 
geometry and trigonometry, I got a 93 or 94 in my college board exam. So my mind worked 
in spatial relationships like trigonometry and geometry and so on, but when it came to the 
theory or philosophy or whatever involved in algebra, I wasn't very good at it. And the same 
thing came through in college. When I went to college, I took analytical geometry and I did 
very well in it. Then I got into calculus and I damn near flunked it. I don't know, my mind 
just didn't function in that area. 
But the Punahou years were, you know, it was a happy time of growing up. Relations in the 
family were all good. We had cousins at Punahou and second cousins at Punahou. Of course, 
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at least you knew almost everybody. Of course, the school was much smaller. And I think our 
class only had something like eighty people in it. So we got to know people very well. And 
the family by that time had a car, maybe two cars . So we could borrow the car, or one of my 
friends would get a car and we'd go off bodysurfing around the island (on weekends). I never 
was very good at surfboarding. But we bodysurfed all over. The boards in those days were 
very different. They were made out of redwood and they were very heavy. And they were too 
heavy to carry. They had automobiles and all this sort of thing. So we just said, you know, 
the heck with surfboarding, we'd go bodysurfing because there was bodysurfing all around 
the island, different places. We went to Waikiki, yeah, sure, I had a surfboard at Waikiki. I 
think I was a member of the Outrigger [Canoe] Club for a while. If not, we had friends who 
had beach places out there and you could leave your surfboard out there with them. I 
remember the family had a friend. I think he was the head of one of the big railroad 
companies in the East, and he had a stroke. And he came down here to live, and he got the 
front cottage at the Halekiilani, and he kept it for months. And so he enjoyed having us come 
out there, and let us keep our surfboards out there. 
WN: While you were at Punahou, did you have any idea of what you were going to be doing? I 
mean, was it tracked for you by your father and grandfather that you were gonna take over, 
at that early time? 
FL: I think there was a certain amount of that in it, but-and I think maybe, I think I more or less 
sort of felt that that was a responsibility, sort of. But when I went away to college, I began to 
get very different ideas, and I looked for jobs on the Mainland, and sought jobs on the 
Mainland, and had offers on the Mainland, and I remember when I finished college, I 
definitely had the idea that I was going to stay there. But whether my father sort of got wind 
of this or not, I don't know. My uncle, Sherwood, who is Dad's next brother to him, was 
then treasurer of American Factors. And I remember going to dinner one night with my aunt 
and uncle, in Boston. And after dinner, we were sitting around, and he turned to me, and he 
said, "Fred, what are your ideas on work after you finish?" 
And I said, "Well, I haven't made up my mind yet." I said, "I sort of would like to stay in 
the East and work for a while, and sort of prove myself and maybe try something different." 
And he turned to me in a very sort of a, almost sort of a commanding way, and said, 
"Look," he said, "things back in Honolulu are very bad at this point." He said, "You were 
told by your father three years ago that he couldn't afford to give you any more money, and 
you've been on your own and working your way through., And he said, "Things at Lewers 
& Cooke are pretty bad." And he says, "Your father needs your help." And he said, "I think 
that it's up to you to come back," and so on. 
Well, that was kind of a thunderbolt to me, because I hadn't made up my mind to come back. 
But then, all of this guilt sort of came back, as if, you know, well, gee, it's my obligation, 
maybe, to go back and help my dad. 
(Taping stops, then resumes on next tape.) 
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END OF SIDE TWO 
TAPE NO. 22-10-1-92; SIDE ONE 
WN: Okay. 
FL: Anyway I, as a result of that discussion with him, I sort of felt that, that I really had to come 
back, and Dad did come back to my graduation. And I guess at that time, I had written him 
and said that I would come back. And so he was East on business and came up to graduation, 
and he went back to Honolulu right away, and a group of us drove across the continent. As 
we did, whenever somebody would have a car, we'd drive across. And it was by far the least 
expensive way to go, because we could drive night and day by rotating. Take four guys, 
you'd have, the idea was to have two guys in the front seat, two guys in the back. One guy 
driving, he never drove for more than an hour. The guy that was sitting next to you would be 
the guy who was gonna drive next. And he would keep an eye on you to make sure you 
didn't go to sleep. And two guys in the back of the car had already had their tum at driving 
and got what sleep as they could in the back. And then we just more or less drove, sometimes 
twenty-four hours a day (chuckles). And we'd go across the continent in three days. Even in 
those days, when the roads were not all that good. 
Well, anyway, to answer your question, so I came back to Honolulu, and the first job they 
gave me was to start taking inventories. We had so many items of merchandise-it was in the 
thousands-because we had hundreds of tools, or literally, maybe a thousand different tools. 
We had plumbing supplies, we had all builder's hardware. All the types of things that went 
into builder's hardware in those days. All the things that made up locks. And in those days, 
you didn't have locks like you do now, they were made up from other parts to some extent. 
And then, we were in the lumber business, we were in the glass business. We had a pretty 
broad range. We were even in the wallpaper business in those days. We even had wallpaper. 
Now, I guess wallpaper has come back, nowadays, but it went out I know. We even had 
rugs, we sold rugs. We sold Chinese rugs. We sold Persian rugs, and so on. That was out of 
my field, though, that was too much for me. 
But anyway, I was-so we took our inventories four times a year, at three-months interval, 
because to take it all at once, you would have had to shut down the whole organization. So by 
taking quarterly, we had an inventory crew that sort of did this work, and they sort of put me 
into that, and trained me to do that. So for the first five quarters that I was at Lewers & 
Cooke, I did nothing really, but take inventories. But it was one hell of a good way to get 
experience in knowing something about the materials and what we carried and what I was 
going to have to sell for the rest of my life if I stayed at Lewers & Cooke. 
WN: Now, this is in '34, after ... 
FL: This was in '34. So I got back-we were married in-wait, wait a minute, I wasn't married 
then. 
WN: Yeah. 
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FL: I came back here. I came back here right out of college. And so I got back here, I suppose 
sometime in June, and I worked in June-here, I wrote this down to keep it straight. I came 
back here in June, probably started work in June of '34, when I got back. Maybe June, July, 
or August. And I worked the rest of that year and 1935, and I could see that Lewers & 
Cooke, having gone through the depression, we're just barely beginning to see the signs of 
coming out of the depression. And we had taken a horrible licking. Lewers & Cooke almost 
went broke. City Mill did go into receivership, at that time. Only at that time, they didn't, the 
bank took 'em over, and put their own man in to help run it, and pulled City Mill out. And 
we were all in real deep difficulty at that time. There just wasn't enough business to go 
around. I'm afraid we're headed for the same damned thing again, right now. I mean, I think 
we're at the beginning of it. But, that's another story. 
WN: So the depression really affected the business. 
FL: Oh yeah! My brother, Dwight, who-that's Dwight H. Lowrey-who went to work first for 
the Bank of Hawai'i, and then was at Cooke Trust Company. And then when Cooke Trust 
Company merged with First Hawaiian [Bank], he moved over with them. He later retired as 
an officer of First Hawaiian. I remember Dwight telling me this story, that Dad came home 
one night, and said if we hadn' t gotten a sale of a little over a thousand dollars today, we 
would've been on the verge of being broke. And that's how serious the thing was. And so, in 
thinking back, it was probably that sort of thing that triggered my uncle to-when he came 
back on business-to see me, and tell me how serious the situation was, and that my father 
needed help, and he thought that I ought to come back to Honolulu, and go to work there. 
Rather than stay in the East, and get the extra experience in the East. 
WN: Was it unique, the depression on your business, was that unique to that type of business? 
FL: I missed you on that. 
WN: You know, the depression affecting building supplies . . . 
FL: Right. 
WN: ... business. Was that a unique thing to businesses . .. 
FL: Oh, I think all businesses were very seriously affected here, some more than others . I think a 
lot went out of business during that time, but I don't know, because I wasn't here. See, I 
wasn't here from '29 to '34. But things were very, very slow when I came back in '34. On 
the other hand, I could see being young and having decided I was gonna come back here and 
go to work, I wasn't going to sit back and do nothing. My job was to try and, you know, 
take this company and move it forward, even though I was just a lowly inventory clerk at that 
time. Having gone to Harvard, I graduated from Harvard with honors, so I must have done 
reasonably well. But my ambition, if I was gonna come back here, was to do something with 
this. And to make a career out of it. And so I studied our situation, really night and day. I 
lived with the family. And while I, you know, I went out and dated, and all of this sort of 
stuff during that time, I spent a lot of time studying where Lewers & Cooke could go, how 
soon we were gonna come out of the depression, how best to try and bring it out of the 
depression. And try and give as much ingenuity and new thinking to the company, because, 
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you know, they'd been through the depression. It really knocked 'em out. It was like a real 
bad body blow. And so, I came back, though, fresh from that, not having experienced it, and 
so my job, as I felt, was to do everything I possibly could to find ways and means of starting 
to expand the business where we could see opportunities. So I immediately talked to Dad 
about bringing in new, younger guys who had good experience and had capabilities of moving 
ahead and moving up the line. And so we started gradually hiring during that latter part of 
'34, and also '35. We hired several very capable guys who later went on to become vice 
presidents and actually presidents of subsidiary companies, that we hired at that time. So I 
think we did a fairly commendable job of picking out kids, and so on. One was Gibby 
Rietow. I don't know whether you knew the Rietow family here now. Gibby was a very 
capable guy. He started in at that time. 
WN: R-1-T-0? 
~I.: R-1-~-T-0-W. 
WN: Oh, okay. 
~I.: And he was tied in with the Gibson family. I think his mother-! don't know whether his 
mother was a Gibson. R. Gibson Rietow, I remember, was Gibby's name. And be 
unfortunately died after he retired, of cancer of the jaw. Very, very sad story. Gibby, in the 
whole time that he was at l.ewers & Cooke, which was probably forty-something years, never 
lost a day of work. But he smoked a pipe, and the day that he retired, he got word from the 
doctor that he had cancer of the jaw. And I remember the dinner party that had been arranged 
for him at that time. And I went and he and his wife were there, and I noticed that they were 
kind of subdued, and so on. And I didn't know, of course, at that time what it was. And I 
only found out later. But I think Gibby lived for about two or three years. But, oh god, 
cancer of the jaw is awful. I never would go through it. I would find some way to make an 
exit to, rather than go through that kind of thing. And, Gibby, he was tough. 
Anyway, we hired several guys that went all the way on up the ladder. Others left us. I 
always felt that I never kept a guy, or never urged a guy to stay at l.ewers & Cooke, unless 
we were absolutely sure that we had the right spot for him and that he was sure to be able to 
move on up the ladder. I always felt it was wrong to tell a guy to stay on, unless I was sure 
of that, or unless the others in the company were sure of that, because, you know, if he 
wanted to go out and try something else, I felt that he should have that opportunity. And that 
a manager or a boss should never hold somebody back, say, give him the runaround, and say, 
"Well, you know, you're gonna get promoted, or we'll give you a raise," and so on, and 
keep him on, unless you could really be sure that that was gonna be. So we did lose. We did 
lose several guys who went on to do very well in other companies. But at the same time, I'll 
never regret it, because I never was sure that we could take care of those guys. 
Anyway, in 1935, in my zeal to try and get some of these things going, I made a lot of-well, 
I stirred up a lot of trouble. And a lot of the old-timers, who had unfortunately gotten into 
their ways of things during the depression, and so on-which I don't criticize them for-but, 
they weren't able to bring themselves out of it and see the opportunities. And so I came 
along, here I was, a fresh, young kid, and the boss' son, which made it all that much more 
difficult. I got myself into trouble with a lot of the guys up the line. 
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WN: So, I mean, what was-what changed? I know you said you brought in some new people, but 
what else? 
FL: Well, okay, several things. I saw the need right away, that we were stymied. I put a map out 
here for you. At that time, I could see that we were absolutely limited as to expansion. 
WN: You were over in, on Queen Street. 
FL: We were on King Street, 177 South King Street. And we were really stymied. Here we were 
at 177 South King Street, we had had a lumberyard property years before down at Iwilei, but 
that had been tied in with the fact that in those days, the lumber to the plantations all moved 
by railroad. So when the railroad started to [decline], and the trucking started to come in, we 
gave up that property, and it was leased property anyway, we gave that up. So we didn't own 
that property. (We leased) the headquarters here at King Street. And right down here a few 
blocks, at Kawaiaha'o and Cooke Street, we had our warehouse, and lumberyard. Kawaiaha'o 
and Cooke Street was the warehouse, and, let's see, Queen and Punchbowl was where we had 
our lumberyard. It's right where the state transportation office building is. 
WN: Oh, okay. 
FL: State transportation ... 
WN: Oh, Queen and Punchbowl, all right. 
FL: Yeah. That was Lewers & Cooke property, we owned that. 
WN: So you had three then, at that time. 
FL: We had three locations. 
WN: Three locations. 
FL: But we were limited there, because everything had grown up around us, and the civic center 
was moving right into us. And we knew if we didn't get out, that, you know, they'd condemn 
the property. And I could see that in 1934, it was clear enough to me then. So besides 
building personnel to take care of the future, I saw the need of building capital and also 
expanding our land. And while I didn't have anything to do with any planning, and we didn't 
have any planning organization-I'm more or less the sort of, just did it on my own. I've 
always loved to plan. I've always liked it, comes sort of naturally to me. So I saw this, I saw 
this all. And I said, "You know, if I'm gonna come back here, and this is gonna be my 
career, I gotta have somewhere to move to. I can't stay here and be frozen in by the limits of 
the land that we own." (Lewers and Cooke was not psychologically prepared to consider land 
expansion in 1935.) 
(In 1935) we had first made progress in increasing our staff with capable people that could 
move ahead, and also young guys who hadn't been burdened by the tremendous depression 
that everybody went through. You know, the depression is not only depression in business, 
but it's a depression mentally, because your salary is cut. For instance, the reason my father 
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wrote me the letter in college-and I remember the letter. He said, "Fred, I've had to cut 
salaries." He said, "My salary was, as president of Lewers & Cooke, was $12,000." He said , 
"I felt it was my obligation to take the biggest cut, so I cut my pay 25 percent." He said , "I 
took my next echelon of people and I cut them 20 percent. The next echelon, we cut 15 
percent." And then I think everybody below that was cut lO percent. 
And that's the only way we survived, was by cutting expenses that way, and not rehiring, so 
that our number of employees dropped during that period of time. But we tried our best to 
keep as many people as we could, during that time. (One other very important improvement 
which developed out of taking inventories for a year, was the realization of how little we 
knew we had in stock, or how much we had on order and on the way, and sales of each item 
in inventory. So, during 1935 we began the development of a perpetual inventory and daily 
sales-card record system. IBM does it automatically for you today; but we had to do it 
manually day by day, but this was fifty-seven years ago. It was a great sales help. We were 
following the market closely and were more likely to have ordered something and had it in 
stock in a growing community. It also made actual inventories easier to take. Ordering was 
triggered and we knew what we had on the way and what we had in stock. Slow-moving 
items could be cut back on. Our inventory dollar was more efficiently invested. This system 
kept us in touch with the market and allowed for faster price changes to fit conditions and 
increases or decreases in inventories as the building cycle kept changing.) 
WN: Did-you were more or less put in charge of the land acquisition? 
FL: Well, I wasn't put in charge until after I came back from college, I mean from [Harvard] 
Business School, and at that time, I recommended that we form a formal planning committee. 
And the directors did that, and they put me in charge of it, but that wasn't until after business 
school (in late 1937 and early 1938). (In 1935 I had attempted to do too much too fast, but 
we did get things underway.) -
WN: So prior to business school, you were more or less in inventory (and inventory controls). 
FL: (Yes.) Oh, and the other thing that bothered me was that our equipment, I felt, was old, and 
not really up to date. And so I put in a argument that we increase our equipment and try and 
get some more modem equipment and so on, which we did. And then other guys carried that 
on, while I was away at school [1936-37] (and put the perpetual inventory control system to 
good use). 
(Getting approval to put in a fairly uniform inventory and buying control system in a 
hurry-because it was badly needed for maximization of the profit control of our inventory 
dollars-did antagonize some of our merchandise department heads who had for years handled 
their buying in their own informed and individual ways. This made it difficult for top 
management to supervise or control assigned inventory dollars. So I ran into disagreements 
with old-time department heads .) 
(We also completely modernized the whole first floor sales display. It was widely 
complimented by our customers. But again, being in overall charge of it, it had to cause some 
friction with individual merchandising department heads. So again to get it done caused some 
friction even though the overall efficiency of the total display area was greatly improved. But 
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I had to keep pushing to get these improvements agreed to by old-timers who had done their 
thing their way for many years.) 
So I got into trouble with a lot of these other people. And I went to my father, and I talked it 
over, and I said, "'Dad, you know, I'm in trouble with these other people . ., 
He says, "'Yes, I know . ., And he says, "'I'm a little bit concerned about it . ., 
(Laughter) 
FL: But I said, "'You asked me to come back here to help." And I said, "'I've tried to do it, and 
I'm sorry that I've stirred up too much trouble." And I said, "'Maybe the best thing for me to 
do is to ask for a leave of absence." 
And he said, "'Well, what have you got in mind?" 
And I said, "'Well, I'll ask for a leave of absence to go back to business school." Then I said, 
"'It's a way of getting me out of here, legitimately, and it won't cause too much trouble. 
You've got younger fellows in, that we've brought in, who can help you, and do some of the 
things that I've been doing. And others, you'll find while I'm away at business school, and 
hire them. And then, while I'm at business school, why, I can learn all the things that I think 
I need to if I should want to come back here, or if things are such that I decide I don't want 
to come back here, why, you're still moving ahead and we've at least laid the groundwork 
with the staff growth and with the major (improvements in inventory control) that we'd made. 
And with the equipment and so on. At least you've got the opportunities now, to grow . ., 
Which we didn't have before we started this. (We could add to our warehouse buildings and 
look for more space.) 
So I put in for a leave of absence and I left in December of '35, and went back to business 
school. And arrived back there in January, and they had at business school, what they call the 
extra session. So many guys who went to business school, didn't like it, or couldn't make the 
grade, that by December, a lot of guys had dropped out, or they fired a lot of guys, so they 
had what they called an extra session. And you started in, in January, and then you went right 
through the summer. You didn't get any summer vacation, and the next year, you started in 
your second year. So I got into what was called the extra session, in January of 1936. So 
went through that summer. I couldn't afford to come home that (short one month) summer, so 
I (made a trip West and called on several Lewers & Cooke suppliers). And then, went to 
business school again and finished in 1937, but I did not graduate. They flunked me out. 
(Chuckles) 
I think the reasons were twofold. One was that I sort of thought that I had an idea as to what 
I wanted to do, because of my Lewers & Cooke work, and the things that I wanted to (spend) 
my time (on). And then also, I met a girl that I was quite interested in. We got engaged 
sometime (in 1937). 
WN: You were married in '37, though, right. 
FL: That's right, I went back in '36, so I met her when I got back there. I had known her when I 
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was in college, but it was no thought of anything other than, you know, just friends at that 
time. So we were engaged, I think, probably in early '37. And then we were married in 
September of '37. She had a car, and so we drove the car across the continent, and brought it 
out here. And we took a month driving across the continent, had a wonderful time. And then 
brought the car down here. 
So we got back here, and I started work here again in, probably November of 1937. 
WN: Were any-did you notice any changes between '35, when you left, and '37 when you came 
back? 
FL: Yeah, we had hired some additional guys, couple very capable. One went on to become 
assistant treasurer. But then he left us and went out on his own. And several others. I can't 
remember 'em all now. But we did have a-with bigger staff. Things had changed a lot 
during that time, in that the whole attitude had changed and there was more of a feeling of 
expansion, business was beginning to pick up. 
WN: The effects of the depression were ... 
FL: Well, it wasn't over, by any means. We really had a hard time in '38. And even toward the 
end of '38, things weren't all that good. But we did have the basis at that time, the 
ingredients had been put together to grow and so on. And we'd made further (merchandising) 
contacts on the Mainland. And as a matter of fact, the summer that-let's see, I said I worked 
(for a month) that summer (1936 between extra sessions and the regular second year of 
business school). (They asked me to call on several companies on the West Coast, in the 
Pacific Northwest and San Francisco areas. I drove across the country again for a few dollars. 
What we had done in 1935 was paying off.) 
WN: Did you already know at that time that you were flunking out, or ... 
FL: No. 
(Laughter) 
FL: No, I didn't. (I had passed the extra session with average grades and no signs of possible 
trouble.) 
WN: Oh, okay. 
FL: I'd passed (all my courses in) the first half (of the second) year all right, and all. But I talked 
it over with my wife-to-be, and I said, "You know, what do you want to do? What do you 
want to do with your life?" 
And she was the oldest of four, and she had three younger brothers. And her family was very 
boy-oriented. And so she always sort of felt left out. So when she and I decided we were 
gonna be married, and we talked about things to do and the job offers that I had in the East, 
'cause I kept looking for job offers in the East. And one of the things that I did was to, and 
one of the things that my father did, was to ask certain of the companies that we did business 
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with, like Pittsburgh Plate Glass Company. We represented, at that time, Sargeant Builders' 
Hardware and, oh, (many) others. And I went around and interviewed them, or they sent 
people. They would always send people up to Harvard to interview guys at Harvard. And I 
remember being interviewed by several at Harvard. And I remember the Pittsburgh Plate 
Glass guy that interviewed me, because we became great friends. And he later came out here, 
and I entertained him a couple times out here. And he said, "Well, Fred, why don't you come 
to work for us at Pittsburgh Plate Glass, and work for us for a couple of years, we'll give 
you all the experience, and then go back to Lewers & Cooke." 
And so I talked this over with Janet, and she said, "No," she said, "I'd rather go to 
Honolulu. She said, "I like the idea of Honolulu." She says, "I've never been there. I don't 
know exactly what it's gonna be like, or anything else," but she said, "I would rather go to 
Honolulu, and not stay here." 
So when we were married in, as I said, in September, and we drove across the continent, got 
back here in November. And my family had found a house for us, up Nu'uanu. And we lived 
up there for several months. And then moved to a house up on upper Manoa Road. During 
that time, I asked her, "You know, where do you want to live in Honolulu?" 
This happened right after we got back here. And so I said, "Let's just make it a job, and fun, 
and we'll look around and see where we want to live. Honolulu is an unusual place. You can 
get all degrees of climate. From the beach, to the mountains, to warm weather, dry weather, 
to wet weather. And so on." And I said, "Before you make up your mind, we ought to go 
around and try out all these places and see what you want to do." 
Well, one day, we drove up Maunalani Heights, which had been built, and the roads had been 
put in, in about 1926, I think. The roads were up there, but it's almost all carnation gardens 
up there, in those days. There were very few houses up there. And we got up to the top, and 
we looked at this lot that was vacant, and she says, "This is where I want to live." 
And so I went down and priced the thing. And it belonged to a Miss Ethelyn Castle, who 
built that big home up there which she later gave to the Queen's Hospital, and is now that 
retirement home up there. She owned all the lots above that, on the Palolo side. And so we 
bought one of the lots from her. And then later on, my wife discussing it with her 
grandmother and grandfather, she said that the lot was wonderful and she loved it. She said, 
"We really ought to have the lot next door to it, to give us room to expand, and maybe we 
can put a paddle tennis court there later. Or it would be a wonderful place for kids when we 
have 'em later, to play and that sort of thing." 
And we were very fortunate that her grandfather wrote her back a letter and said, "Well, find 
out what you can buy it for, and we'll give it to you as a present." 
So, god, we were (chuckles) just luckier than heck. And so we had those two lots up there. 
The address was 5045 Maunalani Circle. And we lived up there for-let's see, we built a 
small, we built a garage and a little room onto it, and a bathroom, I think in '38, or early 
'39. And then I think we finished the house in '39. So we moved up there, and we lived up 
there through the war years, but it was very, very difficult during the war years to get the 
kids back and forth to school, from up there. So-well, okay, I'm getting off the subject here, 
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a little bit. 
WN: That' s okay. 
FL: But we stayed up there until '44 or '45. We can get into that later, if you want to. 
WN: Okay, yeah. So when you came back in 1937, you came back to Lewers & Cooke. 
FL: Right. 
WN: And then you started in the personnel department? 
FL: Well, they gave me personnel, and then they formalized the planning group, (which went 
along nicely with personnel). And so we kept right on where we'd left off (in 1935). (But we 
added "longer range planning." Lewers & Cooke was ready now to think about more land 
and a possible consolidation of its operations, if it could put together sufficient land in the 
right place. We found, about one-half mile Waikrkr at the end of Kawaiaha'o Street just 
beyond Kamake'e Street, nine acres of partially coral-filled swampland. This would be 
sufficient for our lumber operations. In the Waikrkr direction there was another several 
parcels which, if we could get them land courted, would give us another four-plus acres 
which would front on a future extension of Pi'ikoi Street makai to Ala Moana Boulevard. If 
for some reason we failed to secure that we had the probability of leasing long term all the 
land we needed from the Ward Estate, which owned the land makai of this nine acres. We 
completed the purchase of the nine acres in 1939, which was first called the Kalia property 
because it lay in the district of Kalia. Our preference was to get the parcels extending our 
property over to Pi'ikoi Street, but we were not able to buy this parcel making up the full 
14.7 acres until 1942.) 
END OF SIDE ONE 
SIDE TWO 
FL: (We bought an additional four acres from the Dillinghams, who had beaten us in getting 
control of the various "title-poor" parcels in order to protect their very large acreage which 
included everything from Kapi'olani Boulevard to Ala Moana Boulevard, which some years 
later became the Ala Moana Shopping Center. We were no threat to future Dillingham plans 
for their then coral-filled swampland, so we were able to secure the parcels at a reasonable 
price and did so in 1942. Some of our directors thought we might become "land poor," so 
our attorneys held back. But we did accomplish our objectives.) 
(With the 500-foot frontage on the new Pi'ikoi Street extension to Ala Moana, Lewers & 
Cooke now had the total acreage, in fee, to handle all of their planned operations for years to 
come. And we gave it the name of 404 Pi'ikoi Street. The frontage on Pi ' ikoi Street extended 
'ewa along Waimanu Street giving us the 14.7 acres. The mauka-makai width varied from 
over 500 feet at about the middle to less at the 'Ewa end.) 
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(We bought these properties when the areas were still not zoned for industrial use. But we 
were able to show the planning commission conclusively that it was in the city's best interest. 
We got approval and in 1942 the mayor and commission asked me to fill a vacancy which I 
did for some years.) 
WN: The land that Ala Moana Center stands on now was nothing but (below-level) coral , right, at 
that time? 
FL: It was (partly) swamp. (Early on, all land makai of King Street was below useable grade, 
except for some portions.) It (had) some coral in it. Parts of it were high enough above grade 
so that-well, let me go back, well, we're not up to the war period. Oh, yes we are, we're 
partly. During the war period, a lot of it got filled. For instance, I was always looking for 
fill. Everywhere I'd go, where I'd see somebody had some fill, I'd go see 'em and say, "Can 
we get that fill? We'll give you a place to dump it for free." 
And right after the war, the military governor came in and told Hawaiian Electric [Company] 
they had to take down their two smokestacks that were where the present plant is. So sure 
enough, they had to tear those two stacks down because they were thought to be a military 
hazard, in that they could be sighted from further at sea, and were subject to airplanes coming 
in if they came in. So what I did was, I went to the contractor who was taking it down, and I 
said, "I'll give you a place to dump all of those smokestacks." So I got the two smokestacks 
(laughs) from the contractor. Because he had no place to dump 'em. Would have cost him 
money to dump 'em. I gave him a place to dump 'em for free. So, you know, I kept thinking 
all along, how we're going to do better here. My whole focus, I think, was to try and build. 
Anyway, I'm off the subject again. 
WN: So you did it with the idea of eventually putting the whole operation over at Pi'ikoi? 
FL: You're right. (Our) whole objective was to get the company into a position where it could 
(grow and operate more efficiently. We were now ready to draw up plans). We'll have to 
cover the war period. But during the war period, we did some really, looking back on it now, 
really some good moves. In getting additional cash in and so on, to finance this development 
that (we were planning for). 
WN: Okay. We can talk about that when we get to the wartime. I was just wondering, so the idea 
was to get out of Downtown. Eventually get rid of the King Street property and the 
Kawaiaha'o area, did ... 
FL: Well, I knew for sure, that this-well, it was obvious-the city, the civic center had moved up 
to-what's the name of that street? 
WN: Bishop? 
FL: No, the one going down alongside the lumberyard property. 
WN: Kapi'olani? 
FL: No, no. The mauka side was on Queen Street. It's the one that goes past the Queen's 
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Hospital, down, what's the name of it? 
WN: Punchbowl. 
FL: Punchbowl Street. We knew the civic center had moved up to Punchbowl Street, so we knew 
that if there was gonna be an expansion of the civic center, it was gonna jump Punchbowl 
Street and we were there. And, you know, we couldn't stop ' em if they were gonna go, so it 
was logical to plan on getting out of there. And this had been clear to (us) in ('38). 
WN: Okay. So, at the time of the eve of World War II, you had the King Street property that was 
still the main headquarters . . . 
FL: Correct. (It was leased from the Wilcox Estate.) 
WN: . . . of Lewers & Cooke. You still had the warehouse on . . . 
FL: Kawaiaha'o and Cooke Street, (and on Kapi'olani Boulevard). (There was also one very 
important purchase that I have failed to mention to you. In 1937, it was clear with the way 
things were developing that we badly needed more warehouse space. Very fortunately we 
were able to buy a good-sized warehouse across Kawaiaha'o Street from us. We also acquired 
an old theater building on Queen Street which adjoined the first warehouse. So we now had 
added much needed warehouse space fronting Kapi'olani Boulevard, Kawaiaha'o, Cooke, and 
Queen streets. This was in 1938. This is why we could add so substantially to our inventories. 
With inventory controls, our buyers were much better able to interpret market changes. We 
now had the warehouse space to house the merchandise, and we knew what we had in stock 
day by day, and what had been ordered and on the way. We had also added substantially to 
the warehouse three-story building, giving us much more space there plus a loading dock to 
fit new equipment and facilitate the handling of merchandise coming in and going out.) 
WN: You had gotten rid of the lwilei ... 
FL: We had gotten rid of the Iwilei (lumberyard) many years before. 
WN: Okay, and then there was one more. 
FL: Well, there was another small piece (on Halekauwila Street) which we had leased below the 
lumberyard property at (Queen and Punchbowl) We had a piece, maybe an acre or so, which 
we were renting from Bishop Estate. And where Bishop Estate later put their main office. Oh, 
and (in 1942) we bought one other piece of property. 
WN: Yeah, on Pi'ikoi (and Kapi'olani Boulevard). 
FL: There was a difference of opinion as to whether this piece (i.e., 404 Pi'ikoi Street, if we 
could buy it) could ever be a good storefront to take the place of King Street. So (we) found 
that there was a piece of property up here at the corner of Pi'ikoi and Kapi'olani Boulevard. 
WN: Yeah. 
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FL: Yeah. At the corner of Kapi 'olani and [Pi'ikoi]. So we bought a very nice piece of property 
(in 1942), which now has a big, about an eight- or ten-story building on it. And we bought 
that because the thinking of the planning group and the officers of Lewers & Cooke, and also 
the directors at that time, they couldn't quite visualize-and I'm not sure I could either, at that 
time-visualize having the main store of Lewers & Cooke down on Pi ' ikoi Street. In other 
words, the thought was we'd been on King Street since 1901, maybe we needed to be 
Kapi'olani Boulevard to have our front. So we bought that piece of property, knowing, or at 
least feeling very strongly, went in with a very high probability, that we could sell it at a 
profit. So we weren't taking any risk, and apparently we had the funds, or the banks were 
willing to loan us the funds to buy the property at that point. So we had that piece of property 
at that time, which we later gave up, because after we started to move to the Pi'ikoi Street 
property, and concentrate everything there, it was very clear to me that we should not divide 
our operations, and have it separate, even though they were only a hundred yards apart. 
There was no need for it. The business had changed. It just didn't make sense to have it on 
another piece of property. So we sold that, which gave us cash to develop the other (large) 
property. 
WN: So [prior to 1942], just as the war was starting, there were some operations over at Pi'ikoi? 
FL: Yes, yes, oh yes. We (began to bring certain areas up to grade and began fencing as needed). 
We had some lumber on it. We used it as a extra storage area for lumber, as I remember it. I 
think that was all that we had down there at that time, (but it was available for any 
merchandise that did not need cover). 
WN: Yeah, I think you're right. I was looking over some articles, and it says here, 1941, "Lumber 
Operations Move to Pi'ikoi." So I think you were probably in the transition stage ... 
FL: That's right. And we had to fill the property, and get it up to grade. And it may have been at 
that time that we negotiated, I don't remember the date, but I don't know just when we 
negotiated the sale, during the war, of the former lumberyard property at (Queen) and 
(Punchbowl) streets. (During World War II we got a good offer on this old lumberyard 
property and sold it for cash.) 
WN: But at the time of the December 7, you still had that property, because that was, you said that 
was one of the buildings that got shelled, right? 
FL: Right, right, right, right. And the lumberyard's office was there at that particular time, but in 
'41, we did start to move lumber to-well, we may have had some lumber in '41 down on 
this (new nine-plus acre property, but we still used the Queen Street lumberyard during much 
of the war). 
WN: Okay. And the King Street was mainly offices? 
FL: No, we had a lot of storage in that building. 
WN: Oh yeah? 
FL: There was a big basement in it. We had, well, pipe fittings and kegs of nails, and a lot of the 
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very, very heavy merchandise was in the basement. 
WN: Okay. 
FL: And then on the first floor was practically all tools and display material. And then the second 
floor was plumbing display, and what we call a lot of furnishing, home furnishings display. 
And the third floor was our home building department and some additional office space. But a 
lot of merchandise was on the third floor, too, because on [December 7], 1941, it was that 
merchandise that got really, (chuckles) it got really thrown around. 
WN: Okay, why don't we stop here, and what I want to do is, the next time, we'll pick it up right 
around 1940, '41, and you got started into-you were manager in charge of government sales. 
FL: Well, we started the government sales (clearing system), it started in Oate 1940). Well, 
there's a couple things leading up to '41, I think we ought to get into. Have you got tape? 
WN: Okay, go ahead. 
FL: Because I think they lead nicely into the other. Late in 1940, there was no question but what, 
we could see the potential of war being a possibility. If not war, at least the beginnings of 
problems. The government had started to build out at Pearl Harbor and south, makai of Pearl 
Harbor, (Hickam Field and air force housing and facilities), that whole development was built 
in 1939 and 1940. And we could see that the government was going to become a bigger and 
bigger part of our sales, even if there wasn't a war. So we had gotten the government 
(clearing) department started, I think, in late 1940, and in 1941, it was made very definite and 
I had charge of the government department by 1941, early '41. And we saw at that time, that 
war was at least a reasonably high probability, or at least we should be ready for it as a high 
probability. And a couple of things that proved this out, is that in August of 1941, we took 
out with Lloyd's of London, war risk insurance on all of our operations. So we were fully 
covered against war risk on December 7, and we collected on it. 
WN: Was that pretty unique? I mean, was that a ... 
FL: There were a couple of others who did it. I don't remember who they were. We weren't the 
only ones. I don't remember who the others were. I don't think it was very common, no. I 
think there were few of us. So we had war insurance when the war started. Now, another 
thing that will give you an idea as to our feelings and why we were ready for this, was two-
fold. One was the size of our inventory. We kept increasing the size of the inventory, during 
that year, to the extent that we could borrow funds and so on. (We had added very 
substantially to the land and warehouses at Kawaiaha'o Street. This has been related in other 
parts of this history. Also, inventory and buying control helped significantly.) And as of 
December 7 of that year, we were lucky to have the highest inventory that we had ever had in 
the history of the company. Again, I think because of the realization that things were going to 
get worse. Now, I didn't realize this until after the war, when the person who I'd written this 
letter to in October sent me a copy of it, but we, in our desire to try and build our personnel, 
I'd been discussing and had considerable correspondence with a guy that lives somewhere 
around Chicago, and who had a lot of experience in glass. And we had a man who was good 
in glass, but he was an older man, and we needed a younger fellow coming along. We didn't 
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seem to have the right person who knew all the new ramifications of the use of glass and 
moldings, and all of that sort of thing. And so I wrote this letter and had been in 
correspondence with him. He was married, had two or three children. And we were at a point 
where we were in negotiations to get him to come down here. And as a matter of fact, the 
negotiations were just about final, and I, it may have been as a result of a letter of him trying 
to finalize it, or it may have been my feeling of impending trouble, that I wrote him a letter, 
something along this line, that we had been discussing the possibility of your coming down 
here and bringing your family , and becoming assistant manager of the glass department, and 
so on. I said, then went on something like this, "Things have degenerated in the Pacific, in 
our opinion, to such an extent that we feel it would be very unwise to bring you and your 
family down here at this particular time, and therefore I'm writing this letter to terminate the 
discussions with you." And then I told him how sorry I was to do it, but that I just felt that it 
was very, very unwise to bring him in, who'd never been here before, his family, wife and 
two or three children, down here at a time when we felt things were getting bad 
Now, I forgot all about that letter, until the end of the war. The guy saved the letter, put it in 
his file. And at the end of the war, he sent me that letter. Unfortunately it got destroyed, so I 
don't have it, but I can remember it very, very clearly. And so he never came, fortunately, 
but it does give you-the reason I bring it up is, it gives you an idea as to how concerned we 
were in October as to where we were going, and how close we were getting toward the 
potential, or possibility of a war. How much higher probability there was of it. 
And then, two other things. At that time, they began to form block wardens around Honolulu, 
in some areas where people were concerned, and we as a business had a block warden system 
for each one of our locations. For instance, downtown on King Street, we built on the top of 
the roof, a little shelter, with another roof on it. It had sandbags around it. We had to 
reinforce it from underneath. It had food and water in it, and so on. And quite a-well, we 
had, I don't know how many gallons of water up there, but we had quite a bit of water, so 
that if a fire started up there, we would be able possibly to put it out. We had the same thing 
down at the warehouse building down at Kawaiaha'o and Cooke Street. Again, we had 
thought the thing through to an extent where we were at least, you know, partially prepared 
for a possible attack. So there was a feeling on our part, and I think it was at least fairly 
prevalent in the community that we were getting ready for pililda, and that pilikia was going 
to come. 
And then, the other thing we did was every location had its own block warden-type 
organization, the same way block wardens around in the neighborhoods had them. And for 
instance, my job was the warehouse, and I was responsible for the warehouse. So the first 
thing that I heard that morning, of Pearl Harbor, which we can come to later, that there was 
trouble and that, and I saw through my telescope, I saw that Pearl Harbor had been attacked, 
but I couldn't prove it, except by my eyes there. My job was to rush to the warehouse, as 
soon as my family was taken care of, because that was my responsibility. If you read this 
letter from my father, the interesting thing is, he says somewhere in here, and I don't know 
where, but we can pick it out later. He said he didn't know when he got down to Lewers & 
Cooke that morning, himself, that we were at war. Now, I had tried to get back to him, but 
the telephone system went out very shortly after I got that call. Something apparently 
happened where-I gather in a telephone system, if too many people pick up their receivers at 
one time, the voltage drops, and it goes out. And so I wasn't able to reach my father, but I 
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knew my responsibility was the warehouse. I knew somebody else had the responsibility, I 
think was Lewers Paris, for the [main] building. And so I could go to the warehouse, 
knowing that, or hopefully knowing that he knew there was a war on, and so on. 
WN: Now, who set up this block warden system? 
FL: We did, as a group. 
WN: I mean, as a company? 
FL: As a company. 
WN: Yeah. So it wasn't ... 
FL: But the community did it too. That is, parts of the community did it. 
WN: Yeah, those that were forward-thinking . . . 
FL: That were thinking, thinking ahead. 
WN: Yeah. So this is really not the same as the block warden system that was established after the 
bombing took place. 
FL: No, but it was that ... 
WN: Same concept. 
FL: ... that followed it, that became an elaboration of this thing. But we had it within the 
company. And I had a couple of guys who were my assistants, and they knew that if 
something happened, I was to get in touch with them. Well, unfortunately, that morning, I 
couldn't get to them, so I went down myself, and was able then, later, to get them into-but 
we can cover that when we get into it. But my father writes in here [i.e., a letter from 
Frederick D. Lowrey], very interestingly, and I can't find it right now. Well here, he says, 
"On the morning of December 7, I was at breakfast with Mrs. Lowrey and our daughter, 
when there came a telephone call," apparently he got one too. I don't know, maybe I was the 
one who told him, maybe I did get through. Anyway, he got a telephone call. He got a 
telephone call that an explosion had occurred on the top floor of the Lewers & Cooke 
building, which had set off our fire alarm gong. No, if I'd called him, I would have told him 
that we were at war, because I knew it at that time. So he didn't get the telephone call from 
me. He got it from somebody else. But when he got down there, Lewers Paris was already 
there, and he was a vice president. (Either the fire department or Lewers turned the automatic 
sprinkler system off, seeing no fire had developed. This prevented more water damage than 
there was.) 
What else would you like to cover today? 
WN: Well, I think that's about it. I wanted to get, I want to get into next time about, you know, 
we're talking about preparation, you were made in charge of government sales, and what you 
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did was consolidate . . . 
FL: Right. We had made ... 
WN: That was in, also in anticipation of . . . 
FL: Well, we had made quite a consolidation. We had made a major consolidation in 1940, I 
mean early '41. And we ran all during 1941, consolidated, with our government sales, which 
was very fortunate, because we were able to make the change over very, very quickly. 
WN: What do you mean by a consolidation of government sales? 
FL: Well, they gave me space. We had started to make some moves of merchandise out of the 
King Street office building, and into the warehouse building. And I was given space on the 
second floor, as I remember it, it was the back half of the whole plumbing department. And 
so we had half of one-third of the second floor of the King Street building, and I had my 
whole government staff in there. We had a big table, as I remember it, where the salesmen 
would be out, and then we'd come in, and we had girls and clerks, and so on there. And then 
they'd go through all the routines that we'd set up, to make sure that we had proper validation 
on everything and the purchase orders were all properly done and so on. Because, you know, 
the government was getting further and further into this thing, they were building an 
organization very fast, and they didn't have people who knew the intricacies and the problems 
of taking this step-by-step through. And we didn't want to get into the situation of having 
taken orders, and filled orders, and then not have the proper documentation to prove that the 
government owed us money. We had enough of this anyway with the best-laid plans. We had 
a hell of a problem for a couple of years, which we can get to later. But I think we were able 
to foresee a lot of these things, the potential of 'em coming. So I had the whole government 
department set up during the year 1940, and we were ready to operate as of that morning, 
December 8, Monday morning, when the orders started to rush in. 
WN: Yeah. So December 7 really wasn't a total shock to you. 
FL: Well, it was a hell of a shock in a way, but we had done some good planning, even if I do 
say it. I think . . . 
WN: Maybe even more than the government themselves (laughs). 
FL: Oh yes. In many respects, we were much, much better prepared for it (in our own small 
way). 
WN: Let's hold that thought and why don't we continue next time, right what we're talking about 
right now. 
FL: Okay. 
END OF INTERVIEW 
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WN: This is an interview with Mr. Fred Lowrey on February 21, 1992, at his home in Makiki, 
O'ahu. The interviewer is Warren Nishimoto. 
(raping distorted throughout interview.) 
WN: Okay, why don't we get started. We left off talking about the company prior to World 
War II. I wanted to ask you some questions before we get into the war. 
FL: Fine. 
WN: In 1940, you were named manager in charge of government sales at Lewers & Cooke. 
FL: That's right. (We were a clearing department for red tape to see that we met government 
specifications, etc. on all orders to begin with.) 
WN: You said earlier that government operations were consolidated. 
FL: That's right. 
WN: Could we talk about that a little bit? 
FL: Well, we realized from reading the newspapers, that with the Japanese expansion into China 
and so on, that (war) was possible. The National Guard here got more active. Farrant Turner, 
who was treasurer of Lewers & Cooke, was called to duty in late 1940. (So we just thought), 
there must be something to this. So we started our thinking in terms of trying to get ready (to 
plan) for anything that might occur. (We just let it develop naturally as conditions demanded. 
Things work out better that way, I found.) Now your specific question was .. . 
WN: The consolidation of government sales? 
FL: The (coordination of) government (purchases) began (to increase substantially) in (1939 and) 
1940, and business was picking up quite materially. It all made sense to have got these 
preparations made. And so our inventories were high because we knew the army, navy was 
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going to need all of these materials to continue building, not only here, but whatever forward 
bases that they might build. A lot of this might be sent (forward to Guam) or Saipan. We 
didn't know what their plans were, these were kept pretty secret. But all you had to do was 
drive by Hickam Field to see that-Hickam Field and Pearl Harbor were being expanded 
terrifically, and they needed housing for all of these Mainland workers they were bringing 
down. They needed housing for the enlisted men and officers who were going to be here. 
There was more of a fleet here, and then they were getting ready, I gather, to have additional 
units here to send forward if that was necessary, although I don't know any of those details. 
And so, that meant more and more government orders coming in. So we decided that we 
would form a government department and then have every order (clear) that department and 
make sure that (it was in order, properly signed, legitimate, etc.) . Because we didn't want to 
(have our billings questioned later in a crisis). (The government) just didn't have staff and 
people and so on. So we formed this sort of centralized (clearing) department, which we 
called the government department, and we had (full-time) salesmen working out of that 
department, and we had clerical staff inside to do this clerical work of following up on the 
orders, making sure that they were all (in order). (Sort of a self preservation against "big 
brother" at some future time if he questioned bills.) 
WN: So this is separate from the civilian accounts? 
FL: Right. (Largely, their sales cleared through the credit department.) But every government 
order cleared through this department. And it turned out to be a very good idea, because we 
could expand it as the government sales expanded in late '40 and in '41, and when December 
7 came, we were all ready. We had the whole thing set up, so that we were ready to take care 
of the deluge that hit us beginning December 8, 9, and 10, and so on. Does that pretty well 
cover it? 
WN: Yeah. Well, let's get into the war, then. Before we get into how Lewers & Cooke was 
operating during the war era, I'd like to ask you some questions about what you were doing 
that day. 
FL: Well, (Sunday) morning of December 7, Janet and I, we had two children at that time and 
one was on the way. She was born in February. We had had breakfast, and I was sitting, 
reading the newspaper. And I got this telephone call from one of the Japanese boys who had 
driven by 177 South King Street [Lewers & Cooke headquarters], where the Bishop Bank, tall 
Bishop Bank [now First Hawaiian Bank] building is (today). And he was very excited over the 
phone, and he says, "F.P.," he says, "there's been an explosion in the building, just when I 
went by." And he says, "The fire alarm's gone off." He says, "I don't know whether there's 
a fire in there or not." (I think he mentioned glass windows being blown out in the third 
floor, too.) 
And I said, "Well, if the gong's gone off, the police, the fire department will come down 
there very shortly." And I said, "You can stand by if you want, but I'm sure everything will 
be all right." Knowing that our alarm system was tied in with the fire department. Well, sure 
enough, I've heard from (a friend here) who happened to be on the (Bishop and King Street) 
comer that morning, and he saw all of this, heard it and saw all this happen, that the fire 
department came to the front door, it was locked. They didn't realize the back door was all 
open (chuckles), so they broke in the front door. (Lewers Paris) was in charge of that 
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building, somebody had called him also. As soon as I got my call, I turned my telescope, 
which I had up on the hill on top of Maunalani Heights, I turned my telescope to see if the 
building was on fire, and as I brought the telescope down, I could see there was no smoke 
from the building, but I could see the smoke at Pearl Harbor. And as I trained the telescope 
on the channels running into Pearl Harbor, I saw ships trying to get (to sea). I saw planes 
above. I saw (spouts) of water, plumes of water jump in the air, where bombs had hit 
alongside of the ships, and these huge (spouts of water) going up, you know, fifty to a 
hundred feet in the air. And then as I turned the telescope further mauka, I could see the fires 
at (Hickam and) Pearl Harbor. So I guess it didn't take me more than, you know, two, three 
seconds to put two and two together, and say, "My god, we're at war!" 
And so, at that point, I had the responsibility of letting the senior officers of the company 
know. So I went back over to the telephone-and I also had the responsibility of making sure 
that my assistant (knew)-I was responsible for the warehouse property. We had divided up 
responsibility if there should be war, and I had the warehouse (assignment). 
WN: On Kawai aha' o Street? 
FL: On Kawaiaha'o and Cooke Street, right. And so, I went back over to the telephone, and I 
couldn't get any response. The only conclusion that I drew was that so many calls had started 
to come in, that the voltage dropped to such low level, that the telephone system went out for 
a period of time, and I don't know how long it went out. So I felt that it was necessary for 
me to get down to the warehouse as rapidly as possible and do what I could down there. But I 
also wanted to make sure that my wife was all right. She was then (seven) months hdpai, and 
so I wanted to see she was all right, and the two other kids were all right. I (had) made up 
my mind right off the bat that there was no way that the Japanese could (make) a landing or 
anything like that. And there was no way for a carrier air force to drop hundreds and 
hundreds of (attackers). So I felt that my family was safe where they were. I didn't feel any 
problem in leaving them. 
And so I got them settled and I then headed for (the warehouse). I got down to the warehouse 
building, and just as I drove in though the warehouse (gate)-you carne in from the 
Kawaiaha'o Street side, the (main) warehouse was on the right-I heard this terrific explosion, 
oh, I don't know how far above us. And then I could hear shrapnel come down on the 
(corrugated iron) roof. None of it hit me or my car. (That shell had had its time fuse set, but 
unfortunately for too long. It did not explode in the air where the Japanese planes were, but 
carne all the way to above our warehouse area before exploding.) It was at the end of the 
year, and we usually tried to do the maintenance work that we could on all of our properties, 
toward the end of the year to get-if we had profits available-to keep our properties up to 
the standard that we wanted. So we had one of (our many good) Japanese painting contractors 
working for us on that job, and he must have had about twenty men on the job painting the 
roof that day. 
WN: This is on a Sunday. 
FL: This was on a Sunday. And we were trying to get work done in the (tax year 1941). We also 
had people working, doing maintenance in the King Street building, which I'll come to later if 
you want. And so, I'll never forget this picture of these guys, up on the roof, with the 
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shrapnel falling, they hearing it, and they all ran for the edge and started (climbing) off the 
roofs. So here I saw all these fellows getting to the edge of the roofs and then (hurrying) 
down. And it's a, you know, it's a picture that I have in my mind I'll never forget. 
WN: They [were] how far up? 
FL: (They were painting all the one-story corrugated iron sheds so it was not too far to the 
ground. They also had ladders and equipment parked along the sheds.) So nobody got hurt. 
They didn't know what it was all about. And so I called them all together and told them that 
we had been attacked by the Japanese, and that I suggested, that I thought the best thing for 
them to do would be to go home and stay quiet, because I didn't know what the heck the 
army was going to do, you know, in the way of rounding up people like they did on the 
(Mainland), and all of those things. So my suggestion was that they go on home and stay 
quiet, and then just see what happened. 
WN: They were all Japanese, the workers? 
FL: I think they were all Japanese. It was a Japanese contractor and I think his men were all 
Japanese. Now that's my impression, you know, it's, it's quite a long time ago, but I'm pretty 
sure that would be right. The Japanese contractors generally had Japanese employees. And 
this was typical of that period of time, and normal, and accepted, and it was just the way it 
was, at that time. 
WN: So you didn't know these men personally, because they were ... 
FL: Well, I don't know that I knew any of the men personally. I knew a lot of the Japanese 
contractors, 'cause we did business with them. 
WN: What kinds of things were kept in the warehouse? 
FL: Oh, we had nails. Keg after keg, hundreds of kegs of nails. We had hundreds and hundreds 
of bags of cement. We had all of our plumbing supplies, which meant toilets, bathtubs, 
basins. We had paint, huge quantities of paint. (A full line of building materials, corrugated 
iron roofing, plywood, asphalt roofing and adhesives, floor tile, etc.) 
WN: So it's pretty flammable. 
FL: Oh yeah. There was a fair amount of flammable stuff in there. 
WN: Was there a, any threat of fire? 
FL: (Not from the shell which exploded somewhere above us. But yes, from another if it came 
our way.) We had a fire protection system in the (three-story) warehouse building, so that 
should there have been a fire, the automatic (sprinkler) system, like we have in this building 
(FL's present residence) would have come on, as soon as the heat set it off (and would spray 
water over each area affected by heat). 
WN: I'm not too familiar with these automatic sprinklers and so forth, but was that pretty 
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progressive at that time? 
FL: Well, (we thought) it was in warehousing, (especially in multi-story wood post, beam, and 
floor construction) but not in residential or office buildings. And the reason why it was quite 
common in (wooden) warehouse buildings was that the insurance rates, fire insurance rates, 
dropped to such an extent if you had a fire protection system, that it paid for the whole cost 
of the fire protection system, so, hell, you couldn't lose. It was just really almost poor 
judgment not to have a fire protection system. Now if you had just low, flat sheds, one-story 
high, and so on, maybe you didn't put them in. But when you ran to multi-story warehouse 
building-this was a three-story building, why-and part of it was wood construction and the 
floors were wood, and the beams were all wood inside, although the exterior (was cement 
tile). So that if a fire got started in there, why, it would take the whole building unless it had 
sprinkler system (protection). 
WN: So was the sprinkler system activated in the warehouse, after the bomb dropped? 
FL: Well, it was activated (to go off) continuously (day and night). It was always activated. It was 
activated by, just the same way these are (here in my apartment). It's a little metal piece in 
there, in that sprinkler (head), that when the temperature rises to (a certain level) that 
sprinkler automatically goes off. So it's always (activated to go off when the temperature 
reaches the critical level) unless somebody throws the main valve to tum it off, (cutting off 
the water supply). 
WN: So did the sprinklers go off? 
FL: No, (not at the warehouse) because there was no fire. (The anti-aircraft shell exploded in the 
air above us and no part of the shell cut any of the pipes feeding the sprinkler heads.) The 
shrapnel came down on the (warehouse) buildings and hit the top of the building, but it didn't 
puncture the building in any case, so nothing went off. It was different at the building up on 
King Street, where a shell came through the roof. (The fuse had not been set at all, so it 
exploded on contact with the root) and then hit a pipe, which I imagine was at least an inch 
or an inch-and-a-quarter in diameter, ruptured the pipe, and as soon as the pipe ruptured, 
(water flowed), then the alarm went off. And that triggered the fire department and (alerted) 
these people who went by (177 South King Street) because that alarm kept ringing until 
somebody went in and turned the water off. (The water probably prevented any fire from 
breaking out.) 
WN: I see. So from what I've read about Lewers & Cooke and the sprinkling system flooding the 
basement of the . . . 
FL: Correct. 
WN: ... store, it wasn't because of a fire caused by the [U.S. anti-aircraft shell]. It was because 
of the [shell] hitting the pipe. 
FL: Correct. (The shell exploded on contact because of a faulty fuse setting in the shell. The U.S. 
gunners were all inexperienced and wrong fuse settings were common.) There was no fire 
whatsoever. The shell exploded-and there must have been tremendous amount of heat and 
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shrapnel went all over the upstairs. Even with inflammable materials around. But the (water), 
of course, (flowed) right away all over, which spread on that floor , the third floor , which 
went down through the floor, which was wooden, spread on the second, wider, went to the 
first floor and spread wider, went clear down into the basement. And then after our guys got 
down there, or perhaps the fire department, and I don't know who turned (the water) off. 
Now whether the fire department turned it off, or our own people, or Lewers (Paris) did it 
himself, I don't know. I remember right where the valves were, they were, had big wheels on 
'em, because you had a pipe coming in that must have been, gee, at least an eight-inch 
diameter pipe, probably. So you had a lot of volume of water that could come through (if any 
fire had developed and more sprinkler heads activated). 
WN: So a shell came and hit your King Street headquarters. A shell exploded above your 
warehouse (at Kawaiaha'o Street) ... 
FL: The shell that came down in the main office building, at 177 South King Street, hit the pipe 
and (exploded on contact). Really that was where the main damage occurred. A shell also 
came down and hit the lumberyard, but it came down between stacks of lumber and just 
drilled a hole in the ground, about four feet deep, and about four feet wide at the top, so that 
there was a big puktz in the ground, and that's the only damage it did. Now at the warehouse, 
there was no damage whatsoever, other than the falling shrapnel, which you could hear come 
down, scared us all, and we heard the explosion, I don't know how many hundred feet above 
it, the explosion was. But it happened just as I came in, and so-but it was a little scary, 
because you didn't know (laughs) when (another) was going to come (our way). 
WN: Okay, so after you told the contractors to go home, then what happened? 
FL: I stayed down there all day, because other Lewers and Cooke guys, when they heard that we 
were at war-and lot of them didn't ever hear it during the day, because they were way up in 
valleys and so on, the telephone system was out, no newspaper (got to them) obviously, until 
much later. (Some may not have known until Monday.) I stayed down there feeling that if 
there was a third attack or a fourth attack or something like that, that that was my 
responsibility. (I did go up to King Street and saw what had happened there, but there were 
others whose responsibility was to take care of that area.) 
(There was a lot of commotion at King Street when I arrived. A crew had assembled and 
were mopping up the water damage on all floors and the basement. I went up to the third 
floor and was greeted by a fantastic sight. The shell had exploded in a bay maybe fourteen 
feet, U-shaped, where most of the hanks of cotton sash cord were stored on shelves which 
went to the ceiling.) 
(On explosion the shell broke up into many small sharp pieces. The velocity of these many 
pieces cut the hanks of sash cord into hundreds of lengths from a few inches to several feet 
and blew them all over the place. Many lengths hung from the roof rafters . The whole 
wooden roof structure looked like it had big cobwebs hanging from the rafters. It was quite a 
sight, in addition to the sash cord lying over most of the other surrounding merchandise.) 
(Next to the sash cord was one of three freight elevators. They were maybe ten feet square 
with wood floors, two one-eighth-inch steel sheet sides and open on the mauka-ma.klli sides to 
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facilitate movement of the merchandise on and off. I mentioned that we had men working in 
the building that day. One reason was to repair the elevators. This particular elevator was 
stopped at the third floor level and there were two men working near it, I was told. When the 
shell came through the roof not more than twenty feet away and exploded, after penetrating 
the iron roof and severing the water pipe, shrapnel was sent out in all directions. The sash 
cord was a very fortunate buffer for these workers. Shrapnel went through the sash cord in 
two places, went through the steel sides of the elevator and into other parts of the building 
and unbelievably did not touch either of the elevator repairmen working there at that 
moment.) 
(At the top of the elevator, four steel cables held it up. Three of these cables were completely 
severed; one cable was strong enough to hold the empty freight elevator, very lucky again for 
the two men at work. Luckily the sash cord must have buffered the noise; because as far as I 
know neither suffered hearing injuries. The rear wall of the building had glass windows and 
rolling steel shutters. These were completely blown out near the shell roof penetration site. 
So, with all this plus the extensive water damage, there was much clean up work to get under 
way. King Street had quite a day--the brunt of the Lewers & Cooke damage.) 
(It was interesting to see the psycological effect on different people. Most just took it in stride 
and began to clean up the mess, get material to dry up wet merchandise which could be , 
saved, etc., etc. But I recall one man of European birth and background-a young employee 
of a couple of years-was so affected he had to go back downstairs, went out in back against 
the fence and puked up everything. He seemed to be the exception. Many others may have 
had other mental reactions, but this was the only physical reaction I saw.) 
(King Street was well-manned so I made the rounds to roughly assess the losses and damage 
and then went back to the warehouse where I could tell the guys there how lucky we were 
with zero damage. So far, anyway. You can see why I say this was one of the more 
memorable days of my working life.) 
(Nothing more happened at the warehouse), so I went home fairly late that afternoon. As I 
remember it, I (arranged with) somebody who was willing to volunteer to stay on duty that 
night, and I think we kept three, four guys on duty that night, so I went home. 
WN: When you say "on duty," what would that mean? 
FL: Well, it would mean that (they stayed) on the payroll that day, and if they were on overtime 
basis, why, they got overtime pay for it, and so on, whatever the rules were. But I really 
don't have a very clear recollection, except that I feel quite sure that we kept several people 
in the building that night. Because you didn't know what the army, navy was going to do. 
They (might) need materials that night. And so, we wanted to be prepared to service them to 
whatever degree was necessary. (Also, with the warehouse being my kuleana I would have 
someone call me if something more happened during the night.) 
WN: I think this is incredible that a (U.S. anti-aircraft) shell would hit someplace on King Street, 
your headquarters . . . 
FL: Yeah. (We found the base, and, I still have a piece of the shell. USA was written on the base.) 
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WN: ... and a shell would hit Cooke and Kawaiaha'o ... 
FL: Yeah. 
WN: ... your warehouse. And a shell would hit Queen and Punchbowl, (your lumberyard). 
FL: Well (our own shells) hit us in three locations. That is, you know, it's a coincidence. I don't 
remember the exact figures, but in the write-ups, the fifty-year write-ups in the newspaper, 
two months ago, they said that there was something like sixty or seventy of those shells that 
came down in various parts of Honolulu, and I don't remember the exact figure. So we 
weren't the only ones, but we did get hit in three locations, which may have been (laughs) 
a major coincidence. 
WN: What were your feelings at that time, that day? Was it fear, what? Confusion? 
FL: I don't have any recollection of fear (or confusion). My recollection was more along the lines 
of, well, we thought it was going to come, we took out insurance for it, we had gotten 
inventories ready for it, we were organized for it, in a sort of warden system type. In other 
words, I was in charge of the building and I had a staff to (watch) that building. Also, we 
were prepared (for) it in (another way). About a week or ten days before (December 7), the 
National Guard and maybe the army was put in charge of all of the (water) pumping stations. 
So water pumping statio~ like the one at Kapahulu . . . 
WN: Oh yeah. 
FL: You know, the big ... 
WN: Wai'alae and Kapahulu. 
FL: Yeah, that big pumping station out there. That had sandbags around it and-well, I lived up 
on Maunalani Heights at that time. So I would go by there every night going home. And I can 
remember a week before the seventh, that they were, had put sandbags around the 
installation, and they had guards around that pumping station. And I assumed that they'd done 
the same thing, and may have checked on the one on Beretania Street down here and so on. I 
don't, I just don't recall that. (Some others thought there might be trouble or this would not 
have been ordered.) 
So there were lot of things, you know, we had Farrant Turner going a year before, being 
called into the (guard). You had our own watching, what the Japanese were doing in China. 
You know, they were bragging that they were going to take the whole of the Orient. And, my 
god, they had the organized navy and air force and so on to do a pretty good job on it if they 
did it right. And they also had troops, and all, they'd already moved into China. And so I 
think that we were-we were, well, then I told you, I think, last time about the letter that I 
wrote in October to that guy in Illinois, (cancelling hiring him for) our glass department 
(because of our concerns as early as October). 
WN: Right. 
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FL: And I'd suggested that we terminate our negotiations because-and I remember the exact 
words-that the situation in the Pacific has deteriorated to the extent where we feel it's unwise 
to bring you down here at this particular time, particularly with your wife and family . So it 
all added up, it all added up to a situation where, you know, it was a-we, I guess we almost 
expected it sometime, but we just didn't know when. 
WN: You felt you were as prepared as could be? 
FL: Right. And the fact that somebody had called out the troops to-or National Guard, or 
whatever troops they were-to defend the pumping stations indicated that they were afraid of 
the possibility of sabotage here, and that again was one more very clear indication of potential 
trouble. And then, of course, my feelings were well, this is it. I think my feelings ran more 
toward, my god, how are we gonna survive this, from a company point of view. I was a 
young guy. My reaction was, how were we going to survive as a company? How are we 
going to handle all of our (problems and survive)? As a company, as individuals, (what will 
the) army, navy do to us? 
WN: Okay, so the next day, you were telling me about a meeting that took place . . . 
FL: Yeah. 
WN: ... with your (company). 
FL: (December 8, 1941.) That's probably one of the most interesting business days of my life. We 
all got to work on time, I think we started at seven-thirty, and we were all there, and 
everybody was there early, pretty much. And a good number of the Japanese boys came to 
me, and (being) personnel manager, they came to me, and they were all upset. They dido 't 
know what was going to happen. I got them together in groups. And I simply went over the 
situation with them, and said that, we were going to do the best to keep Lewers & Cooke 
going (as an operating organization to help in any way we could), but we had no idea what 
the military governor, who had already been appointed I think, what they would do, whether 
we'd be taken over and so on. But I said, "You guys, unfortunately, have an extra problem in 
that you are all citizens of Japan, whether you like it our not, whether you want it or not, 
because Japan says you are a Japanese citizen, because you are ethnically Japanese." So I 
said, "You are dual citizens, and that puts you in an awkward spot." 
And so we talked about it, and they said, "Well, is there anything we can do?" 
And I said, "Well, I don't think anything is suddenly going to happen here. You know, 
there's no question in our minds about your loyalty or anything like that. If there are 
(unloyal) people of Japanese ancestry or Italian ancestry or German ancestry here, they'll be 
picked up because the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation] and the military intelligence, 
naval intelligence, (will) have those people already spotted, and they'll go around, they're 
probably already being picked up. And maybe they were picked up yesterday. After all, of 
our total population here, you people are approximately a third, they can't pick you all up, 
where are they going to put you? If you are concerned, it might be worthwhile to think about 
writing a letter (stating) the fact that you are an American citizen, (not Japanese which) you 
have no control of. I don't know whether that will do any good, if something happens or not, 
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but I wouldn't (get upset). After all, (Hawai'i) needs you here to do the same jobs that you 
have (and to help) to supply the army and navy. They will demand more and more from us." 
(I hoped this would allay some of their concerns.) 
(Later), I suppose it was about maybe nine-thirty in the morning that this army officer walked 
in the front door, and went into my father's office-this was Colonel Marek. He was either 
from the military governor's office, or he was from the, more likely from the corps of 
engineers [i.e., U.S. Engineer Department], probably. And he walked into my father's office, 
and we all knew (him). He was a-I forgot what business he was in, but he used to do a lot 
of painting, did some beautiful seascapes and so on. I don't know whether he's still alive now 
or not. (We all) knew him, and they talked for a few minutes, and then Dad said, "Well, I'd 
like to call in several of my staff people so they can hear what you've got to say," because he 
had already told my father that the corps of engineers was going to take us over, at least that 
was what we understood. And he gave my father a purchase order from the corps of 
engineers for all the materials we had in stock, and it was written in such a way that we 
couldn't sell anything without their approval, because they'd already purchased it. In other 
words, at that point, we had a purchase order for everything, everything that we had. 
WN: Was there a dollar value on it? 
FL: No (value was on the purchase order). They were just using their government authority to 
say, "It's (now under our control), we need it. We're going to need it and we want you to put 
a freeze on it for us. " 
So we talked to (Colonel Marek) and he was very (open) with us, because he said, "You 
know, I don't like to do this." 
I remember him (implying), "I don't think it's the right thing to do," well, he implied we're 
not only going to take over and run the organization. In other words, my father would report 
to (some) higher (up) in the corps of engineers. Well, right off the bat, he said, off the 
record, he didn't think this was the appropriate way to handle a situation. But he said, "These 
are my orders." 
And Dad said, "Don't worry about it, we understand (the present confusion)." 
And so then he left, all very (outwardly) friendly, and we stayed on though to (try to) decide, 
what are we going to do? If they (do as) he says, "We are taking over Lewers and Cooke," 
and with either from the military governor's office, or from the corps of engineers office, or 
some other agency of the government, then what are we gonna do? And (so we discussed it), 
how are we going to respond, what were we supposed to do. So we said if (anybody can 
operate Lewers & Cooke, we can). (We have the multiple connections and the organization.) 
And so we bantered ideas back and forth, but nobody had a good idea other than to wait and 
see. (I felt that we should try to see what might be the military thinking.) I said, "Look, 
we've done a lot of business with the corps of engineers." But I said, "We (have had good 
relations with) the head of the supply corps for the navy. We're doing business with (the 
navy) all the time. I'd like to go out to him and tell him what has happened here, show him 
this order, and get some ideas from him as to how he feels, whether he can give us any better 
ideas as to how were we to be taken over, and how they want us to operate with them, (the 
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navy)." 
END OF SIDE ONE 
SIDE TWO 
FL: They thought that was a good idea. So I called Captain Gaffney, I got an appointment with 
him right after lunch, and I showed him this purchase order, and he blew his top, he really 
blew his top. I don't remember his exact words, but they amounted to, "They don't have 
authority to do this, and we are equally important and maybe more important than the corps 
of engineers is in getting forward bases set up (for the navy)." 
WN: What-did the navy have an equivalent to the corps of engineers? 
FL: They-yes, they had the Seabees (as well as maybe other special ones). 
WN: Oh, okay. 
FL: Yeah. And there may have been others, but I remember there were Seabees working in all the 
forward areas. So (taking us) over would be (a mistake). It would be much more appropriate 
for us to function (independently with all of our many connections) and not to sell any 
material to anybody, without (coordinated) approval from (the navy, too). 
And I said, "That's fair enough." I got the impression from Captain Gaffney that the corps of 
engineers may have gone off, you know, (half-cocked), and made the decision (which might) 
not be approved and so he told us to just sort of forget the thing until we got further 
instructions. And as I remember it, within the next couple of days, we (were told to) honor 
army and navy orders, (until formal regulations were issued.) And they were. It was a new 
department formed by the military governor, and I don't remember, there were so many 
government departments that I don't remember the name of them. (It all developed over the 
next many weeks to control how we were to sell and to whom.) [This function probably was 
under the jurisdiction of the Director of Materials and Supplies Control, under the Office of 
Military Governor.] 
WN: What kind of approval was it? Written or ... 
FL: Written. Everything was in writing. (Plenty of it, and all kinds of regulations.) 
WN: So private individuals who wanted to buy materials from Lewers & Cooke had to get a 
permit, something, from the military government? 
FL: Right, right.(Or we followed instructions put out by the new bureaucratic authorities as the 
crisis subsided to more routine operations.) 
WN: [How did you come to accept the government bureaucracy and almost complete control over 
your operations, such as not being allowed to freely sell to civilians, etc.] 
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FL: We accepted it. We wanted to win the war, and we felt that, if somebody had a house that 
was three-quarters built, and it would help to get (it completed), we would make application 
to the office of civilian supply, or whatever it is [Director of Materials and Supplies Control], 
and, if they would allow (the contractor to finish the horne, we could sell the required 
material). (It took time to get the civilian sales details worked out. Our major problem was to 
continue to exist and build on the strong Lewers & Cooke knowledge of building material and 
our ability to get materials sent out here.) We knew that our business was going to fall off. 
For instance, little did we know at that time that the profits that we made in 1941, (which 
were not large) would not be realized again until 1958. This just slammed us back to a point 
where it took us from '41 to '58 before we made the same profits per share again. So the war 
set the company back terribly. Forty-one was the peak year (to that date), it was a good year, 
up to December 7, and then after December 8, in those last three weeks, a whole lot of 
material moved out. Forty-two started out with a bang, because they just bought out almost 
everything we had, so that by the first of April, we had very little inventory left. Our 
lumberyard was (practically empty). 
WN: What about at the time war broke out, [were price controls enacted immediately]? 
FL: Well, my father put out a memorandum the following morning. He said, "No increase in 
prices," (until the imposed government sets up an approved new price structure for all). And 
then it was followed up very shortly by the military governor's office freezing all prices. And 
so all our prices were frozen (periodically) all during the war. And I can't remember all (the 
red tape). So we were very, very closely controlled for about four years. 
WN: [What about smaller companies? Were they controlled like Lewers & Cooke?] 
FL: (What happened to us) was really very different from what happened to a lot of others. I had 
a friend whom we sold a lot of roofing material to. Well, (the government) immediately 
(ordered a) blackout (policy), that you couldn't have any lights showing that night. He had a 
big stock. What he did, he took his rolls of roofing, and he cut 'ern up into short lengths, 
probably multiplied the price by ten and sold it. Now, nobody paid any attention to that. So 
he just cleaned up, because roofing, the roofing that he had, he was able to tum around and 
sell, there were no restrictions on him. (The government only looked at the bigger guys. And 
our profits, even though controlled, were renegotiated during the war period.) 
WN: Why weren't there restrictions on the smaller suppliers? 
FL: (I guess there were too many of them) to try and, to pick up everybody. So they were able to 
get away with it. And of course, it put them in beautiful shape, I mean they had a fantastic 
amount of money corning in, their sales just skyrocketed. You take a roll of roofing and cut it 
up into short lengths and multiply the price ten times. And people had to buy it in order to 
black out (their homes). Smaller businesses did very, very well, depending upon how they 
responded, how they reacted, how they felt about it, and so on. But it (may not have) lasted 
very long, because their inventory (decreased) and they couldn't get new supplies (for some 
time). 
WN: Right. 
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FL: (We knew that Lewers & Cooke was in deep trouble, with no incoming inventory and prices 
frozen.) You see, the first convoys didn't come in to replace any of our inventory until about 
the first week in April, (1942 and that had only parts of what we had ordered and needed) . 
We had to get approval for new orders for Mainland merchandise. We had to keep a lot more 
records. We were frozen on our prices. Whenever some new materials came in, there were 
lots of times we couldn't get a price increase (soon enough), and it cost us a lot more. So our 
profits (decreased in) 1942. We immediately started to think, how are we going to survive? 
And so, having (a good relationship with the navy, we contracted to become their lumber 
supplier). (The navy) needed a lot, whole quantities of lumber. So they came to us and said, 
"Would you put your buying organization into gear for us and start buying lumber for us?" 
(We had a Seattle buying office who dealt with the major lumber suppliers. More on this 
later.) 
And so we worked out a contract with the navy supply corps to run a big lumberyard for 
them during the whole war. We rented or leased a piece of property where the present 
[Central] YMCA [Young Men's Christian Association] is, out on Atkinson Drive. That whole 
piece of property, lying between Atkinson Drive and the [Ala Wai] Canal, we leased and had 
a huge lumberyard. We also had the (Queen Street and) Pi'ikoi Street (lumberyards). So we 
had three yards. (This gives you an idea as to how we survived: we had to close our .. home 
building department, the largest part of the business. We could not build civilian housing or 
supply much material for residential or civilian maintenance.) (Even with more people for the 
lumber operations our staff) dropped by about a third. Some were drafted, some volunteered. 
A lot we went to and simply told them, "We have no idea whether we're going to survive. If 
you can get a job from the corps of engineers, from some other government agency or 
somebody else, and it's a better job, or you feel more comfortable, we're not going to try and 
(influence you to stay)." We didn't want to keep anybody who felt that they had a better 
opportunity somewhere else. (Who knew how long this was going to last?) So we did lose a 
lot of people. And all during the war we had problems retaining enough to keep (surviving 
under the changing conditions). 
WN: Was the government paying more than you? 
FL: Government was paying a lot more than we were (in many job categories). 
WN: [What other actions did you take to survive?] 
FL: (We acted as warehouse and storage areas for the government.) Their materials that came in, 
it would be their property, and we were simply storing it until the time they needed it (such 
as food items, etc.). (We felt we could help them and help to survive if we tried to do 
everything we could to facilitate their getting goods from the Mainland and the docks. To do 
all this and keep going, we made a major new move.) (The company) opened a San Francisco 
office. Fortunately, my father had had friends in San Francisco and (to whom he wrote and 
described our problems of buying, expediting, getting shipping approval, and following up on 
all these problems, as well as informing our suppliers of the military need here). (Through 
W. P. Fuller of the Fuller Paint Company, whom Lewers & Cooke had represented, we found 
just the guy we needed.) (Lewers & Cooke hired) Mowatt M. Mitchell, a Stanford 
[University] graduate, (sight unseen but highly recommended by W.P. Fuller). He'd been in 
the diplomatic service for several years and then had gotten out and been in a couple of other 
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places and (had just completed) the job that (Fuller) had hired him for , and he was 
immediately available, and he came to work for us within a matter of, oh , hours after we 
made the proposition. And so we were extremely fortunate in having a very capable man start 
a San Francisco office for us. So he rented a space in San Francisco, (hired staff), and we 
even got word out immediately by mail to every one of our suppliers, and he got word out 
and started on the phone calling all of them, and saying that he was our representative in San 
Francisco, and to shoot everything through him. And in that way, why, we were able to 
quickly, very quickly, start a buying department in San Francisco. (Mitchell expedited, 
coordinated, and arranged for transportation which the government had to approve.) 
Now, in the Northwest on lumber, we had had a (very capable buyer) up there who was sort 
of an agent for us, he wasn't an employee. We (had) paid him on a commission basis. And so 
we just kept him on, and he was our buyer, and he bought lumber from northern California 
to, through Oregon, Washington, up and into Canada, and knew that game very, very well. 
(He now took on the problem of getting the lumber forwarded to us here to handle for the 
navy, etc. and alleviate the extra problems of government bureaucracy.) And so we kept him 
on. And so we had a lumber purchasing office up there, and we could use him also for other 
things, if they came from up there that Mr. Mitchell couldn't handle it from San Francisco. 
So again, looking for survival, why, I think probably one of the most important moves we 
made was to set up this San Francisco (office) immediately. We kept Mr. Mitchell on for 
several years up to a time when the war was (well) over, and we didn't feel we needed him 
any longer. And anyway, he wanted to stop at that point (and retire). 
WN: So because of Mr. Mitchell and the agent in the Pacific Northwest ... 
FL: Yes, his name was Jernberg, J-E-R-N-B-E-R-G. Newton Jernberg. 
WN: And having these people facilitated you getting materials faster. 
FL: Oh god, yes. We would have been at a terrible disadvantage without the two of them. And 
with Jernberg it was just a matter of (adding to his regular duties). Jernberg commanded the 
respect of anybody he dealt with, (as did Mitchell). 
WN: So they helped get the materials from the West Coast prior to April, or April was the first? 
FL: No, prior to April. (He got space lined up to coordinate with his buying but the first convoy 
did not leave until April.) 
WN: Prior to April, you . . . 
FL: Right. Another (very important) function that he performed in San Francisco, you had to get a 
shipping permit in San Francisco for (everything) that you brought down here. So there he 
was, (luckily), in San Francisco, and so he had to go down and spend many hours, every day, 
probably, trying to convince the shipping (officers) or whoever was responsible-! don't know 
what they called it-but to ship this stuff to Honolulu. (You had to have approved 
merchandise ready for shipment.) And we had to back it up by orders from the government 
here. So we were really a sort of a subsidiary department of the government, but acting on 
our own within the framework that the government set up, and had to follow all their orders. 
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WN: There were no problems, I mean, did your father feel any kind of frustration that, you 
know .. . 
FL: Well, we still . .. 
WN: .. . here he is running a business, until ... 
FL: (We were trying to do our part in winning a war. Bureaucracy was necessary. Some of it was 
good and some was very poor. We had to accept what the government was able to put 
together.) And besides, the government really didn't know what they were doing (They were) 
trying to do their best, but, you know, they would okay some of our stuff and (not others). 
Well , it was frustration over that because they had to put people into jobs who really didn't 
have any (knowledge of what it was all about). Some of them hadn't been in that sort of thing 
at all. So they were learning from us, in a way. So it was a tough (war period). And we 
didn't have enough people, so we were hiring but we were working our crews, rather than a 
forty-hour week, maybe a forty-four, forty-eight hour week. And so our costs went up very, 
very considerably, and we couldn't pass it on, until the office of price (control) approved it. 
And eventually, we (might) get these approvals, but they'd come through way after we'd had 
to sell the materials. And so our gross margins dropped. In other words, margins between 
what we bought it for and what we sold it for, dropped because we had to use the old prices. 
So they were rough years (mentally and physically and profitwise). (But we were a lot better 
off than the guys fighting the war.) 
WN: For your labor, did you raise wages at all? 
FL: I (know) we raised wages, (as we could), all during the war, (if they allowed it). (Other 
things we did to help the effort and to bring in revenue to survive) was to lease to the army 
engineers the Queen Street lumberyard property. And we leased part of our (office) at Queen 
and Cooke Street. Sales (in 1942) were 20 percent less than in 1941, even at the higher prices 
that were allowed, so that the number of units that went out during that year were 
considerably less (than in 1941). 
WN: You leased it out to the navy (and other government agencies) . . . 
FL: Oh, in order to try and bring in as much revenue as we (could to survive) because our sales 
were falling and our prices were (not keeping up with inflation). We had this contract with 
the navy which brought in (revenues). And we stored for the army food supply. They brought 
in quantities of food. We also warehoused, for them, in our warehouses a lot of food 
(because) space was available. I can remember at one time, we had several hundreds of cases 
of corned beef, and I think there probably were a lot of other foods we had, too, but I just 
happen to recall that. 
(Since there was a limited availability of shipping space, we had to cut way back on on 
civilian home building supplies at the beginning of the war. We had to close our home 
building department.) We tried everything we could to find out what the army, navy wanted, 
then would find it and arrange space to get it here for them. Because building materials were 
high priority items, we were able to get many of our orders approved. For all the islands of 
the Pacific where they were building bases, (we had a large catalog made up in 1939-40). 
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(We sent copies forward and had it reprinted as soon as they could do it so Lewers & Cooke 
was known all over the forward areas). 
WN: Did your father hire women? 
FL: Oh yes, the number of women started to go up. Our staff, in 1942, included twenty-two 
women, or 7 percent of our regular employees, compared to an average of approximately 
3-1/2 percent of women employees prior to the war. So we had, we doubled up on women in 
the first year. And I gather, during later years we probably increased women as-you know, 
if we could find them and they could (perform our kind ot) work. (We were happy to have 
them.) 
WN: What kind of jobs did they normally do? 
FL: Well, in those days, you didn't usually use women for warehousing work (or for handling 
lumber). I mean, it wasn't thought, it wasn't considered-so I think most of them went on in 
stenographic work, clerical work, telephone work, taking orders, double-checking. For 
instance, they were good, excellent on doing all this double-checking on the government 
orders that came into us. And that had to be double-checked to make sure they had proper 
(purchase) orders backing them up (so that the government bureaucracy couldn't haggle about 
and not pay the bill). 
WN: And prior to that, men were doing that? 
FL: Prior to that, (we had less problems with people not paying bills). We had some of those 
women, 3-112 percent of women that we had were doing it, but now more women wanted 
jobs, and so we could, wherever we could find one, you know, we would hire them. And 
they were capable girls. (Before, we did not have all this government bureaucratic work to do 
and we had few job applications from women.) 
WN: What about students? 
FL: I have no recollection of students coming to work for us. There may have been some, I just 
don't have any recollection of that. Certainly if they'd wanted to come to work for us, we 
would have taken them. 
WN: Okay. While we're on the subject of labor, was there any kind of union activity involving 
Lewers and Cooke? 
FL: No, the union activity, as I recall, did not start until after the end of the war. Our first 
experience with organized (labor) was a group of men that worked in the lumberyard. (They 
may have been extras--not hired on a regular work week. We had to use a number of extras 
because we never knew when certain materials were coming, particularly lumber which came 
in large amounts few times a year.) And they signed up, and the union (wanted to) negotiate. 
And then, lo and behold, within about sixty days, we got a petition from 84 percent of those 
who had signed up with the union, saying, "We don't want the union." 
And so, we were caught in a bind. The union said we represent these people, but 84 percent 
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of those who signed up (changed their minds). We've got to respect the wishes of our 
employees, and we did not negotiate. The matter did not come up again, until after this long, 
very violent serious strike (of 1949, when our problems really began). (Nineteen forty-nine 
began a period that was much more difficult for Lewers & Cooke than the war was.) 
END OF INTERVIEW 
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Tape Nos. 22-13-3-92, 22-14-3-92 and 22-15-3-92 
ORAL HISTORY INTERVIEW 
with 
Frederick P. Lowrey (FL) 
February 26, 1992 
Makiki, O'ahu 
BY: Warren Nishimoto (WN) 
WN: This is an interview with Mr. Fred Lowrey on February 26, 1992, at his home in Makiki, 
O'ahu. The interviewer is Warren Nishimoto. 
Okay. This is our third interview and we had some slight technical problems last time. So I'd 
like to back up just a little bit and ask you some questions that I've asked you last time that 
somehow didn't get on the tape. 
FL: Okay. Fine. 
WN: Last time I asked you about bomb shelters. 
FL: Yeah. 
WN: And I was just wondering, you people built one and how the fact that everybody else was 
building bomb shelters, how that affected your business. 
FL: I don't think it had really very much effect on the business, although it may have had some. 
Because we had considerable difficulty, you see, selling to private individuals. We had to get 
an approval to sell almost any building material of any structural value. We couldn't sell 
without a permit from the government. And most of the type of materials that would go into 
bomb shelters would be of that type. So I doubt whether---they may have approved some and 
they may not, I really don't have a recollection. So I'll tell you what we did. I went down to 
the junkyard and I found a used truck body that hauled sand and rock and that sort of thing. 
And it was junk and for sale, and they hauled it up to my house for me. I bought it. We 
tipped it upside down on the ground on the terrace outside the house. And then I put a piece 
of some type of a water shield over the top. Whether it was plastic, or something I was able 
to get a hold of, or not, I don't remember. And then we were able to get somehow-1 don't 
know how we were able but we were able to get sandbags some way, I think. Or sacks, 
gunny sacks, or something. I know, maybe it was from concrete or something-used concrete 
ones or something. But anyway, so then we filled those with sand and then built a sort of a 
wall around it of sand. And then went and put something over the roof. I guess anything we 
had lying around the place we put on the roof to give it some more {protection). I don't know 
that we used it more than three or four times. When a couple of those sirens went off-one or 
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two times-why we may have used it. 
I did phone my (eldest) daughter, who was only a couple of years old at the time. And I 
phoned her over the weekend and said, "Do you have any recollections of Maunalani Heights 
when we lived up there and the war?" 
And she said, "Yes, I do. I remember you getting a telephone call and being quite concerned. 
And you talked to Mother. I don't remember the conversation but I do remember your going 
over to a locked desk, and opening it and getting out a gun." 
And at that time I had a (.22) Colt automatic, which was small caliber. It shot "long rifle" 
(shells). It was the only gun I had-had it for years. Matter of fact, my wife and I had bought 
it when we were driving across the continent on our honeymoon. And if you come through 
the state of Colorado-they had no rules whatsoever about it. And I saw this gun there and I 
thought, "Gee, you know, maybe where we're going and all maybe we ought to have a gun." 
So I bought it and I taught her how to use it. So when I left the house that day to go down to 
my job, down at Lewers & Cooke, I think I left the gun with her and showed her (again) 
how-filled it, the what do you call it? The thing that held the shells and the bullets and so 
on. And left it with her. And my daughter remembers that. She was only about three, three-
and-a-half years old. And then she says she does remember the bomb shelter and she 
remembers the sirens going off overhead once. I think there was once or twice when we had 
sirens. And she said she still has some fear, and it's left her with residue-psychological 
residue-of those years. 
And she says that, "Maybe it's one reason why I am very fond of a house, and don't like to 
move, and so on. I don't know what the whole psychology of it is." 
So we had a bomb shelter. But it wasn't . . . 
WN: Was it stocked with anything? Canned goods or so forth? 
FL: No. Not that I recall. Because it was within a very short running distance of the house. And I 
sort of felt, I guess, that if it came to that I could run out and get some kaukau and get back. 
(Laughter) 
WN: Was it tall enough to stand up in? 
FL: No. No, no. It was, I'd say at the most, three-and-a-half feet high. In other words, it was the 
depth of a dump truck turned upside down. In other words, that would be the height of it. 
WN: I imagine the kids must have had some fun with it. 
FL: Well, they probably used it-played house out there and that sort of thing with it. The kids in 
the neighborhood probably came over there and so on. (When I think of it now and the shell 
that hit the King Street building, what we had built was not all that substantial, perhaps 
useless.) 
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WN: How did the war affect your home life and family life? 
FL: It was a strain because of my hours . I had to get to work early, being an officer of the 
company and all. And we started early. And, of course, we supplied the contractors who 
started early. And the army was working twenty-four hours a day during all of the first year 
of the war. So that we kept a crew on at Lewers & Cooke, I believe, for the first year. 
Somebody was in the warehouse, and the lumberyard, and so on, all night long to fill any 
orders that the armed forces might want. So I felt it my responsibility to get down to work in 
time, and we started work at 7:30 [A.M.]. So that meant leaving the house really very early. 
And I had to drop the kids off at school. That got them at school way early, and so on. But 
there were other kids, I guess, that were in the same situation so they played with other kids 
until school started. And then it was sometimes very late when I got home. And then the 
blackout, of course, really disrupted things. All parties ceased-for several months there were 
no parties. I guess there were more divorces in Honolulu in the early years of the war than in 
any short period of time. Husbands and wives couldn't get along with each other because their 
(social) relationship had been changed. They used to go out and see other people and be able 
to do other things. Now they were pushed together. And they were very-they had to be very 
close. And if they couldn't be close then there was trouble. I remember several of our friends 
got divorces. And then when there was room on some of the clippers going out, several of the 
wives who were afraid at being here, they left. They got up and left their husbands. And then 
they couldn't get back. And I remember one couple-she went back. Actually, she was a local 
girl but she went and stayed with her husband's family-! think it was in Texas-for the 
balance of the war. And they came back, and then they got together again. But it was really a 
very disruptive situation. On the other hand, it was a very interesting situation. We had 
(Mainland) friends-classmates of mine (or Janet's friends) who came through here (on the 
way to forward assignments) and would give (us) a call. Then when they'd get time off we'd 
invite them up for a (meal). I'd pick them up Downtown and bring them up. I have no 
recollection of how we got them home, at this point. Whether I drove them home at night 
with the blackout lights or. . . . A couple of them that we knew very well we kept overnight. 
In other words we put up a bunk out in the living room and so on. And I remember several 
of them slept overnight and then we could take them back the next day. And then, of course, 
my wife had friends who (came through). But what they would (also) do would be to have a 
friend and so on and they say, "Well, look up so-and-so," and, "Look up Janet Lowrey." So 
we had some very interesting people coming through on their way out to forward bases and 
so on. But we had very little gasoline. I would say we practically never went out during the 
week at night. (The day after Pearl Harbor I went and bought the most powerful radio I could 
locate. It helped us keep in touch with things around the world.) The only real (outside) 
recreation that we could get would be on Saturdays and Sundays. Our typical family life on 
Sunday would be to go up and visit my grandfather, who lived up Nu'uanu Valley. And we'd 
go up and spend part of the afternoon with him and then-to the extent we had any 
gasoline-we'd drive around and show the kids places, and (visit other friends). (We made it 
a happy time.) 
Later in the war I joined the Outrigger Club. And that was a great opportunity because it 
meant that the kids could go out there swimming. And Janet could take the kids out there 
if-again, if there was gasoline. And we didn't have two cars until quite late. Late in the war 
(or later) I was able to pick up another second-hand car. And I guess at that time they were a 
little freer on gasoline. I know we used to go out Sunday nights to Outrigger for dinner. The 
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kids loved it because they could eat and then go out and play on the beach while Janet and I 
finished, and maybe talked with other people and so on. So we had that advantage. And also 
that gave us (social) contact with other people (whom we) would have otherwise completely 
lost during those years . And so I've always looked back on those weekends as happy 
occasions because it did give us a chance as a family to get out and do a few things, but not 
travel very far because again of gasoline problems. Now later, as the war got further and 
further on they were much easier on gasoline and we could do more things. And so briefly, 
that .. . 
WN: I asked you one time about the businessmen's military training corps and how a lot of big 
business people got involved in it. Did you get involved in that at all? 
FL: Well, it was something a lot of people wanted to get into and we had requests at Lewers & 
Cooke from all of our younger guys, and even some of the senior officers. Lewers Paris, who 
was always considered the number two man in the company. If my father had suddenly died 
why he would probably would have been the one who'd have been elected president. He 
wanted to be in it. And a lot of the other younger fellows wanted to be in it. And the problem 
was I felt the same way, in a way, and yet I didn't like to leave my wife alone with-she 
had-our third child was born in early 1942. I think it was February. February 3, '42. So she 
was hllpai for the first several weeks of the war there. And then, of course, was in the 
hospital. And we had a heck of a time getting her to the hospital the night that she thought the 
child was going to be born because it was a blackout. And god, we eased our way down the 
hill-top of Maunalani Heights-and we got down to the bottom. And we were very fortunate 
in that as we were about to tum out onto Kaimukl A venue and head down toward the 
(Kapi'olani) Maternity Hospital right across the street over here, a policeman came along. 
And he waved us over and he says, "Where are you going?" 
I said, "I'm trying to get my wife to the hospital." I says, "She's got beginning labor pains." 
And he was nice as hell, I mean just wonderful. 
He said, "Park your car here in this service station." He says, "I'll take you down." 
So I said, "Well, how am I going to get back?" (I had to get back to the two young ones at 
home.) 
"Oh, we'll worry about that later." 
So we got Janet down to the hospital, and got her entered into the hospital, and everything 
was all right. So I said goodbye to her, goodnight. And she wasn't at that critical period when 
you knew the baby was going to be born that night or anything. But this was her first--well 
no, it wasn't. It was her third experience. As it turned out, it was a false alarm and we had to 
do the whole thing over again two weeks later. 
(Laughter) 
FL: But the police were very, very helpful. (I think they got me back to my car in Kaimuki.) 
Now, to get back to the question you asked about my joining it. My father came to me-l 
may have gone to him and said, "How about me joining that?" 
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And he turned to me and he said, "Fred, I wish that you wouldn't do it." He said, "All the 
others want to go. I don't want to tum them all down. If you go there isn't anybody of officer 
or junior officer status that I have left that I can count on if something should go wrong." So 
he said, "I would prefer that you not do it and then you're available. I'm sure I can count on 
you if-in being available-if something should happen and we need to have somebody down 
at the office or something like that." So I didn't ever have that fun of being in it. I've always 
regretted it. They all got--they all had uniforms, they all carried guns, you know. Everybody 
that was in it thought he was a big shot (and constantly talked about interesting experiences 
they all had). 
(Laughter) 
WN: What did they have to do? What were their duties? 
FL: Well, they rode sort of shotgun. (Laughs) That's not a very good word, but they rode as a 
second to a police officer. They never were alone, but they were there to assist the police 
officer. It made the police not have to send two police officers out. They could send a police 
officer and then one of these businessman policemen, so-called. And they were given training 
and so forth and so on to do it and were able to assist. And a lot of them did a lot of good. 
You know, if a policeman had a guy that was a little bit rough, why, having a second guy 
there was very helpful. And . . . 
WN: Did they get paid at all? 
FL: No. No, I don't think so. 
WN: Were there any advantages, besides being able to carry a gun? I mean, did you get a higher 
gas ration or anything like that? 
FL: I suspect they did. I'm sure they did because they couldn't have operated otherwise. So 
they-I'm just talking off the top of my head now but it must have been that way. 
WN: And did Mr. Paris join? 
FL: Yes. And all guys my age joined. And (it) was (the) conversation (of the day). They'd come 
in the following morning and the trouble was how did you get people to start to go to work 
because they were all talking about their experiences of the night before. 
(Laughter) 
FL: Where they'd been, and what they'd done, and that sort of thing. But it was in a way a good 
diversion from the pressure and stress of the war. 
WN: So you were-you didn't serve in the military and you didn't serve in this. Did you feel at all 
any kind of disappointment that you weren't ... 
FL: Yeah, and I felt-1 sort of felt guilty about it, as if I should be doing something else. And 
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that's one reason why I did get into a lot of things that could be done during daylight hours. 
For instance, I think I gave you a copy of that-remember I won that award in 1942 or '43? 
And its---they're all listed in there. 
WN: Right. 
FL: But I've forgotten all the things-I can get into that if you want to. 
WN: Okay. 
FL: I think I've got a listing. I think I have a copy of it here. 
(Pause) 
WN: You mean the article? 
FL: Yeah. Because I just don't remember. 
WN: Okay. 
FL: This was entitled-! don't know which paper it was in. I guess it was in both. But it was 
headed, "Frederick P. Lowery Honored by Junior Chamber of Commerce for Outstanding 
Service During 1944." So this would have been as the war was tapering off and so on. And it 
starts out, "Frederick P. Lowery, 33, assistant treasurer and secretary of Lewers & Cooke" 
and so on. I had been in the Junior Chamber of Commerce and I think I was treasurer of the 
YMCA [Young Men's Christian Association] and so on. 
WN: And you-it says here that you were ill at home with a cold so you weren't able to attend the 
dinner. (Laughs) 
FL: That's right. I had the flu. They said "cold." I had the flu . I had a bad case of flu and so I 
never got to the meeting, which was very unfortunate. But I always felt fairly good about this 
award [distinguished service award of the Honolulu Junior Chamber of Commerce] because 
the committee that gave it was Hosmer Rolph, who was a vice president of Castle & Cooke; 
and Harry Field was the chief engineer and an officer of the Hawaiian Electric Company; 
Peter McLean was a vice president of Hawaiian Trust; Gregg M. Sinclair was president of the 
University of Hawai'i; and Shigeo Soga was head of The Hawai'i Times, the newspaper. So I 
felt that this was really quite an honor because of the type of guy that made it. In other 
words, that committee picked me out of other guys to do it. (I must have been doing quite a 
few community service type of things from early in the war and perhaps before.) 
WN: So you're--let's see. The name of the award is "The Distinguished Service Award of the 
Honolulu Junior Chamber of Commerce." 
FL: Yeah. Now they gave that out for a period of about ten years and then they decided to change 
their policy and they gave out several awards each year. And that went on for several years. 
And then recently, I haven't-I don't know whether they still do this or not. You know, at 
age eighty why I'm not material for the Junior Chamber of Commerce. 
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(Laughter) 
FL: And so I really don't know what goes on in there anymore. But at that time I was, according 
to this, let me see. It says, ". . .. was chosen because of his community services in the 
following fields .... " Oh, I was on the city planning commission at the time. I was on a 
special committee that had been appointed to look into the wharf situation as to where the new 
wharf should be built. And I was treasurer of the YMCA. Oh, another thing I did was-I felt 
I was never-I never liked to go to church. I was forced to go to church from the time I was 
about four or five years old. And so I really hated church. And when I got to Andover they 
had church twice on Sunday. They had church every day. In other words you went to chapel 
before you went to school. And then twice on Sunday you had to go. Well that sort of cured 
me of ever wanting to go to church. And I married a girl whose family was not particularly 
church-oriented and so on and didn't go to church very much. So that gave me an additional 
excuse. So we never--while we were members of Central Union [Church] and made a 
(financial) contribution every year to Central Union, which I always have and still do, we 
weren't very good members. So I felt though that I should do something in the line of church 
work. And so I was asked to be a member of the Hawaiian Evangelical Association, (serving 
with several very prominent older men), which was the senior organization that held all of the 
properties for the congregational churches. And they literally held hundreds of pieces of 
properties all over these islands. Wherever there was a little Hawaiian church in the early 
day, that property belonged to the-was given to the church and was owned by the Hawaiian 
Evangelical Association. And I remember one of the things, perhaps, contributions that I 
helped to make to that organization was I asked one day, I said, "Do we have title papers to 
all of these and have they been (cleared through the state land court)?" And we found out on 
investigation that no, we (had not cleared a lot of them). So one of the projects that I 
suggested that they do was to bring up to date a study of all of the properties that the 
Hawaiian Evangelical had, because they were worth-they literally could be worth thousands 
and thousands of dollars. And they had a lot of clauses in them; they could only be used for 
church property and so forth and so on. But over a period of time, why, some of those things 
by court could be changed. 
And it says that I was a member of the maritime affairs committee of the Chamber of 
Commerce. There was a lot of discussion as to where the next major wharf should be built. 
Because most of the wharves were built down at the 'Ewa end of town and were almost all 
owned by the Dillingham Corporation. They later-the state [territory] and the Dillingham 
Corporation got together-and the state [territory] bought all of that from the Dillinghams. 
And a lot of the funds that came to build the [Ala Moana] Shopping Center probably came 
from the state's purchase of the Dillingham wharf properties, and so on. And my feeling was 
that this was the area [East Honolulu] that was the (first area) of growth at that time, and for 
the next say ten or fifteen to twenty years was going to be toward Koko Head. And so I felt 
that if we built any more wharves we should build them around the Pier 2 area (near the 
Honolulu Harbor entrance). And it was as a result of that thinking that the planning 
commission decided to recommend that-the Harbor Board recommended that. And that 
big---those great big facilities-huge facilities-at Pier 2 were built to-where ships could 
supply the Waikfk£-Diamond Head side of town-as distinct from the other side of town 
where there was ample wharf facilities. There were no covered wharf facilities at Pier 2 in the 
early days. It was all just open concrete. And they'd bring lumber in there but they didn't 
bring anything that could get damaged by the rain and so on. 
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WN: So were wharf facilities actually built? 
FL: Yeah. Yeah. The same facilities that are there today. 
WN: Is that like Kewalo Basin area or .. . 
FL: Well it's at-the entrance to the harbor is called Pier 2. 
WN: I see. 
FL: All that whole great big pier area in there is Pier 2. All of the-until you get to where the 
Coast Guard is. Coast Guard I think is Pier 3. So all the docks at the mouth of the harbor was 
all called Pier 2. And all of the buildings that were built on that were built at that time. 
So that's a brief summary of this. In other words these were some of the things I did in the 
community because I felt maybe I wasn't doing my fair share. I wasn't at war where some of 
my friends were, I wasn't doing these police duties and been asked not to. So I felt, you 
know, I'd get out and do some other things in the community. And these were apparently a 
few that they took into consideration. (I was often the youngest member which gave me 
wonderful experience with experienced people.) 
WN: You were telling me a story about you getting-you spending a night in jail. 
FL: Oh yeah. (Laughs) 
WN: Can you tell me about that? 
FL: Oh yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah (laughs). I didn't spend the full night in jail. It was a Friday at 
lunchtime. My father had insisted that a senior officer of the company-and I was corporate 
secretary, which automatically made me a senior officer-had to be on duty at times, from 
early in the morning until we closed. And so one Friday noon, while I was in the office there, 
the others had all gone to lunch. And I had to go to lunch either before or afterward because I 
had to stay on duty there. And in walked these two huge military policemen. God, you know, 
they looked about six feet six [inches] high, and they were carrying sidearms, and all in 
uniform and so on. And they asked for the manager. Well, in a sense I was the manager on 
duty. I was the senior one on duty. And they said, "You're under arrest." 
And I said, "What for?" 
I'm not sure whether they told me or not. But anyway they said, "Come on with us. You're 
going down to the police station." And of course, the military were running the police station 
at that time. So I had to walk through town with these two military police. (Laughs) One on 
each side of me. And I don't know what my friends thought. 
(Laughter) 
FL: And so I got down there and they would hardly let me tell what had happened, or could I fmd 
out from them what it was (all about). But apparently it had to do with they claiming that we 
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had broken a rule of the military governor. That we had sold some Black Leaf 40, which was 
a-oh, what would you call it? It was a . . . 
WN: An insecticide or pesticide? 
FL: Yeah. It was an insecticide for flowers and that sort of thing. And it was poisonous. I don't 
know what it had in it. Anyway. And you'd sell it by the quart or less. And under the rules 
we were entitled to sell it. We had a small garden department. And under the rules we were 
allowed to sell it, providing we had authority. And providing that we sold it to somebody who 
had gotten permission to buy it. And this elderly Japanese man who grew flowers, I think, up 
on the top of Maunalani Heights. Up in that whole area was all carnations in those days. 
There weren't very many houses up in the upper part. So he'd gotten permission to buy this. 
We sold it legitimately. But somebody (outside) got up in arms about it and thought we'd 
broken the rules and so forth and so on. And so I tried to explain the whole thing to the guy 
at the desk-booking desk-and I got nowhere with him. He didn't know what it was all 
about. But you know, these were young junior officers or enlisted men and so on. They didn't 
want to make a mistake so they took me downstairs and put me in the Bastille that was down 
in the basement, or whatever they-their cells down in the basement. It's in the old police 
station down at Merchant and Nu'uanu. And they wouldn't let me make any telephone calls. I 
thought, you know, I (needed to) get back to Lewers & Cooke and get somebody to come 
down, or get an attorney to come down and bail me out. I didn't have any money on me, and 
I don't know whether they would even let me put up bail at that point. And so they put me 
downstairs. It was dark in there-no lights. And I saw this-when my eyes got used to the 
dark-1 saw this man huddled in the-lying on the floor. And I tried to talk to him, but he 
didn't talk very good English. But I got the impression that he might have been the guy we 
had sold the stuff to. And so I waited and waited and waited, and thought, "My god, am I 
going to get out of here, or am I going to stay overnight here, too. 
WN: Right. 
FL: Finally, I raised quite a bit of hell so finally somebody upstairs decided that, I guess, maybe 
they weren't carrying out their duties properly and they let me-or they made a phone call. 
Or maybe, maybe it didn't happen that way at all. Maybe somebody at Lewers & Cooke 
found that I had been taken out and the other guys noticed that these guys had taken me out, 
so they thought I was in the police station. So somebody else, late in the afternoon at Lewers 
& Cooke-I hadn't come back-went down to the police station and somehow found enough 
money to put up enough bail. And they got me out late in the afternoon. Then a couple weeks 
later, I was taken to military court and Roy Vitousek-that's the father of the present Roy 
that's here now-and grandfather of the youngest one that's here. He represented---he was our 
corporation attorney-Lewers & Cooke's attorney-and he represented me. And we had quite 
a battle explaining the whole thing to the military judge and so on, but they finally let me off. 
And then I think we helped get the Japanese man off too. And so that we cleared the whole 
record. But we hadn't done anything wrong. But this was typical of the type of thing that 
happened during the early months of the war. In other words, everything was fubar. You 
know, snafu or fubar, whichever word you want to use. Fouled up beyond all recognition, 
you know. 
WN: Would you call it a kangaroo court? 
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FL: It was a kangaroo court, of the way we think of it. There was no jury or anything like that. 
You had a single (military) judge (who was often untrained) and he just made automatic 
decisions. And you know, you could be madder than hell at him, and yet looking at the other 
side of it, (the community) had to have some law and order because some guys were always 
trying to break rules. So you had to look at the two sides of the thing and say, "Well jesus, 
he's a bastard but at least he's trying to do a job." And while you were mad as hell at him, 
and I was mad as hell, and Roy Vitousek was mad as hell at him and the way he handled the 
whole thing, in looking at it in retrospect, there had to be something like this during that 
(early) period of time or law and order would have just been out the window. The local 
courts couldn't have handled it. They wouldn't have known how to handle the thing. The 
normal laws wouldn't have handled the situation. So like it or not-and I didn't like it 
particularly, none of us did-I think it was something we had to put up with. And we had to 
put up with it for a couple of years. Now maybe they kept it on longer than necessary 
[martial law in Hawai'i lasted until October 24, 1944] but as time went on they got people 
that were better in the job and understood things better. And there weren't the same types of 
problems later on. 
WN: Did they get more polished as the war years went on? 
FL: Yeah, yeah, yeah. Definitely, definitely. 
WN: And when did this occur? 
FL: Well, I would say it must have been within a matter of two or three weeks after the war 
(started). See, what they thought was this guy had this poison and he might put it in the water 
supply and then a lot of people would get sick. That was their line of reasoning. And so it 
was, you know, one of those interesting experiences. (Laughs) 
WN: So that's-so what happened to you was sort of like the negative aspects of martial law. Or, 
you know, you're saying that martial law was something that was necessary but there were 
some glitches to it. 
FL: Oh yeah. Definitely, definitely, definitely. A lot of glitches (chuckles). And people were 
really upset about it. They [the military government] didn't seem to know how to use reason. 
And they didn't have any understanding of what normal peacetime law was. 
WN: Would you say that martial law helped Lewers & Cooke in the business or hindered it? 
FL: That is very hard to say because it would involve a judgement on how bad things would have 
been had there not been military law. You know, we like to think that everybody is a law-
abiding citizen but, you know, there aren't. We know it from just reading the daily papers. 
And even today there are hundreds and hundreds of cases of people that are doing things that 
aren't according to law. Well, when you have a situation where everybody is under the stress 
that we were during the war, this sort of thing multiplies. And I think that things would have 
gotten completely out of control if we hadn't had the-literally having the military court up 
there put a sense of fear into everybody. "Look, maybe you better be a little bit more 
cautious on what you do, and don't do some damn fool thing." And so I think it had its place. 
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WN: Did it create more paperwork than normal? 
FL: No. Not that part of it because-but the thing that created the paperwork was all the literally 
scores of other types of (regulations) that we had to follow. For instance, we had to get a 
permit for every single (transaction). We had to get a permit to order from the Mainland, and 
that had to be signed by some organization. Because the buyer that we bought from couldn't 
sell it to us until he had a military order approving the sale to come to Hawai'i. Then we had 
to get shipping papers approved to bring it from wherever it was on the East Coast, or the 
Midwest, or wherever it was to the coast, to a docking facility. And then we had to get a 
permit from a shipping authority (from San Francisco, mostly) to bring the stuff to Honolulu 
or it couldn't come down here. So it was just one thing after another that you had to get 
approval on. So the paperwork, yes. The paperwork increased, I don't know, I'd say maybe it 
went up ten times. Not only to accomplish getting the merchandise down here but then also 
handling the paperwork in such a way that you could get paid for it. Because if you didn't 
have the proper invoices-I mean the proper purchase orders-signed by proper people, they 
wouldn't even consider your bill to them. So we had literally hundreds and hundreds of 
thousands of dollars tied up for a couple of years in accounts receivable because they couldn't 
handle the (load). 
WN: So it took a long time to get paid? 
FL: Oh yeah. It took us long time. I'd say some bills we didn't get paid for over two years. 
WN: So after the war was over too, you were still trying to ... 
FL: Well, as the war tapered down it got better. So that I would say when the war was all over 
we still probably had some but my memory just doesn't help me there. But I don't think we 
lost a hell of a lot on bad accounts, because we were very careful. Had we not been careful, 
had we not set up this whole system, we could have lost literally hundreds of thousands of 
dollars, and we never could have proved that we supplied them with the merchandise and they 
wouldn't have paid us for it. 
WN: Did other businesses go under because they weren't careful? 
FL: I don't know. It's perfectly possible. A lot of businesses went under during that period of 
time. And I just have no clear recollection as to how many did. But you had to set up all of 
this bureaucracy to handle it. We set up-as I think I mentioned-we had a buyer in Seattle 
and we designated him as our agent up there to handle all of our stuff. All of our lumber and 
all of our plywood and all the products from the Pacific Northwest. And then we hired a man 
in San Francisco by the name of Mowat M. Mitchell, who was a graduate of Stanford and 
had been in the foreign service, and had worked for W. P. Fuller & Company. But god, we 
couldn't have (survived) without him. And he got a--he hired a secretary, and then he would 
hires such additional other help as he would need. He had to keep in touch with all of the 
shipping organization there. He had to keep in touch with the warehousing on the West Coast. 
He had to keep in touch by phone-we couldn't phone from here (too much) because of 
the-partly the cost but also the-oh, what do you call the, you know, the restrictions of 
writing letters. All our letters went through that, what did they call it? 
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WN: Censors. 
FL: Censors. So we couldn't make telephone calls in a lot of cases because of the possibility of 
not (giving information to Japan). So we would have to do it through our office in San 
Francisco (by mail). And this guy was just wonderful. He caught on right away. He got a 
very good secretary and she was with us during the whole time that he was. And the two of 
them, plus what other help they needed, then just took care of (our suppliers)-they could 
telephone to San Francisco, you see, and make whatever arrangements they wanted. If they 
didn't have the proper authorization, why, we then could get the authorization to them and 
then handle the shipping instructions, and the shipping approvals, and so on, that were 
needed. 
END OF SIDE ONE 
SIDE TWO 
WN: Okay. So, you know, there were some difficulty in getting materials from the Mainland to sell 
in your store (and lumberyard). 
FL: Oh. Terrific. We couldn't get anything. We couldn't get anything without approval. Not an 
order could come through without approval, as I recall it. 
WN: Okay. And then, you know, you had trouble getting paid by the government . . . 
FL: Right. (They just did not have the staff to put our invoices through even though the invoices 
were in order.) 
WN: . .. for all of these things. Was Lewers & Cooke turning a profit during the war? 
FL: This was a very serious situation. We had a situation where if we got merchandise in it could 
be immediately sold because somebody-some government had ordered it. So there was an 
immediate sale for it. So it wasn't like the 1949 [longshore] strike situation where you 
couldn't get material, but when you got it you couldn't sell it because things were so bad that 
(people couldn't) buy it. So we had a ready market for anything that came in. Just to give you 
an idea, our (net) profits in 1941 were ($422,000). In 1942 our profits went (down even 
though) we sold out practically our whole inventory (and most of what was allowed to come 
in). And then we were able to get materials and as soon as that came in, it went out. But then 
the profits started to drop. So they went from ($422,000) in ('41) to ($289,000) in ('42). (In 
1943) they dropped to ($127,000). In 1945 it dropped to ($121,000). The controls at that time 
and our inability to get price increases, even though the price to us was increased, but we 
couldn't increase our prices. So our margin of profits dropped to a (very low) point. And then 
the following year, 1946, they went up a little bit, but they were still only ($170,000). In 
1947 they went up to a little over ($256,000). Remember they (later) came back and 
renegotiated the profits for 1942 and we had to give quite a bit of our profit back that year, as 
I recall. In 1941 we paid almost $400,000 in taxes. By 1945 we paid only $111,000 in taxes 
because we hadn't made (much) profit, which shows you the terrific additional cost that we 
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had to put on. This involved the San Francisco office extra work, the extra work in Seattle, 
all of the extra people we had to put on in Honolulu doing paperwork. 
WN: Plus overtime. 
FL: Plus overtime. A lot of overtime. Because we kept on people all night long and we felt we 
should pay time-and-a-half for over forty hours. And we may have even paid time-and-a-half 
for anybody who worked at night, if they didn't work during the day. I don't recall that-1 
mean the facts on that. So ... 
WN: And does that--do those figures take into account like delinquent accounts? 
FL: Well, I've got the net merchandise sales. And the net merchandise sales in '41 were 
$7,582,000. In 1942 they dropped to $6 million. In 1943 they dropped to $5 million. Then 
they started to go up in 1944 to $5.9 [million]. In 1945 it was $5,800,000, and by 1946 we 
began to come out of the thing and we got up to $7.8 [million]. And then by 1947 we got up 
to $12.9 million-almost $13 million. But then the (real) war (the longshore strike) hit us in 
1949 and the sales dropped from approximately [$13 million down to $8.6 million]. (These 
figures of course included the inflation in prices that was taking place at that time, so the 
amount of merchandise was less by the amount of inflation of prices by manufacturers.) 
WN: Forty-nine. Are you talking about the strike, you mean? 
FL: The strike. (The long one originating in San Francisco and the West Coast.) 
WN: Okay. 
FL: The strike---we went from (about) $13 million sales in 1947 (and 1948) to less than $9 million 
sales in 1949. 
WN: Okay. So with the war then there was the difficulty in getting materials, there was the wages 
going up, the labor that you had to pay, the fixing of the prices, not being able to raise 
prices, you had delinquent accounts and so forth. So even though you had a pretty good 
demand on your inventory, you weren't making any money. 
FL: That's right. That's right. Profits fell way the heck off. (A normal legitimate profit was 
needed to keep the business healthy and able to grow and pay higher wages and attract 
capital.) 
WN: If you were to make some profits would you have been able to keep profits? Were there profit 
controls? 
FL: Well (yes, in the war years). You can see what happened (to profits with price controls. 
Profits fell from $422,000 in 1941 to $289,000 in 1942.) And they had renegotiated that and 
said we had made too much money that year. So we were set back (plenty). We were set back 
pretty badly from a profit point of view during the war years. But nothing compared to the 
way we were just creamed during the shipping strike. 
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WN: Okay. We can get into the shipping strike later. 
FL: Yeah. 
WN: Okay. So you' re saying then that a business like yours which is a-I guess you would 
consider it a big business. 
FL: Well, I wouldn't call it a big business. I would say we (may have been) the biggest-probably 
the biggest-in our field (but was American Factors, Theo H. Davies, City Mill, and others). 
But we were not considered part of the Big Five and we were not considered (at any time to 
be in that league). I would say we were the second tier. Second tier company in Honolulu. 
WN: Okay. And, you know, as far as profits are concerned wasn't too good. And then you have 
some small businesses who really made out during the war. 
FL: Well, yeah. Some people really did-some people (laughs) did really quite well because they 
were able to take advantage of the thing a little bit more. My father and my grandfather were 
very strict people. And my father put out a rule-and I don't have a copy of it but I 
remember it very clearly-that we were not to take advantage of the government. We were in 
this to win the war. And that while we should get whatever was due us and all, and do 
everything we could to help them, we were not to overcharge in any way. And so that got 
around and anybody knew that if they overcharged, why, you know, they were going to be 
subject to a reprimand and so on. So we kept our records pretty clean that way and everybody 
had to follow the rules. Now we did immediately start to apply for approval to get higher 
prices, because wages went up, hours went up, work went up that the government was 
requiring us, and the cost of materials coming to us-when it did come-went up. So we had 
to find some way to cover those. But they did it gradually through-they had a regular-what 
was it? WPA, War Profit . . . 
WN: Works Progress Administration? 
FL: Well, it's something to do with prices. I think there was a price (control) administration and 
every price increase had to go through them. 
WN: OP A, I think. Office of Price Administration. 
FL: That's probably the one. That's probably the one. 
WN: Urn hmm, urn hmm. 
FL: Now, have I answered your question? 
WN: Just about. Well, why don't we just get into .. . 
FL: Oh, you asked about some of the other people making a lot of profits. I gave you the 
example .. . 
WN: Right. You gave some examples. 
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FL: Do you want that example? 
WN: The roofing? 
FL: Yeah. 
WN: Yeah, I think you gave me that. We have that on tape already so that's fine. 
FL: Okay, check. 
WN: Okay. So the war is just about ending, 1945. What were some of the ... 
FL: I would say from the financial point of view, certainly we were getting back to better profits 
by 1948 (but only $268,000 versus $422,000 in 1941). And sales were good and profits were 
somewhat better. But we still were way, way below profits before the war, even at that point. 
For instance, in 1948-and there hadn't been any major strikes that year-our sales were at 
the highest rate of sales we had ever had. But our profits-net earnings per share were only 
$1.39, whereas in 1940 they had been $1.69. And in 1941 they were $2.40. So seeing that 
we only had the war for three weeks in 1941, (our profit was) $2.40 a share. And that then 
dropped all during the war. Some years-well, here it is, 1943 we made seventy-two cents, 
seventy-nine cents in '44, '45 fifty-five cents, 1946 we only made eighty-two cents, and then 
they began to creep up. But in 1948 we only made $1.39 as against $2.40 in 1941. But we 
had (begun to) recover. We had recovered in other ways that we had our-you know, our 
objectives were to try and consolidate things at Pi'ikoi Street, get out of some of our other 
properties-leased properties-and start to move down there. We had been able to make some 
progress by 1948 on ~oving some of those things down and consolidating some of those 
things there. So that we had made progress toward getting ready for the post-war period. But 
never did we expect to run into the 1949 shipping strike and this was just a disaster for us, 
which we'll come to. 
WN: As the war ended did you notice any definite change from before the war and after the war 
ended in terms of, for example, being able to raise prices and things like that? Wages . . . 
FL: Well at that time we were, I guess, free to-we must have been free to do it. And what we 
tried to do was to meet, you know, what the going (competitive) rate was. We always felt that 
we wanted to be as high as anybody else (on wages), but we didn't want to be-we didn't feel 
that, you know, it was (good business judgement) to be way above everybody else. So we 
tried to meet the going wages at that time, and we did. So that there were significant wage 
(increases). Everybody got significant wages during that period of time, (even though our 
profits were still way down). 
WN: Did you notice anything dramatic in terms of being able to get goods in or anything like that? 
Was it a grad--what I'm asking is was it a gradual thing ... 
FL: Yes. Yeah. It was gradual. But you can see from those figures I've got. For instance, in '44, 
our sales were only $5.9 million, or just about $6 million. That's in '44. By 1948 we were 
able to get almost $13 million in sales. Part of that was increase in units, but part of that was 
increase in prices (i.e., inflation) because prices went up during the war very substantially. So 
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that you can't say that we got double the amount of merchandise in 1948, even though sales 
went up to between $12 [million] and $13 million, and had only been around $5 million in 
1943. Because a very significant part of that was the increase of prices. Inflation had started. 
War inflation and, you know, it was just continuing to go up (and postwar inflation continued. 
But profits did not increase because our costs were much higher.) 
WN: What about labor? Were you able to get labor a lot easier [after the war ended] because 
people were coming home? 
FL: Yes, we were. In the 1948 annual report it indicates that during the year the total number of 
regular employees (not including extras) had decreased from 605 to 571. But 571 was a lot 
higher than where we were at the beginning of the war where we had only around 400. So we 
had gone way down. During the war period I think we got to as low as 200 (regular) 
employees maybe. And then we were somehow able to gradually-now some of the guys, of 
course, who'd come back from the war. And we took them all back. And we were able to 
hire a lot of the guys also coming back from the war who stayed in Honolulu. They liked 
Honolulu and they stayed here and we were able to hire them. (And the military was letting 
people go.) And then we were looking for younger guys getting out of school to start. So the 
labor problem, as far as getting people, was easier. The major problem that we faced was that 
unionism had begun to start, and unfortunately the union leaders were-most of them had 
philosophically very different ideas from the prewar ideas and so on that we'd had in Hawai'i. 
And, you know, Harry Bridges was supposed to have had a communist (philosophy). And I 
don't know what [Arthur] Rutledge was but he certainly was pretty hard to deal with. But 
they didn't have the same-the labor leaders at that time didn't seem to have the feeling of 
responsibility. They felt that they had the right to demand more and more and more in wages, 
but they dido 't seem to have the feeling of responsibility to the community to produce and 
justify the higher costs. And so that's of course what brought on the 1949 strike and why it 
was such a disaster for the community was that you had a-really a philosophical battle going 
on. It was a new war, but a different type of war. The reason why the war period went ahead 
was we had an outside adversary. We were fighting Japan. They were not Hawai'i, they were 
not American. We were fighting a foreign enemy. But the 1949 strike, it was psychologically 
a very different situation. You had an internal fight of one group of people fighting another 
for higher wages. And so you had an internal war going on, and it split the community. Just 
completely split the community wide apart. 
WN: Now the 1949 strike involved the dock workers mainly. But it didn't involve any Lewers & 
Cooke employees per se, right? 
FL: Well it did in this respect, that we couldn't get-beginning in-let's see. The strike started 
and we thought it was going to come in April but it started in May. And it lasted until 
November. [The strike ended October 23, 1949.] So we did not get one single bit of 
merchandise in from April to November. In other words, it was an eight-month period when 
we didn't get (supplies). Now, in the war there was only a four-month lag before we started 
to get some merchandise in. But when the 1949 strike hit it was eight months that we didn't 
get anything. And the other thing that was different was in the war you had an immediate sale 
for everything you brought in. Whereas in 1949, with the strike, with the community split, 
and with (companies) having to cut wages and letting people go, the demand for merchandise 
fell and if you did have merchandise you couldn't necessarily sell it because there wasn't 
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anybody who was capable of buying it. (The banks were hurt and probably reluctant to loan, 
not knowing what the outcome would be.) 
And now, you asked about unionism and Lewers & Cooke-how we fitted into that. We took 
the position at the beginning of the strike that we hoped that we would be able to ride it 
through and keep everybody employed. Well, I'm not sure exactly what month we did it but 
we had to call-I remember I had to do it. The job was assigned to me, I was personnel 
manager. I had to call all of our warehouse (and lumberyard guys), and drivers together for 
several meetings. And I had to just tell them and lay out for them what the situation was, and 
say, "We•re losing money so fast here that we•re just going to have to cut either wages or, 
seeing we don•t have hours for you to work, we decided to take and look at it the other way 
and cut the hours ... So we•d been on a forty-hour week and we cut to thirty-six hours. And 
then within another month things were getting worse so we cut to thirty-two hours. So 
everybody took-this went from top to bottom-everybody took what amounted to a 20 
percent cut in wages. And yet there really wasn•t work for thirty-two hours a week for 
everybody then because we weren•t doing-and we took a horrible licking. Looking at it from 
a cash-flow point of view and a profit point of view, our sales in 1949 dropped from almost 
$13 million to about $8.5 million. We lost money. We went from a net profit after taxes, in 
1948, of $268,000 to a net loss of $118,000. So, you know, this was a not quite $400,000 
difference. 
WN: So absolutely nothing was coming in. 
FL: Absolutely nothing came in except we did do this-again we tried to do everything we 
possibly could to further getting ready for after the strike, in getting ready to move to Pi'ikoi 
Street. But the other things we did to try and bring merchandise in, seeing only (the West 
Coast) to Hawai'i was closed up. And we felt that we might be able to get some merchandise 
if we got it down to the Gulf [of Mexico] ports. And those ships might run because they were 
a different union, as I remember it. So we had stuff reshipped from the West Coast to the 
Gulf [of Mexico] and then come down, so we did get a little bit of merchandise in. And we 
had some Eastern stuff shipped through the [Panama] Canal and down here. So we were able 
to get a small amount in, but the additional costs were such that-I don•t-looking back on it 
now in hindsight-you know, it was a good (try) and an attempt to survive and all, but 
whether it made a profit or not on that particular item of merchandise or that group of 
merchandise is questionable. (But our survival was in question again.) 
WN: Now by that time your employees were organized under AFL-CIO [American Federation of 
Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations]. 
FL: No. 
WN: Not yet? 
FL: No. Not yet. 
WN: I see. 
FL: Not yet. We did not begin to get organized unti11950. 
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WN: I see. 
FL: They had in 1948, I think it was, we had the unions come to us and say that they had a 
majority of the guys wanted to join the union. And we then asked for proof of this and so on. 
And while we were discussing the proof of this we got-unsolicited completely, from what we 
knew-we got a letter from our own guys in which, I think, 86 percent of all those who said 
they wanted to join the union now said no, they did not want to join the union. And so we 
then simply said to the union, "Well, it seems clear to us that the guys don't want to join the 
union. We don't see any point in negotiating any further." And we withdrew and the union 
apparently knew at that point that they didn't have the guys on their side and so they didn't 
press us. On the other hand, in 1950, after the 1949 strike when we had had to cut wages 20 
percent, then-and you had this wide split in the community, you see. The community was 
really divided over this whole thing. And the guys in the company were (confused) because 
the union guys made out that we weren't paying fair wages and so on and so forth. And yet 
we were doing the best we could (to stay alive), and you can see we lost over $100,000 that 
year. Which was drastic, devastating for us because we had planned our whole development 
at Pi'ikoi Street to come to a head after the war. We got a lot of it done in '47, '48. We 
hoped to finish it all in '49. And then we couldn't get the materials to do it, and further we 
lost $100,000 of cash. So this means we had to go out into the (capital) market later and get 
another $100,000 of cash to complete the project. So it was a devastating thing to us. Much, 
much worse than the war. Much worse. And the worst thing about it was during the war, you 
know, if you go to a guy and he had a problem, why, you could say to him, "Look, we're 
trying to win the war. And sure you've got problems, we all have problems, all your friends 
have problems, but we're trying to fight Japan. We're trying to win the war against Japan." 
But when it came to 1949 you didn't have that argument. Or you had an argument that he 
wouldn't accept. Because he said, "But the union guys say that you're not being fair to us." 
So a lot of them went over to the union. And, you know, in retrospect now, looking back, 
seeing a lot of this was-from a philosophical point of view-was dominated by people who 
were of a (foreign socialistic) communist philosophy. And we now know after the breakdown 
of the Berlin Wall and the breakup of Russia, that the whole communist (production) 
philosophy is for the birds, (it was non-productive). It produced a good war machine (at high 
expense) but it didn't produce any (regular supply of food and housing) and here these guys 
now are starving in Russia. (Their system didn't produce.) But, you see, they used that. They 
used that on the guys-on all of our guys, and all the other people in town, and on 
particularly the sugar workers and the dock workers-as if the community and the bosses in 
the community were not being fair. But, you know, if a person now went back and wrote a 
book about it you'd have the (proof) that communism has failed. But at that time (some 
thought) communism was a coming thing that was going to be the, you know, it was the Holy 
Grail from these guys' point of view. And you couldn't convince them-most of them. So we 
lost our good relationship that we had had for years with our employees and we had a union 
headed by Rutledge, who wasn't the easiest guy to deal with. (He could not seem to 
understand the ups and downs of business, the need for a longer-range point of view to 
survive. And in the end all these union people lost out when Champion Paper liquidated.) 
WN: So the cutting wages brought on by the shipping strike was a big factor in probably getting 
unionized. 
FL: I would agree. I would agree. I would agree. And yet, if we hadn't cut wages at that time that 
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loss of $100,000 could have gone up to $200[,000] or more (and Lewers & Cooke's future 
and the guys' jobs might have been lost then rather than in 1978 when Champion Paper 
liquidated). 
WN: Was anybody laid off at that time? 
FL: We laid nobody off, as I recall. And we might have had-I was going to say we might have 
had a few guys quit but I don't recall it and I don't have any record of it. We tried to do what 
we felt was right, and in looking back now, we did the right thing. But you had no argument 
(that made sense to them). You had no argument that you could use, where-you didn't have 
a foreign enemy that you could use and say, "Look, let's win a war." 
WN: Yeah. It was like civil war. 
FL: That's right! You hit it right on the nose. This was a civil war in the community here. You're 
exactly right. And this is the way business went on for (a time). And it's only been in the last 
ten years or so that there's been a leveling off of the union activity in Hawai'i. And again, 
it's probably because some of the fact that Russia wasn't all-wasn't as good as it was 
cracked up to be and that may be our system of things, while not perfect, is the best that's 
been found so far. 
WN: So '49 was---the longshore strike lasted for six months . . . 
FL: Eight months, (I believe). [The 1949 longshore strike lasted from May 1 to October 23, 1949, 
a total of 177 days.] 
WN: And then following that, 1950 was when the Teamsters would organize your employees. 
FL: Right. 
WN: And that was the same year also that you were making the move-the complete move to 
Pi'ikoi Street. 
FL: Right. 
WN: It must have been a difficult year. 
FL: Well, it was. It was. Those last three years had been difficult. But '49 and '50 were really, 
really rough. Because we were operating now with a beginnings of a union or, if the union 
hadn't completely started, why, the guys didn't have quite the same feeling toward us that 
they had before. And so they were tough times, and I always felt real bad about it because 
there was no way to convince a guy that joined the union and got imbued with the union and 
so on that we were really trying to help him, (in the long run) and that we were really trying 
to do the best we could. So we were under more pressure. And it was hard to see guys who, 
you know, you'd been very friendly working with before-sure, they were in the lumberyard, 
they were in the warehouse, and so on. But you had a good relationship with them and that 
began to change. And I felt bad about it. 
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WN: Were all the employees-Lewers & Cooke employees-in the same union? 
FL: Yes. We only had one union but it only involved our warehouse guys, lumberyard people, 
(and drivers and helpers). They never organized our office people. 
WN: What about sales? 
FL: And they never organized sales. So it was limited. And again, we were trying to do the best 
job we could in the way of pay for them. But you can see from our profit point of view that, 
you know, it was disastrous. Looking at this in another way, because of the strike following 
the war we did not get back to 1941 profits until 1958. That's seventeen years it took us to 
get back to making the same profit that we'd made in 1941. Now, there are other factors 
other than the unionism in this. The business was going through-Lewers & Cooke itself, or 
the whole building business-was going through major changes. We had for years---the 
housing business and the home building department that generated the largest part of our 
business. Housing was being built individually, single-story, and so on. Then the trend shifted 
toward building houses in tracts, but they were single-family houses in tracts. Then the next 
trend was toward building maybe two-story buildings, and so on. And then you got into 
multi-story buildings. This was the trend in building at that particular time. We were doing 
our best to meet these changes because they meant changes in the type of building materials 
we handled, it meant changes in organization, it meant changes in the way we handled 
sales-who we bought from. We had to think in terms of joint-venturing with tract 
developers. We even thought of buying land ourselves and developing it, and then building 
houses on it, and selling a house and the lot together. And the same thing with our joint 
ventures. So that our whole organization was going through a gradual change that took place 
over (the years). And this was all very, very important because of our piece of property down 
at Pi'ikoi Street. In other words, we could see the value of that property increasing, and as 
business grew up eventually that property would have multi-story buildings on it. And so we 
had to think in terms to maximize our resources and do the best job we could for our Lewers 
& Cooke people, and also for our stockholders. We had to think way ahead as to how we 
would develop the Pi'ikoi property to bring in the maximum revenue from that, and develop 
it to its highest value. And all you have to do is drive by that Pi'ikoi Street property today 
(1992) to give you an idea of it, and it's owned by the Nauru Trust and they have a forty-
(four)-story building on (one part of) it. And they're now building a---they're in the process 
of tearing down the old warehouse building and it's partly torn down. I drove by there the 
other day and almost tears came to my eyes to see the building. I helped to design it with one 
of the Rothwell boys. But now it's being torn down. And that building was one of the most 
interesting jobs I had in my life-of designing a building to fit what we thought was going to 
be the future of Hawai'i and to maximize the savings that we could develop in getting 
merchandise from the supplier to the consumer. So that, again, our Pi'ikoi Street property we 
had to keep in mind. And again, to think that when we bought it, it was all coral. And it was 
below grade. And here it is today with a forty-(four)-story building on it (laughs). It's just 
being finished. And where the warehouse building was, they're tearing it down to build 
another (high-rise). So there's going to be a second major building on that property. And 
there will be several others that will be on the back ('Ewa side) property that was all 
lumberyards. But they're only considering the second one at the moment. 
WN: So back in 1950 when you moved over to Pi'ikoi Street, whatever happened to your King 
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Street location? 
FL: Well, Lewers & Cooke had built that building between 1898-99 and it was finished, I 
believe, in 1901. And we stayed there until 1950 or '51 when we moved completely to Pi'ikoi 
Street. Around 1906 something happened in Hawai'i and I've forgotten now what it was, but 
business fell off very badly. I think it must have been sugar. Maybe sugar was a very bad 
year or something. Anyway, Lewers & Cooke's business fell off so that they felt that with the 
business that they could see ahead that it probably was not wise to own a building. That 
you-that the profit-that you could maximize the potential profit for the stockholders. So 
Lewers & Cooke as a corporation then-having been formed in (1900)-sold the property to 
the Wilcox Trust. And as they had money coming in from other interests they bought 
property and took a-probably a thirty- or forty-year lease and then had renewed it. So that 
we still had the building under lease in 1951 when we left. (The Wilcox Trust then leased it 
to someone else.) 
END OF SIDE TWO 
TAPE NO. 22-14-3-92; SIDE ONE 
WN: What about the other two properties, (the warehouse on) Kawaiaha'o Street and (the 
lumberyard on Queen Street)? 
FL: (The lumberyard on Queen) Street was sold during the latter part of the war to a company 
who held it for a few years and then sold it. (We leased a parcel makai of Halekauwila Street 
from Bishop Estate. We gave that up.) · 
WN: This was a property that was sort of leased over to the government during the war, right? 
FL: That's right. We leased it to the government to bring in income so that our income wouldn't 
fall so far during the war. 
WN: And then there was one more property, right? 
FL: We had the warehouse property at Kawaiaha'o and Cooke Street. And during the war we 
knew that we weren't going to need that at the end of the war. We got a good price on it and 
sold it to Von Hamm Young Company and took a lease back which was for the length of the 
war plus a couple of years or something like that. So we didn't---we got our money from Von 
Hamm Young Company. And then gave it back to Von Hamm Young Company. And they 
used it for many years. 
WN: Where is this? Kawaiaha'o and ... 
FL: It was at Kawaiaha'o and Cooke Street and Kapi'olani Boulevard. The frontage was on 
Kapi'olani Boulevard and went down Cooke Street (past) Kawaiaha'o Street. So we gave up 
the leases or the fee-simple title to all of our properties during the latter part of the war. And 
then to concentrate on and have the capitol to move to [Pi'ikoi] Street. And then '49 comes 
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just when we need the capital and we lose $100,000 because of that strike and not being able 
to (finance) it. So it was almost devastating to Lewers & Cooke from a financial point of 
view, and it set us back very, very badly. 
WN: Well, you said you didn't get back to your (1941) profit level until (1957). So it took you 
from 1941 .. . 
FL: That's right. 
WN: To ('57) to get back to the pre-war level. 
FL: That's right. That's right. You're absolutely right. 
WN: Okay. So you're over in Pi'ikoi Street and then in '53 your dad retired. And [Lewers] Paris 
was named president. Was that more of a required retirement or voluntary retirement? 
FL: Well, Dad had reached retirement age and then he may have stayed on for a couple of years, 
I don't recall. And he wanted to get out at that point. And he felt that he carried the 
(business) through the [Great Depression], the war and (the strike years), and I think Dad 
began to develop some (signs of) heart problems. And he did eventually die of a heart attack, 
but I know he was in the hospital a couple of times with heart problems. So he got out, as 
you say in-what was the date? 
WN: I have '53. 
FL: He got out in '53. Let's see, I've got that right here. Lewers Paris' first year was 1953. And 
I would imagine that the changeover must have taken place at about the time of the annual 
meeting early in the year (or during the previous year). I don't have a record of the exact date 
and don't recall it, but that was the normal way to do things. So Dad left. Dad's last annual 
report was (for the year) 1952 and Paris' first annual report was for the year '53. (I was 
named vice president and was given the responsibility for most everything except financial 
matters.) And [Paris] was (president) '53, '54, and '55, but Lewers was not a very healthy 
guy and as stated in the last paragraph of his annual report for the year '55 he says, in the 
next to the last paragraph, "My health has not been good for some time," and so on. So he 
has requested that he not be reappointed. And so, I gather it was at that time that I came in 
because I wrote the next annual report. So the changeover must have come about 
sometime-Paris' annual report is dated March '56, so I would imagine that I came in as 
president at about that time. 
WN: Did you come on-was Lewers & Cooke getting pretty fairly healthy by that time? 
FL: From a profit point of view, (they had begun to increase). In those three years that Lewers 
had we started to get better, but the net profit-well, it got substantially better from the worst 
years of the war. But we did make progress during those years but we really never got going 
until after that. If you look at it from the point of view of dividends paid, the directors didn't 
feel that things were good enough because they paid actually less dividends during a couple of 
those years than they paid during the war years. We paid only forty-one cents a share in '53; 
'54 was forty-one cents; and seventy-three cents in 1955. So apparently we made substantial 
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improvement in that third year, which was 1955. (This compared to seventy-two cents in 
1941. The stockholders finally got one cent more per share than in 1941.) 
WN: Was being president of Lewers & Cooke at that time something you wanted to do? 
FL: Well, it's what I didn't stay in the East for, when I went to business school. I had 
opportunities when I finished college in '34 to stay in the East, and the reason I came back 
was because my uncle, who was treasurer of American Factors, came back and got me aside. 
About the middle of that year or later in that year he was back there on business and he said, 
"Fred, business is so bad in Honolulu you may want to stay on here in the East. You've 
made a lot of friends back here," and so on. "You'll get job offers back here." But he said, 
"Your father needs you back in Honolulu." And he said, "He's had a lot of problems." And 
so I sort of felt a responsibility to come back and then when I got back here-as I think we 
talked earlier-! was kind of gung-ho, I guess, to get things done and get things moving. 
Because they had been in the [Great] Depression, and everybody was depressed. They hadn't 
thought of moving forward and so on. And I was coming in as a young guy and I was gung-
ho to get things done and I probably stepped on a lot of toes. And I guess I wasn't very 
popular amongst the guys who were older than I was. And so I remember talking it over with 
my father one day and he said, "Fred, maybe you better get out of here for a couple of 
years." (Laughs) After wanting me back and so on. So I thought it over and I went to him 
and, I think we covered this, but I think I said, "Well, why don't I go back to business 
school? And will the company give me a leave of absence or the directors give me a leave of 
absence to go back to business school?" Now 1---where were we on your question? 
WN: We're back in '56 now and you're taking over as president, and I asked you if it was 
something you wanted and I guess ... 
FL: Well, then I went back to business school and I had the same situation at the end of business 
school. My marks at business school were so lousy they didn't give me a degree. (Laughs) 
Janet and I were going to be married that fall and I had talked it over with her as to where 
she wanted to live and so on, and I knew that I had these possible opportunities of jobs back 
in the East. And I said, "But I've also got the possibility of going back to Honolulu." And 
she said she wanted to move to Honolulu. And so that was what made up my mind to come 
back. So to answer your question directly, (yes) this was something I wanted. I'd have to say 
this is something I'd been working for (while I was at business school and) since I got out of 
business school. 
WN: What were your goals like upon taking office in '56? 
FL: Well, my goals were really to take this company to a point where it never had been before. 
Somehow I needed to energize the group to get together. And so I started right away to 
(continue what I had begun as vice president): to reorganize, move guys around, put people in 
positions where I thought they would do a better job. (Some of this I started as vice president 
under Lewers Paris.) We started to do a lot of training, both inside and outside. And we had 
the short-range objectives and we had the longer-range objectives which involved the (whole 
business and the) development of the Pi'ikoi Street property. I think I really tried to think of 
business in a different way and try and think of our job as not being done until we did a 
excellent job for our stockholders. Because they were the final people that were responsible 
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(for our source of new capital). If we didn't make enough money to pay our stockholders a 
reasonable dividend, they weren' t going to be willing to put money into us, reinvest money 
into us. The banks wouldn't lend us money. We weren't going to have the wherewithal to 
develop as a company, to grow in that area, and eventually to develop the Pi ' ikoi Street 
property itself. And so I felt that we needed right off the bat, a statement of purpose. And I 
think, I'm not sure that I gave you a copy. 
WN: Right, you did, you did. 
FL: I did. Well, maybe the easiest way, rather than taking about it would be just slide that into the 
report. And say that was what I felt my purpose was. I entitled it "Our Purpose at Lewers & 
Cooke." And I felt the need for this statement in order to try and bring the group together. 
Now it's largely to some extent, was done because of the union. Again, we had this 
psychological split within the company. We didn't have a common purpose. They were 
thinking of their union pay and so forth and so on. It was a piece written to try and show that 
there were four groups of people that were involved in any company. And I said, "Our job is 
to bring together a team of four-what I call people groups." There were 700 stockholders at 
that time. There were 400 Lewers & Cooke people, approximately. There were 500 suppliers 
we were dealing with. We had to have their kokua. And there were at least 20,000 builder-
customers that we (sold to). And we had to organize (these groups) into a team that would 
bring about a vital balance between the interests of all of these groups. Every one of the 
groups had an interest in it. And the union guys were thinking only, to a great extent, only of 
themselves because Rutledge and the union leaders would keep drumming into them, you 
know, "More money, more money, more money." Well, we couldn't pay them more money 
till we made more (money if we were to survive and grow.) I felt my job was to get in there 
and somehow bring about a change, or help, you know, I didn't do this all myself. I mean, I 
was a coach, sort of. I felt my job was to coach a team to do a job. Another way to put it was 
I was an orchestra leader to lead a symphony orchestra who were my team that involved the 
stockholders, the suppliers, the Lewers & Cooke people, and the customers. They were the 
orchestra and somebody had to be the conductor of the orchestra and I think I sort of filled 
my job that way. And to achieve this we had to coordinate and balance the interests of each of 
these four groups of people. And then I brought into that statement the free enterprise system, 
how it worked. Profit was the measure as to how well we were doing, and that our job was to 
add value so it made it possible to sell our product at a profit large enough and sufficiently 
large to pay for the merchandise from our suppliers, to pay the merchandising expenses, to 
provide job opportunities for Lewers & Cooke people, and to pay the Lewers & Cooke 
stockholders a return on the value of their property sufficiently large to induce them to put 
additional funds into Lewers & Cooke. And I said, "Only then can we grow to contribute 
toward this major purpose of building a better Hawai'i through service to builders." And so 
what we did at that time was to-with the kOkua of my top guys who all went along with me 
and they all wanted it. They knew the only way they could get ahead was to make more 
profits too. So we had to try and see what the trends were and so on, and how to adapt to 
those trends. The building business was going through major, major changes and we were 
aiming more toward getting into tract development, and we gradually set up a tract 
development group, which we-later actually became a separate corporation. So we had a 
merchandise corporation and a tract development corporation. And those were the two 
corporations that held all of our assets, with the exception of (the thirteen-plus acres of land 
on Pi'ikoi Street) which we kept up in the top corporation. And so it was the two corporations 
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that we later traded to U.S. Plywood (for their stock). (This stock would be the source of 
funds to develop the Pi'ikoi Street property.) 
WN: Okay. We're going to get into that merger with U.S. Plywood shortly. Then you are saying, 
then, that because of this balance of the four people groups that you stated, like unionism 
tilted the balance a little bit. Sort of made it ... 
FL: It made it very difficult because the community was all split during that whole period of time. 
A lot of the community had this communism (and socialism) philosophy that now has been 
disproved. But at that time, they all thought, you know, this might be the way things were 
going to go. Maybe the United States was going to go communistic. And this is the way some 
of the labor leaders tried to make out. 
WN: I know that-I've been doing some reading-in 1959 there was a strike at Lewers & Cooke. 
FL: Yes, we had two or three short strikes. I don't think any of them lasted for more than a 
couple of weeks. We simply couldn't arrive at a reasonable-what we felt was a reasonable 
way. And these guys would use tactics that to me-almost killed me. Let me give you an 
example. We were a member of the [Hawai'i] Employers' Council. We needed that sort of 
advice to help us and so on. And I remember one---the most memorable union meeting that I 
ever remember was one night we were discussing wages. We had a negotiating team. And we 
were at that time-the state had come in. What do they call that? 
WN: Mediator. 
FL: Mediator. I think his name was Shroat. Wasn't there a young guy, a fellow named Shroat. I 
think he's died since. Anyway, the mediator was in there. And the union, they had asked if 
they could bring, oh, as many as ninety guys or a hundred guys to the meeting. And we 
thought it was a little unusual but we said yes it would be perfectly all right, because we 
thought and I thought that in discussing these things with them we could get through to them 
and have them understand at least that there was more than one side to the problem. And that 
we couldn't pay out more than was coming in. And they had rights, but they had certain 
responsibilities for those rights. And all during that time was this really, sort of a battle, 
between rights and responsibilities. And so anyway, we got to a point where it was decided. 
The union said-well, I guess we had told them that we couldn't pay them the wages that they 
wanted and that we'd made our final offer and so on. 
So they asked if they could leave the room. In other words, we just called a recess. All of us 
needed to get out to get a little rest at that time. These were meetings that were, you know, 
they were fairly stressful meetings. And the whole future of the company depended on 
whether you could get these fellows to be willing to work at a (wage you could pay). And the 
same way with everybody else. And we were always paying as much or a little more than the 
other people in town. So they all left the room. And then about fifteen minutes later Rutledge 
brought them all back into the room. And do you know that every single one of those 
guys-and there were over eighty of them-came back into the room with a pickaxe handle 
over his shoulder. They had taken pickaxe handles from Lewers & Cooke, out of our stock, 
taken them that afternoon. And that night they came in and marched back into the room and 
everybody with a pickaxe handle over his shoulder. And then they set the pickaxe handles 
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down (between their legs)-these were all wooden-sat back down in the room. And so we 
had to face those guys to negotiate from then on with every single guy with a pickaxe handle 
in front of him. Now this is Rutledge-type tactics. And this shocked me. I talked to the 
mediator and I said, "I think that we should just adjourn the meeting at this point." And I 
said, "I don't think this is the proper way of (proceeding). These men have rights; they also 
have certain responsibilities. (Our company as a whole has certain rights; we have certain 
responsibilities. And I don't think that this is a proper way to go at this important problem.") 
And he said, "Fred, let me talk to you. You just have to make up your mind that this is the 
way the unions are acting at this particular point in time." And he said, "If you do that it'll 
probably make things worse. I know how you feel, and you feel that this is a demand against 
you-you're being held hostage to pickaxe handles (with an implied threat to use them) if you 
don't move in their direction." But he said, "I think you'd do much better to just ignore it. 
Not even comment on it. And just go back into the meeting." 
It took me several minutes to do that. So I said, "This guy has had a lot more experience in 
this sort of thing than I have." Our attorneys (and our guys) didn't like it. We always had an 
attorney there because a legal problem would come up. He didn't like it. And our guys-all 
our negotiating team didn't like it. And I had to take-being responsible-! had to more or 
less say (to myself), well guys, if this will get us a contract, it's more important that we have 
a good contract and win these guys over to do a job than we antagonize them in a way that 
will make things worse. Now I don't know whether that brought on one of the. strikes that we 
had, because we couldn't increase the wages beyond the amount that we had already put 
down. I just don't remember. I don't remember what year that was. 
WN: So at negotiation, I'm sure the mediator examines your records and so forth to find out 
whether ... 
FL: Well, the mediator would go over everything and try and act as a go- between, and try and 
make suggestions. He'd call a meeting-he'd adjourn a meeting and he'd take one group out 
and say, "Look, they've made this offer, and this offer, and this offer. They can't go any 
further. How about you guys modifying yours this way. Maybe that will bring it about." Or 
he would take us out and he'd say, "Look, the union has gone and say they have to have this 
and they have to have that. Why don't you make a suggestion along this line. Maybe this can 
bring about getting together." They were a facilitator to bring about a union agreement. And 
a lot of them were very capable guys. 
WN: Now this is different from arbitration. 
FL: That's right. This is right. We never had an arbitration that I recall. We were always able to 
arrive at an agreement, but most of them were a little bit more (chuckles) than we thought we 
ought to go. 
On the other hand, one of the major things that I think that helped to change Lewers & Cooke 
during those years was that I (discussed with) every department head that he was responsible 
for his part of the business. "Your job is to come up with a set of objectives as to what's the 
best thing you can do-the best you can do for the company next year. And this must all be 
spelled out." And then every year we had what we called our objectives meeting. And each 
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one of the department heads would make his presentation. So each one of the other 
department heads and all of our supervisory staff knew exactly what everybody said they 
would do the following year. And during the time that they made up these objectives they 
were in constant touch with me back and forth, you know, as to whether this fitted in with an 
overall program. But what it did was it put the responsibility to a great extent onto them, and 
they took the responsibility and said what they could do. And then it was-they having said, 
"I am going to do this for Lewers & Cooke," it made it important that they meet those 
objectives. And they liked it, most of them. There were some that hated this and they didn't 
want to do it. But most of them went along and it changed the whole picture of Lewers & 
Cooke, and from that time on our profits just started to go up . We had a couple of bad years, 
but from that time on, why, our profits did a lot better and we were able to do better for all 
our (people groups, especially the stockholders who had been left behind). And that meant 
that the banks were more willing to loan us money, insurance companies loaned us money at 
times. 
And so, I think, with (a new vital balance) these guys who were all enthusiastic about 
this-their future was dependent on it the same way mine was (or) they couldn't move ahead. 
We put in a profit-sharing plan. Rather than paying it out yearly, we made it part of the 
pension plan, as an addition-supplemental pension plan-so that they had two pension plans. 
They had the going pension plan and then they had the profit-sharing pension plan, and so on. 
And we paid a certain amount into it based on profits. And this was another thought that 
some-one of the guys brought up-and a good one. And it may have had a definite effect on 
some of the union guys that, you know, the company isn't all that bad after all. And that 
unless we produce, how can they move ahead? (So we moved ahead.) 
WN: Okay. So when you were president there were a couple of strikes and so forth. Now, coming 
along to 1965 was when the company merged with U.S. Plywood. What brought on that? 
FL: Well, it largely came about through the change in the nature of building business. In other 
words, I referred to-some time ago-about building up until the wartime was mostly single-
family residences. Then you got into duplexes, and you got into small tract developments. 
Then you got into bigger tract developments, which we joint-ventured with others, and so on. 
And then a major problem that we had was that the big piece of property that we had at 
Pi' ikoi Street became a problem for us in that it was too expensive to do just the type of 
business that we were on. We had to develop that piece of property for (high-rises) or some 
other development which would properly recognize the value of that property, because that 
was an (underutilized) resource of the stockholders. And it was perfectly legitimate for them 
to ask for a return on that resource too. And so the merger into U.S. PI ywood (or someone 
else) was one of the several alternatives that we had been considering over a period of years, 
as to how to develop Pi'ikoi Street, (and yet still keep and develop the other basic businesses 
we were in and the future of the people who were in them). Should we move some of the 
merchandising activities that we had there-which were simply storage or sales-to some 
other location and use this beautiful piece of property for building multi-story buildings, 
which we could either sell, rent, lease, and so on? And there were a multitude of alternative 
ways to develop that property. We had a consultant from Los Angeles. We had our own guys 
thinking in terms of how we could develop that property. And we had drawings of multi-story 
buildings, several different types and ways . And in doing that we had to think of how we 
would move off of the property and where we would go. We bought at one time, I think, 
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Hawai'i Builders Supply, which AI Hastings had run for years. And he wanted---and he had a 
lease down on the Kapalama Canal on (Dillingham Boulevard) and the canal frontage there. 
And we bought that property and took over the lease, thinking in terms of, "This is an 
alternate merchandising sight," if we wanted to develop the (Pi'ikoi Street) property 
ourselves. You see, we could take the Pi'ikoi Street property and develop it piece by piece 
and bring in revenue, and do it over a period of years. Or the other possibility would be to 
sell it. The other possibility would be to joint-venture it, and so on. But we had to find a 
way-and I felt it was absolutely important that we be absolutely fair with all of our 
employees who worked with us for years and years, that they have a future that was as good 
or maybe better than what we could do with the Pi'ikoi Street property. And so we tried to do 
it within the company, and find ways of doing it. And there just didn't seem to be a way to 
work it out. (It involved a huge capital problem.) So then in 1964 the president of U.S. 
Plywood was down here. And he was in my office and we were talking about various things. 
And then he sort of asked quite a few questions that were very-1 thought, you know, that 
there was something more back of it. And I figured, maybe U.S. Plywood has an idea that 
they would like to move into Hawai'i (through us) and that they'd like to take over Lewers & 
Cooke. 
WN: What kind of company was U.S. Plywood? 
FL: U.S. Plywood was a very large national company. They made beautiful plywoods, all kinds of 
plywoods, hardwoods, softwoods, and so on. They were a large manufacturer of glues 
because glues went with plywood. They were a big company, a profitable company, a very 
well-run company, a very ethical company, and one that I was interested in talking with the 
president because I thought, well, here's somebody that might take over the company and 
would be the type-have the same type of policies that Lewers & Cooke had, and that we 
wouldn't be making all that much change. In other words, they wouldn't be the kind of guys 
that would fire people, and so on and so forth. They would build on what we had, and so on. 
(They saw the future of Hawai'i.) 
So it developed that we did have some preliminary discussions in '64 on a potential merger. 
And we ran into a stumbling block because we felt that the Pi'ikoi Street property was more 
valuable, and quite a bit more valuable, than they did. And so the negotiations came to a halt 
at that point, but they still seemed to be interested in the possibility, "Well, is there some way 
that we can merge all of the operating assets of Lewers & Cooke into U.S. Plywood and in 
that way not have to take over the property and pay for the property?" We weren't in a legal 
or corporate setup at that time to have brought about that type of a merger, (but 
organizationally we were). So we discussed, during the year, that possibility. And so we 
decided to form two subsidiary corporations. And they were legally formed on December 29, 
1964. In other words, it took us most of that year to work out the details of it. And what we 
decided to do was to put all of the merchandising operations into what we called the Lewers 
& Cooke Merchandising Corporation. And we put Jim Lovell in as vice president (and 
manager)-he was already a vice president of Lewers & Cooke-but he became vice president 
and manager also of the subsidiary corporation. And then we took all of our types of 
operations and activities that involved land development, tracts, joint ventures, and that sort of 
things, and we put that into what we called the Lewers & Cooke Development Corporation. 
And those were the two corporations that held all of the (operating) assets of Lewers & 
Cooke, Limited, with the exception of the land. See, what we'd done was we took the land 
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out because Plywood said, "We won't pay you a reasonable price for" what we thought was a 
reasonable price for it. "But we will consider all of your other assets." 
And so that gave us the opportunity to-and for them-to reopen negotiations in 1965, after 
these corporations were formed, where we could say to them, "Well, let's talk about merging 
the merchandise corporation and the development corporation into U.S. Plywood. We will 
take Plywood's stock in payment for it, and then the Lewers & Cooke overall company at the 
top (owned by the Lewers & Cooke stockholders) will have only two assets. It'll have the 
land at Pi'ikoi Street," which they did not want to take and did not want to take over the 
development of that because they said our price was too high. We gave them a short-
term-the top company gave them a short-term lease in order for them to move to another 
location. Now, one of the conditions of the merger was for us, and all of my staff here, to 
find a location in Honolulu that was satisfactory to them that they could move to. And so we 
found a big area of property down at the entrance to the [Honolulu International] Airport, just 
before you get to the airport. And I don't remember how many acres in there, but there must 
have been over twenty acres in there. It went all the way through from the airport property to 
the next street on the Diamond Head side, and ran from-well, it was a great big block of 
land anyway. We couldn't buy the land, we had to lease it because that was all part of the old 
Damon estate and that had been sold to K. J. Lttke and that hui that he put together. K. J. 
was in it and, let's see, there were several other people involved in that. So we leased the 
land. Well, I guess we presented the problem to U.S. Plywood and worked out with them 
what a fair lease would be. And so we had their approval and then the merger . . . 
END OF SIDE ONE 
SIDE TWO 
WN: You were talking about that piece of land by the airport. 
FL: Okay. Plywood insisted, perfectly legitimately, that they couldn't have a merger unless they 
had a piece of property to move to. So we found the property. We apparently agreed on a 
satisfactory lease rental. That was negotiated with the owners of the property, and then the 
merger came about. And I think it was a-in my opinion-! felt was going to be for 
everybody-myself included-! felt it was going to be a very, very good merger. We were 
dealing with a company we had done business with for twenty-five years. We knew a lot of 
the top people. They were honorable, ethical, they had been in business for a long time. So 
that from the employee point of view, merging all of our employees in these two operating 
companies, I felt it was going to be a very fair setup. I also felt, from the point of view of the 
former Lewers & Cooke-which they asked we rename L & C, Limited, or any other name 
we wanted. They said they had no objection to L & C, Limited and in order to keep the 
continuity we chose to call it L & C, Limited. And it was then the successor to Lewers & 
Cooke, Limited. In other words, L & C became the legal successor to Lewers & Cooke, 
Limited but its assets were very different. The assets were the land and a little bit of cash that 
was up there, and the Plywood stock that we took in payment for the two operating 
companies-the merchandise company and the development company. And I felt it was going 
to be great for everybody. It was going to be great for our stockholders because Plywood 
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would go up in-gradually, over a period of time would go up in price. It still left the holding 
company a chance to develop the Pi'ikoi Street property the way they felt best. So we sort of 
hedged the future of Lewers & Cooke (now L & C, Limited) . We were still in the 
merchandising business through U.S . Plywood. 
WN: Which would still be named Lewers & Cooke, (Incorporated, rather than Limited). 
FL: The two subsidiary companies asked for the name. They insisted on the name. It was part of 
the transaction. They said, "We want the Lewers & Cooke name, that's important to us." 
And so that's why we had to take the L & C, Limited name and couldn't call the whole 
company Lewers & Cooke, Limited. They did not want to come in and say, "We are U.S. 
Plywood." They felt it would be a detriment to them, to come in and wipe out Lewers & 
Cooke, (a name which had) been known for a hundred-and-several years and just put U.S. 
Plywood right on top of Lewers & Cooke. They felt that the name had value. And so they 
insisted on it. 
So it seemed like a good thing. My top five guys all had five-year contracts with U.S. 
Plywood that they couldn't break. And we were all in favor of it and, you know, there was 
some discussion, you know, could some of us get hurt on the whole thing. But in the end 
everybody came along and we felt it was the best thing for-each of them felt it was the best 
thing. I remember a couple of guys in my treasurer's office said, "You know, this could be 
great. One of us might be able to move up from here to a treasurer's job back in New York." 
And so it gave everybody-all the employees-it gave them-well, I shouldn't say all because 
a lot of them were going to want to live here-but it gave specific guys who were ambitious 
and wanted to live on the Mainland a chance to ask for a transfer to U.S. Plywood 
somewhere on the Mainland, or to go clear back to their main headquarters in New York. So 
from the employee point of view it seemed fair, and going back to my four people groups, 
my mission or my purpose and so on-it took care of the stockholder interest. It still took 
care of all of the companies that we had been buying from, because it was-probably they 
would buy a little bit more from Plywood, or maybe quite a bit more, but they would still be 
buying from all the other several hundred companies that we bought from (as U.S. Plywood 
expanded here). And as I said it was good for the employees, it was good for the 
stockholders. And I felt that it was very, very good for the community, because we had this 
union problem, which, you know, we had been able to survive with but it was a constant 
threat. It's like that night, you know, that night I described-the type of threat and how far 
Rutledge in some of his other activities went. You know, those activities out at Pearl City 
Tavern, where his guys, you know, cut tires on cars and smashed radiators and threw various 
things, and so on. And it doesn't take too much for a leader of his type to get some guys riled 
up, particularly if they've had a few beers, and that sort of thing. And while he never pulled 
anything of that type on us at Lewers & Cooke, it was always that threat that something could 
get out of hand. And so it was my feeling that from the point of view of the stockholders at 
Lewers & Cooke, they had a small percentage interest in a big nationwide corporation-as a 
matter of fact it was international to some extent-but at the same time the (L & C) 
stockholders had the piece of land at Pi'ikoi Street-which they had to develop as they felt 
best to do (in their interests). 
WN: So the decision for the merger was a variety of decisions, one of them being the union 
situation, another being the desire to fully utilize that Pi'ikoi Street property. 
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FL: Exactly, and it involved-a great point in it was the whole way that the building industry was 
changing. (L & C) then had the possibility of developing Pi'ikoi Street to the best maximum 
use, but Plywood had all of our operating assets to go much, much further into the tract 
development business in Honolulu. Because whereas we couldn't get capital, U.S. Plywood 
was a company that was many, many, many times larger than Lewers & Cooke, and they had 
banking connections, and insurance company connections, and so on, that could get money. 
And they did. They poured money into Lewers & Cooke. So while I was never privy or had 
access to how they did during the years after the merger-because I only lasted six months in 
the merger myself. (Laughs) I'll come to that if you want. (I do know they expanded very 
substantially, far more than we could have as Lewers & Cooke, Ltd.) 
Fortunately all my other guys liked it and stayed on, and did a good job, and took the 
company to new heights, which we never could have gotten the capital to do. Even though we 
made more money-and quite a bit more money during the years after my group took over (in 
1956)-and we started some of these newer thoughts, and thinking, and training, and various 
other things and all, we just couldn't have possibly have gotten the capital to do what U.S. 
Plywood (could do) and that meant that they all had unlimited opportunities for advancement 
in U.S. Plywood. And the same way with the union guys. They were working for a bigger 
company, a company that might be able to do more than we could do. So that I felt that it 
was really a good merger, it fitted our purpose that I've mentioned in every respect. And I 
felt that it was really going to go places. 
But you know, we signed the papers down in Dudley Pratt's office (our attorney). And they 
sent three of their men down here-their corporate secretary, their financial vice president, 
the other man I can't remember. They were happy. I remember at the meeting, they said, 
"Fred, you and your guys have done a wonderful job with this company. You've built it up, 
and we're very happy with what we've bought and we think that we can take it, with our 
ability to get capital and so on, we think that we can take this a lot further than you can." 
And I said, "Well, that's why I've been willing to do it." And so on. But, do you know what 
happened? We signed all the papers in Dudley Pratt's office and then I was to take them to 
the airport. And we hadn't been in the car for five minutes on the way to the airport when 
this financial vice president, who was the senior one, turned to me and he said, "Fred, we 
like what you've done." He even told me, "You have done things that we haven't even tried. 
We think that we can send people down to Lewers & Cooke to learn things that we can use at 
Plywood." And then he said, "But." 
And I thought, oh my god, we've been married for ten minutes and the "buts" have started. 
And I said, "Well, what do you mean? What are the buts?" 
"Well," he said, "You know, you're 5,000 miles away from New York. We feel that you 
really have had, as president of Lewers & Cooke and all, and these companies, more 
authority than we feel that you should have under us. And that we feel that we should take 
some of that authority back." (They had already begun to renege on our understanding.) 
And I said, "Well, what do you mean?" 
And he said, "Well, number one, you will have no further right to hire anybody at the 
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$10,000 level or higher without our authority." (Yet we had agreed on the organizational 
charts that we needed additional help at this level. But now I could not hire them without New 
York's approval . And then he said, "You have no right to give a raise to any person at the 
$10,000 level or higher without our authority.") 
And I thought, my god, how do you run a company 5,000 miles away, and you've got guys 
that have done a terrific job and you want to reward them with a raise and at an appropriate 
time when they've done something, not wait a year, and not have to go back (to New York 
for) permission to do it, which may take two or three months and might be denied. And I 
thought, my god, they're taking away everything that I can do for this company. And then he 
went on down another list, and the list was about eight or nine things that I couldn't do. And 
I thought to myself, my god, what have I done? And I thought to myself, well, you still have 
done the right thing for your Lewers & Cooke people, you still have done the right thing for 
the community, you still have done the right thing for all of the people you buy from, your 
suppliers, and you still have done the right thing for your stockholders . The only guy that you 
haven't done the right thing for maybe is yourself. (Laughs) Maybe you aren't going to be 
able to take this. 
WN: Now what position did you hold after the merger? 
FL: At the merger, the way they did it was exactly the way we had it here. I was the president of 
these subsidiaries, and when we merged it I remained the president and Jim Lovell was the 
vice president and the manager of one of the companies, and Gibby Rietow was the vice 
president and the manager of the other. And the treasurer was the same way. Let's see, I 
think Hal Hocking was the treasurer. He was the secretary-treasurer of both of the subsidiary 
companies. And all the other officers stayed the same too-the assistant treasurers remained 
the same, the secretary remained the same, and so forth and so on. And (at L & C, Ltd.) we 
kept Jim Lovell as a vice president , and Gibby Rietow was the vice president and Hal 
Hocking was the treasurer. And we, I think, took one of the fellows from our legal office and 
made him the corporate secretary of L & C, Limited, so that we'd have a very close 
relationship with our attorneys on that part locally. And so the officer setup stayed the same 
for the three corporations, with the exception of bringing a-1 think-l'd have to go through 
the papers to find out. I can't remember now which one it is. So that the directors of L & C, 
Limited, formerly Lewers & Cooke, all stayed the same. There was no change there. But they 
were now directors of a piece of property-Pi'ikoi Street property-and were responsible for 
the development of that. And they had this number of how many thousand shares there were 
of U.S. Plywood stock which we took in exchange for the assets of these two corporations. 
(U.S. Plywood did change the directors of the subsidiary companies they had bought. I was 
still president, but all my directors were now U.S. Plywood officers.) 
WN: Okay. So you--they gave you the list of demands . . . 
FL: They gave me the list of things and I was shocked. I can tell you I was shocked, because I 
said to myself, my god, how can I operate this? How can I bring about the same enthusiasm, 
and maintain the same enthusiasm, and help these guys grow if I've got to get approval of 
everything that I do from New York? And so, god, I was really sick. I think I darned near 
puked. It was such a shock. But there wasn't anything I could do. And I knew, as I said 
before our break, that I'd done the right thing for everybody, and that I was the only guy that 
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was going to (possibly) get hurt if I couldn't stand it. 
And so the first step, everything went well. Their president came down. We had him at a 
meeting and he talked to us about the merger, what they wanted to do for us. He was a very 
soft-spoken, gentlemanly guy and made a good impression. And the others-the other people 
that they sent down-were all capable people. And again, so from the point of view of 
everybody but me, I don't think there were any great fears developed or any, you know, any 
anxiety over the whole thing. On the other hand, I can tell you I was kind of .... (Laughs) 
My anxiety level went up. 
But I said to myself, well, they want me to come back and discuss this whole thing with the 
company, with U.S. Plywood. And so we settled on June, and I went back in June and they 
were just nice as hell to me. They had a meeting in one of their big meeting rooms-there 
must have been fifty or more guys in there-and they asked me to explain the whole of the 
Lewers & Cooke operation. We asked questions back and forth. We must have had a two- or 
three-hour meeting-very friendly, everything else. No problems at all, except, in the 
negotiations I had told them that seeing they were considering, and probably would increase 
our capital by several millions of dollars, that I didn't feel that I had the full staff of people 
that were capable of handling that increase in business that rapidly. And so we had agreed, I 
thought, to an organization chart-which I do not have a copy of. But it had the places for the 
addition of three to four new people at a relatively high level where we did not feel that we 
had somebody on the staff of these two corporations that was capable of moving up that 
rapidly, and so on. So one of the things that I found out when I got back there was that they, 
in a sense had-1 felt-changed their mind on that agreement. 
They practically said that they didn't have anybody at that time that they could send down. 
And I felt at that time that I needed at least one. If we'd lost somebody or somebody had 
retired and so on, and I just didn't have-1 felt-the right person for the job, particularly if 
we were going to expand. And so I left the meeting-! was there for I guess a week. And 
they were very happy with what we were doing. We had set up objectives for the year that 
were considerably, I think, greater than the year before, and we were well on the way toward 
meeting all of those objectives. So they were happy. In other words, we were meeting their 
(1965) profit plan. And they had, as I remember, no complaints. We were beginning to 
exchange people back and forth. We would send people back there to see what they were 
doing, and so on, and sort of try and integrate the merchandise company and the tract 
development company, so they got a better understanding of it back there and we got a better 
understanding here of what we might be able to buy in the way of merchandise from them. 
But I came away with a very-1 don't know just quite the word to use but. ... The feeling 
that this merger was not going to work out as far as I was concerned. From this point of 
view: they were treating me perfectly all right. I had no complaint about salary or anything. I 
had signed an agreement with them and they kept me on the same salary and everything else. 
And, you know, they discussed that there would be probably salary increases and so on. So I 
had no complaints along that line at all. 
Also we discussed-I've got to throw in a little thing here but bring me back to this again. 
We also had an agreement that these same officers here were officers of the holding company 
(L & C, Ltd.) at the top. Now this was a very unusual situation because they were working 
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for an entirely different group of stockholders . They weren't working for Plywood 
stockholders, you see, in the (L & C, Ltd.) corporations here, but they were also officers up 
here. And we'd worked out an agreement-all verbal but very satisfactory, and satisfactory 
back there-that I would spend not more than a certain amount of time on the other and that 
any time that I spent on the top company, and any time my officers spent on that, would be 
deducted and transferred. In other words, they would be given a credit and those expenses be 
paid for by the L & C, Limited. SoL & C, Limited paid them-I've forgotten how often we 
settled up on this sort of thing and so on. And this went on, and as I say, everything was 
satisfactory on our discussions about that in June. But they would not do anything about these 
(new people to be in the U.S. Plywood subsidiaries) . So at this point I came back here and I 
talked to several people on the outside whom I had confidence in-business people. And I 
said, "How do we go about trying to convince them that we need some more help down here, 
that we can't develop quickly within our own organization?" And so we came up with this 
idea that I would hire the firm of Heidrick & Struggles, who are-the term is headhunters, 
who, you know, look for people. It's a horrible name but it-what it means is they go around 
and look for capable people in other organizations and then you take them out and (hire) 
them. They kept telling me when I was back there in June that they would be able to give us 
the people we needed when we needed them, that they were going to make the decision. And 
I had the feeling that I needed them now. So I thought, well, I'll have Heidrick & Struggles 
go back and see if there are people back there that they have that are surplus or could be 
made surplus that could fit down here to do the job. 
And Heidrick & Struggles came back to me and said, "Fred, you got a hell of a problem on 
your hands. They don't have enough people back there really to do the job that we think that 
they should be doing in certain areas." And so he said, "You're chance of getting somebody 
to fill the one job, let alone any others that you feel you have a tentative agreement on, you're 
just out of luck." And so I left that meeting feeling pretty blue because I felt this way-and, 
you know, maybe I was wrong on this. But as I think back I feel I was right. I had been 
president of this whole ball of wax-all three of these companies and so on-and was still 
president and had the probability of continuing to be president of L & C, Limited, but I felt 
that I was not going to be able-without this additional help-and some of my top guys felt 
the same way-unless we could get some more very capable help in. Because they were going 
to start to pour money in here. I never knew for sure but I understand that the amount of 
capital they put in was several millions of dollars, which made Lewers & Cooke, or these 
operating companies, maybe two (or more) times as big when you considered the amount of 
money they were borrowing plus the amount of capital they had . And so that's why I felt it 
was important that we get these extra people in and start melding them into the organization. 
Because I didn't want to fail. I felt that if I didn't have this extra help, even though I had very 
capable top people and very capable layers in there, I didn't have really the total capacity of 
people that I wanted. If one should leave-supposing one died in an auto accident? Or 
supposing somebody died on the plane between here and (New York), because we were going 
back and forth a lot? And some of my men were very capable and they might be offered a job 
that was better than Plywood would pay them, (or Plywood would take one of them). 
And so then I was in a hell of a fix . And having had the Lowrey name connected with the 
company since my grandfather (became president around 1900). You know, a head of a 
company can't do everything, he's completely dependent on the team he puts together. And 
they weren't letting me have the type of guy on the team that I felt I needed. And so I came 
517 
away pretty blue. And I came back and I reported to a person on the West Coast on most of 
the things, which was a good relationship and I'd known him for twenty-five years, and we 
were good friends. And so I took up this matter with him. I said, "I just feel that we aren't 
going to be successful. I think it could have a negative effect on you, if we aren't successful. " 
(U.S. Plywood did liquidate the Lewers & Cooke companies in 1978, twelve years later. 
They had merged with Champion Paper Co. around 1966-67 and Champion came out on 
top .) 
And of course he was pretty busy with all of the things that he had, and so it went on and on 
and on. And then I requested that I go back and see them in November. And so I went back 
again, and again we had very, very good meetings-very friendly. They even invited me to 
their executive committee meetings of U.S . Plywood. So I sat in while I was there, on the 
executive committee of the U.S. Plywood Corporation, with all of their top officers. And they 
were discussing a merger with another very large company. As a matter of fact, it was larger 
than they, but not one that they did merge with later. And they even asked me what I thought 
about the merger. And I said, "Well," I won't mention the name because they never merged 
with them. But I said, "This company has the type of products that are very different and are 
sold a different way, have to be inventoried differently," and I said, "If you merge with them 
I don't know that you'll get the economies of the merger as much as you've indicated." Well, 
they didn't-I don't think they liked this necessarily. Anyway, they never merged with this 
company. So the afternoon that I was to leave I had quite a long meeting with the president of 
the company in his office and I said, "I'm very, very upset about one aspect of this whole 
thing. Everything else seems to be going along beautifully." And I said, "The marriage of the 
companies, everything is going well, except I am very unhappy. I feel that you will not be 
able to accomplish what you want in this merger unless you let me get this additional 
capability that we need and we haven't been able to develop because of the way you're 
expanding." I said, "Supposing we lose Jim Lovell or Gibby Rietow? They're (traveling) back 
and forth. Supposing we lose one or more of the key guys right under them?" 
And he turned to me after thinking for a minute and he said, "Fred, in a corporation the size 
of U.S. Plywood, we cannot worry about things like this." 
And I thought to myself, my god, I already know from Heidrick & Struggles that you don't 
have the capability of people that are free that you can send to me now. This was one of the 
best-known headhunting companies in the United States. And so I knew that, and he then tells 
me, "We don't worry about things like that." Who was going to be the one to worry? It was 
me, because I wouldn't have the staff-and I couldn't get them (without their approval)-and I 
knew I couldn't make this company profitable (in the long run with the manifold changes on 
this business). And that meant (the high probability of) failure. And I said (to myself) that I 
cannot put myself in a situation where I fail in Honolulu as a third generation in this 
company. I didn't tell him this-this was what was going through my mind as I was there. 
But I didn't say anything to him about it, because I thought it was (at the time) inappropriate. 
In other words, I didn't want to turn my resignation in at that point, but I did alert him to my 
very deep concern about (how I felt about his expansion plans for his Lewers & Cooke 
companies in Hawai'i). 
Well, I got on the plane later that afternoon and was going to meet my daughter in 
518 
Minneapolis and have Thanksgiving with her the next day. And I just made up my mind on 
that trip-two-hour trip or whatever it was-look, you've just got to get out and resign. It's 
just more than you can take, to be put into a situation like this. And so, you know, maybe I 
was wrong. But I wasn't hurting any of my guys. I wasn't hurting any of the objectives we 
tried to meet. In a sense it gave Jim Lovell a greater opportunity, it gave Gibby Rietow a 
greater opportunity. It gave my guys a greater opportunity if they could meet these objectives 
and meet the profit objectives and the profit plan that U.S. Plywood imposed on them, or you 
know, put on them every year. So I came back a very, very changed guy. On the other hand, 
I was still president of L & C, Limited, the holding company that owned the Pi'ikoi Street 
property. 
WN: That [Pi'ikoi Street property] had nothing to do with U.S. Plywood. 
FL: Had absolutely nothing to do with Plywood, had no say in it. It was separate corporations, 
completely divorced. And so I felt pretty sure that the directors of L & C, Limited, the 
holding company, would want me to stay on and run that, at least for a while. And it was just 
a difference of opinion, legitimate. Just two different ways of thinking about (a problem). 
And it was probably, maybe my own weakness that I felt this way about it. I'd put together a 
team that had done a commendable job of moving those other companies forward (and that 
they could do the job without me or with someone sent down from U.S. Plywood). 
WN: So you're saying that you didn't want to fail, but by getting out you satisfy your own goals 
personally as well as saving the company. 
FL: I felt that the (L & C) directors-if I did resign-that the directors would (give me the 
opportunity) as president of L & C, Limited. And so I talked to the (U.S. Plywood West 
Coast manager, the) person I reported to in Los Angeles and told him that I felt that I should 
get out, and that it would be better for the company to put their own person in down here (in 
order to see the local problems and get better coordination). And then it would go along more 
smoothly and they could do the things the way they wanted. And I told them that I felt that, 
really, in my opinion they were making a mistake in not bringing in some more help here but 
if that's the way they felt-legitimately-and maybe they were right-probably right-then it 
was just better for me to just ease out of the picture and let them do it the way they wanted. 
So I (orally) let him know that I was going to turn my resignation in but told him that I would 
gear it to a time that was convenient with them. 
And he said, "I'm going to be going on an extended trip, would you put it off for a month or 
two?" 
And I said, "Sure. No problem about that." (The top brass) was coming down here, and the 
president of the company was coming down and bringing the others and to go over what our 
(1966) projections were going to be. (And with him as well as the president there was no give 
on getting any additional help. And they didn't seem to be concerned over my leaving. So I 
felt maybe they were right; but my feelings also were that in the longer run this wasn't going 
to work out well.) And so we agreed on the time, agreed on the meetings here. So when they 
came down here it gave me a chance to discuss everything with the president of the company 
and the others. And I told them that I had made up my mind, that in view of the way that 
they felt about it versus the way I felt about it, that I felt that I should just ease out. And I 
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would do it on whatever basis they wanted. Now, I had this five-year contract and I said, 
"Under the contract, I would feel that obviously you don't owe me anything, if I'm leaving. 
On the other hand, I don't feel that seeing you have not been willing to do the things (that 
you agreed to do) the way I feel they need to be done, I don't feel that I owe you anything." 
So we parted (amicably). And they elected their own (West Coast manager in) at that time (in 
1966 as president of their two Lewers & Cooke subsidiaries). (All of our people knew him 
and liked him, so it made for a natural and smooth transfer to Plywood. I thought things 
would work out well with him as president, a Plywood president in Honolulu as a logical 
intermediary. He also would experience what I had been trying to convey.) 
END OF SIDE TWO 
TAPE NO. 22-15-3-92; SIDE ONE 
WN: Okay. Well it must have been very difficult for something that's been in the family for so 
long-I was wondering if your father was still around and what his feelings were on all this. 
FL: (There always has been a belief that the Lowrey family had a large part of the ownership of 
Lewers & Cooke. This has not been true since the 1920s when my grandfather sold off a 
substantial part of his interest to younger men, including Phillip E. Spalding and my father. 
So, we played a role in management, but not a large one in ownership.) 
(I talked over my decision to resign from Plywood with my directors and my father, feeling 
as I have indicated that they were going to assume most of the real top management in New 
York City and the West Coast. So, feeling that our Lewers & Cooke people would have 
better opportunities with them, I felt it better for me to quietly leave. My directors and my 
father agreed.) 
(I was given my chance to accept their terms. It was my decision. They were changing the 
spirit of the agreed relationship toward Lewers & Cooke and me and I just decided I would 
not be able to work with them. After all, Pi'ikoi Street and L & C, Ltd. were a very major 
responsibility and an important challenge, too. L & C, Limited's profitable development 
fascinated me, too.) 
WN: Before you quit being president. You told me a story about what Hung Wai Ching told you. 
You were walking Downtown, can you tell me that? 
FL: Yeah, sure. (Laughs) This happened immediately after the merger of the two-the 
merchandise corporation and the development company into Plywood, and the fact that L & C 
Limited had kept the (Pi'ikoi Street) land. And I was walking along Merchant Street, and I 
can remember it just as clear as it happened. And I was on the mauka side, walking back, 
walking along, and Hung Wai was on the other side. And he hailed me across the street. He 
said, "Hey F. P.! I want to talk to you." And so we both started walking across the street. 
And he put out his hand to me and he said, "F. P., you one goddamn good PtlU!" (Laughs) 
What he was saying was, you kept the land, the most valuable asset. And, you know, in the 
mind of the Oriental people land is the most valuable thing. And we thought so too. It's why 
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we wouldn't let the land go to Plywood, because we felt that they wouldn't pay us enough for 
it. But when he said this to me we just laughed and laughed. And I took it as a great 
compliment because he was telling me, "Look, you guys used your head and kept the land 
which is your most valuable asset, and you didn't let it go." And my directors felt the same 
way, (too, and the stock market did, too). (The price of L & C shares increased 
significantly.) 
WN: Where did you--where did the L & C, Limited operate? Still at 404 Pi'ikoi? 
FL: Well, yeah. For about a year, until (Plywood) got their (airport) building built, they were still 
in the (Pi'ikoi Street) building. So I of course moved out of my office and they were good 
enough to let me have an office, seeing (L & C) owned the building and were leasing it to 
them. I was in the building and I had a secretary there, but had no relationship with the 
Lewers & Cooke subordinate (operating) companies. In other words, I had of course resigned 
from the subordinate (Plywood) companies, but stayed on as president of L & C, Limited, 
now a holding company. 
WN: I see. 
FL: And so I kept an office down at 404 Pi'ikoi Street. I only had a token staff. I had one secretary 
and then I would hire the consultive help (here or on the Mainland) that we needed. And I had 
an architectural group that was working on developing plans for the property, if we (could find 
the means to) develop it ourselves (and show to potentially interested people). (It was an 
interesting complicated assignment in all sorts of ways. We felt there were all kinds of potential 
ways to develop the value of the property. We were at this point two years ahead of even 
thinking that the Dillingham Corporation might want L & C's assets, i.e., land and cash. We 
considered the possibility of converting L & C, Ltd. into a real estate investment trust which 
had certain tax advantages in paying out dividends, but we could find no way to bring in 
sufficient income. All we had was an indefinite short-term lease with Plywood which might run 
to June 1969, but probably would be much shorter because they were underway on building a 
new modem plant near the airport. And we would have had to effectuate a sale of the Plywood 
stock and buy a strategic income-producing property to qualify as a real estate development 
trust. We had become a closed-end investment company at the time of the formation of the 
subsidiaries which meant we had to operate somewhat differently, legally and tax-wise.) 
(Dillingham Corporation's condo at 1350 Ala Moana began in September 1966. Most of the 
apartments were pre-sold, so we knew that there was a demand for condos in this area. But 
we were at that time limited by the short-term lease to U.S. Plywood. Plans were begun of 
possible types of buildings for the whole of the Pi' ikoi property. Many alternatives were 
possible.) 
(U.S. Plywood in joint venture with a group of their contractors made a study and an offer 
for L & C, Ltd. at one point, but their price was low. In January 1967-to diversify 
our holding in Plywood-we sold 68,000 shares and invested it in CDs [certificates of 
deposit] to bring in about 5-112 percent interest.) 
(On January 20, 1967 Plywood merged with the Champion Paper Co. expecting to become 
the dominant corporation, but it turned out otherwise. Champion became dominant. In my L 
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& C mid-year report dated August 11, 1967 we noted that we had then sold by that time 79 
percent of the Plywood-Champion stock, converting the stock to short-term instruments, 
making L & C and its land more attractive for merger at a time when money for development 
was not only scarce but costly.) 
(An appraisal done by capable Mainland appraisers indicated that the value of L & C would 
rise substantially as soon as Plywood moved off the property and gave up their short-term 
lease. All these studies were done to show investors and developers that the L & C property 
had considerably higher and increasing values for apartments or a large hotel fronting Pi'ikoi 
Street with easy shuttle access to Ala Moana beach and park. The land stood on L & C books 
from 1938 at $371,000. We estimated the immediate future value of $9,000,000. Our 
appraisals indicated an increase in value of maybe 7 percent per year. L & Chad the only 
large parcel available in fee simple for merger, purchase, or joint venture, etc.) 
(Our sales and development effort since early 1966 was beginning to pay off. We were 
beginning to get numerous inquiries and were approaching people we might be interested in 
developing with. In September of 1967, I approached Lowell Dillingham and in November we 
wrote to the stockholders of their offer of merger of L & C into Dillingham. Our stockholders 
agreed and the merger took place in March 1968.) 
(Dillingham would now continue the work we had begun: to develop the Pi'ikoi property 
which had now grown in size from fourteen-plus acres to seventeen-plus acres with frontage 
of 300 feet on Ala Moana Boulevard. It was a tax-free exchange. We had increased the value 
of L & C stock from three to four dollars in 1956-when I was elected president-to eighteen 
to twenty-six dollars in 1965, at the time of the Plywood merge, to about forty-one dollars per 
share with the Dillingham Corporation merger in early 1968. We accepted the Dillingham 
Corporation merger for many reasons. The directors and the stockholders felt we had done a 
good job and Dillingham Corporation was a growth situation. It split two for one in 1969. 
L & C, Ltd. and the former Lewers & Cooke stockholders were now Dillingham Corporation 
stockholders in a growing company.) 
(The seventeen-plus acres of land was the Dillingham's to develop. They apparently had other 
plans and the property was not developed by them and was sold to the Nauru Trust when 
Dillingham Corporation later liquidated. Nauru in 1992 is finishing its first forty-four story 
tower on the Ala Moana parcel and has cleared the mauka parcel fronting Pi'ikoi Street for its 
second tower as of May 1992). 
WN: So why did you decide not to develop it yourselves? 
FL: This was (a) hard decision for me to make because I knew I was going to merge myself out of 
a job if we merged with Dillingham, because I didn't belong at Dillingham. There wasn't 
anything I could contribute over there. (They had a capable development department.) So I 
wanted to try and see if we could continue to develop the L & C property, because that meant 
(the fun of building a valuable property). But I ran into problems where (we) just didn't meet 
the (stockholders') objectives that I felt I had to meet. Namely, that we had to find some way 
of taking care of (the best interests) of our stockholders. There were very many anxious 
(times) because there were a lot of Mainland companies-big Mainland companies, wealthy 
Mainland companies-who wanted land in Honolulu (and the approximately $10 million of 
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cash). And all they had to do was look at our balance sheet and they saw two assets. 
(Fourteen and later seventeen acres) of land in Honolulu in a beautiful location, right across 
the street from the biggest shopping center, I think, in the United States at that point. And, in 
addition to that, was cash. So if I didn't bring about a (good) merger, and get my 
stockholders a tax-free exchange, I was not doing my job fairly to the stockholders. Because 
the company that came along might have offered cash and(/or bonds and) these poor 
stockholders who had costs of two and three dollars a share would have had to pay the 
difference between two and forty dollars in capital gains. And there were a lot of old-time 
stockholders. Furthermore, there was the problem-a major problem-that a lot of these 
stockholders were living off of Lewers & Cooke stock. They had fairly significant blocks, as 
far as their income went. We were paying relatively good dividends and they were increasing 
gradually each year. And so if a Mainland company bypassed (management) and just made an 
offer directly to the stockholders and the stockholders took it up, then all these (other) 
stockholders who had this low cost (might be maneuvered out). Or made an offer in bonds, or 
made an offer in non-in a taxable instrument-in a taxable vehicle. Then they-they I was 
putting a large block of my stockholders in a very awkward (financial) position. So I felt it 
was my responsibility to get the highest-if I could get a price on a tax-free exchange, that 
was equivalent to the price that one of these other companies would give that would be 
taxable, I was doing my (best for the) stockholders. And during this time there were several 
companies that were-well, we were being looked at by lots of companies. As a matter of 
fact, to work out the Dillingham merger (we) came to the point where (we were) sure that a 
very large company on the Mainland was going to offer something around this forty dollars 
(per share) level. But (we) knew--they probably would offer it in bonds of that company or 
some type of taxable (instrument). So I felt that in the best interests of the community and the 
best interest of the stockholders, that I should talk this matter over with Lowell. He was the 
director and would have heard about it when it came up at the meeting. And so I went over to 
see Lowell and I said, "Lowell, I'm at the end of my rope. I can't (be sure of holding L & C) 
together any longer. If you feel you want the seventeen acres of property (to protect your 
development plans) I think you should (consider) an offer to the (L & C) stockholders." 
I told him that it was my feeling that I would be ready to recommend a tax-free exchange of 
Dillingham stock for L & C stock, providing it was within shooting range of what the best 
offer that we could get from somebody else was. And so within a matter of ten days or two 
weeks, Lowell came back with this offer. (Lowell could see L & C could be raided by a 
powerful Mainland competitor and he would have problems.) And the directors decided that it 
was a fair offer and recommended it to the stockholders. And as soon as that information 
came out these other people backed away. And I think that what (L & C stockholders) got for 
their stock-the dividend that they got, which would-with the preferred dividend plus the 
common dividend that Dillingham paid-the stockholders got quite a big increase in income 
from what we had been paying. So again, it was a---it seemed to me that, we had been 
able-the whole team that we put together of architects and other people and so on, to try and 
work out what we could do in the way of developing it as against the others-1 felt that this 
was the best deal. Because if we didn't (put it into stronger hands) we had the possibility of 
having a vulture come in and grab off the stock, or a big chunk of stock, and foul up (any 
chance of a tax-free move). And (it turned out lucky for the) stockholder, Dillingham stock 
almost doubled in the first year, (1968). Dillingham split its stock two for one the following 
year, (1969) and so (comparisons) get a little bit of complicated (thereafter), I think, turned 
out as a good deal for the Lewers & Cooke stockholders-( now an) L & C stockholder. (So 
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to answer your question-we did not have the power to assure continued development and we 
were constantly at risk of being taken over by some company many stockholders would not 
want.) 
WN: Well, the stockholders were the last of the four people groups that you had to deal with ... 
FL: That's right. (It was good too for the community having the land in good local hands here. Of 
course, that later changed.) 
In other words, (Dillingham Corporation received) all of the assets of L & C, Limited and the 
only assets that L & Chad were land-which, by the way, had been added to. While we were 
(still) L & C, Limited we had the opportunity to pick up this piece of (adjacent) land (in 
1967, about four acres), where the first Nauru Trust building has just been built (on Ala 
Moana). This made the (L & C) piece of property T-shaped (with frontage on Ala Moana 
with this purchase). (Many more people began to see the potential value of this seventeen-
plus- acre fee-simple parcel-the Dillinghams included.) We (worked on this as opportunities 
arose and felt this four-acre addition) would make the mauka fourteen acres more valuable (if 
we controlled) this frontage on Ala Moana Boulevard (and access from Ala Moana). (This is 
just what Nauru Trust has done in 1991-92). 
WN: I see. 
FL: And Chinn Ho owned that piece of property. (We bought it from Chinn Ho or one of his 
companies. I negotiated with Chinn for the purchase.) 
WN: Is that where 1350 Ala Moana is? The condo? 
FL: (No, it is adjacent on the 'Ewa side of the Dillingham Corporation condo. The condo [i.e., 
1350 Ala Moana] was a Dillingham development. Their former head office had been on this 
comer parcel and their condo added substantially to Dillingham Corporation's assets and 
profit.) 
WN: Oh, okay, okay. Right on the comer. 
FL: (The Dillingham Corporation condo is on Pi'ikoi and Ala Moana, and the 1992 Nauru Trust 
condo is adjacent on the 'Ewa side fronting Ala Moana. The 1992 Nauru condo is on the 
parcel we bought from Chinn Ho.) 
WN: And you folks were Gust 'Ewa of Dillingham Corporation's-just 'Ewa beyond) the comer of 
Pi'ikoi and Ala Moana. 
FL: (L & C) owned 500-plus feet of frontage on Pi'ikoi Street and then the property went back 
('Ewa) about 1,200 feet, (with Waimanu Street being our mauka boundary. The mauka-makai 
depth varied.) 
WN: Right. All the way to--almost to Kamake'e Street. 
FL: Correct. 
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WN: I see. Okay. And then the newly-acquired property was more toward Ala Moana Boulevard. 
FL: Yes---it went (makai) from our (mauka) property right down to Ala Moana (giving all the 
mauka fourteen-plus acres frontage to Ala Moana and to Ala Moana traffic). 
WN: I see. 
FL: So (our purchase of this makai four-acre parcel just 'Ewa of 1350) gave the (fourteen-plus) 
acres-in our opinion, a lot more value because we had the 300 feet frontage on Ala Moana 
(in addition to the Pi'ikoi frontage and the total size of the whole parcel made a bigger 
development project valuable and possible). 
WN: I see. So in '68 then, it was-the entire L & C was merged with Dillingham Corporation. So 
now Dillingham (took possession of all your seventeen-plus acres of land and stock and cash 
at the time of the merger)? 
FL: That is correct. (A possible explanation of Dillingham's changing and growing interest in the 
L & C property was its size and proximity to the Dillingham Corporation [i.e., Ala Moana] 
Shopping Center. They did not want an adverse competitor across the street, and so 
Dillingham bought it up. And so I had tried to develop the parcel within L & C, Ltd., but for 
a lot of reasons, primarily uncontrollable raiding because of the number and diversity of the L 
& C stockholders, could not work it out for the benefit of the stockholders. The Dillingham 
Corporation offer was a good one.) For me, I was this time really out of a job. 
(Laughter) 
WN: Yeah. So that was your official retirement. 
FL: Yeah. 
WN: In '68. 
FL: (I felt this was a good, fair deal the way it was worked out for our stockholders.) 
WN: So there was a Lewers & Cooke down by the airport. 
FL: (Yes, it was made up ot) Lewers & Cooke Development Corporation and Lewers & Cooke 
Merchandising Corporation, (the companies and operations Plywood had bought) were now 
located at the airport, on something over twenty acres of land which had been leased by U.S. 
Plywood, or by the corporations backed up by U.S. Plywood. And that was where U.S. 
Plywood (Champion Paper) operated until that date that I gave-(liquidation date, about) 
1978-they operated down there. (I was not privy to their operations except through the 
newspapers and hearsay. Seeing some of the joint ventures they participated in; Plywood and 
later Champion must have been quite generous with the capital they put into Hawai'i and 
made substantial profits in some years, but I have no solid knowledge of their operations or 
why they decided around 1978 to cut back on their Hawai'i operations.) 
WN: Okay. Well, you know, you were a pretty young man still when you retired, weren't you? 
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You were still in your fifties I think. 
FL: I was fifty-seven. (But these had been two tough years, many Mainland trips. Many vulture-
types to hold off, but many very interesting people who considered the potential of the L & C 
assets and their development. I had serious talks with several interested companies who were 
merger candidates. I think it would be inappropriate to name them. But I was "pooped out.,. 
I needed some rest or change for a while. When you run a complicated development like this 
with no major assistant, you get no vacation and the constant raiding problems were very 
difficult.) 
WN: Fifty-seven. 
FL: Yeah. Well, that's right. It was too early and I had expected (in time) to get back into some 
other business. (But) I was still a director of several (major) corporations in town. And I was 
still a director of several charitable organizations. So I had (several very interesting corporate 
and community jobs to work on). 
(Also, Janet and I had not done much traveling except for trips to Japan in 1961 and Australia 
in 1964 with the Chamber of Commerce, and back to Plymouth in the summers to see all her 
former eastern friends and family. So I had thought, here [1968] is an opportunity to get a 
change from a tough three years of the Plywood and L & C-Dillingham mergers. But a series 
of misfortunes hit us ending in 1973 in Janet's death. In 1968, she fell and broke her hip. No 
trip. In early '69, I was operated on for a clogged artery in the neck. A stroke developed, 
affecting my right side and the loss of my voice for over six months. I got Janet to take a trip 
with our youngest daughter back to see her friends and family in Plymouth while I 
recuperated during the rest of 1969 and early 1970. Later in 1970, the real tragedy of our life 
began. She knew something was not right with her, I could see subtle changes and the doctors 
knew something was not right, but we had no CAT scans in those days.) 
(It turned out to be a massive eighth nerve brain tumor, to which her body adapted until an 
accidental body-surfing accident disturbed the brain, allowing an accurate diagnosis. She was 
operated on by the best at the Huntington Memorial Hospital in Pasadena in early April 1973, 
but her body could not handle the void of the removal of the tumor. Nothing went right and 
we lost her in August 1973.) 
(In November and December 1972, before the accident, when she was still in good health for 
all we knew, we did get in a Mainland trip back East again for Thanksgiving. We spent time 
with her family in Boston and down in Plymouth seeing her mother and three brothers and 
their families, as well as the many friends and classmates. She had gone to Vassar and spent 
her summers with the whole family, grandparents and all, in Plymouth. The trips worked out 
well, she enjoyed many happy reunions.) 
(We saw our youngest daughter, who had been married that summer [1972] and was finishing 
college in the East with her husband. We returned to Honolulu before Christmas after seeing 
our other three daughters and three grandchildren on the Mainland, where they all lived and 
still do.) 
(On the trip, little did we know of what was to begin in February 1973 and the post-operative 
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series of critical problems which continued on until her death in August at only fifty-eight 
[years old], just when life was to begin.) 
(Now, coming back to my early retirement. My stroke in early 1969 and Janet's illness put 
off any thought of any full-time job during those years and I am glad that I spent them with 
her. What happened to my life in 1973 changed everything. I had drawn back, but continued 
some directorships and community activities. I felt I had been fortunate in being offered 
community and corporate jobs at a young age, so why not do the same now. Ease out of 
positions slowly and make it possible for younger people to have the opportunity I had had 
when I began.) 
(During the war years getting the kids back and forth to school became more and more of a 
problem, particularly with differing after-school activities. So I asked a real estate broker to 
look for a house for us near Punahou School. They found one on Rocky Hill at 2030 Kakela 
Drive. The location was perfect; we did over the house to fit our needs and of our five 
children. Janet hated to leave Maunalani Heights, but the advantages of the children being 
able to walk to and from school simplified family life very considerably. She grew to like 
Rocky Hill with its Manoa breeze and view of the valley more and more and became very 
happy with the change. Sometime later we were able to pick up an old quonset on the ocean 
at Makaha. It was a mess when we got it; but together we all worked on it weekends and it 
became her favorite. Friday afternoon she would fill the station wagon with food, dogs, kids 
and their friends and we would be off to 'Upena Street in Makaha for the weekend. It was a 
great place to entertain and relax and keep adding to our needs there. We kept everything 
very simple but comfortable. It was great relaxation and exercise for us over the weekends 
and vacations.) 
(After Janet's death in 1973 and after the youngest daughter returned from college and found 
her own place; I sold Kakela and moved in 1977 to 700 Richards Street, Harbor Towers, 
which was conveniently close to my remaining business activities and I had a downtown 
parking space. I sold this after ten years in 1987 and moved to 1434 Punahou Street.) 
WN: Is there still a Lewers & Cooke today? 
FL: There's no Lewers & Cooke (corporate organization today that I know of). 
WN: Not at all? 
FL: It's gone. It (was closed down around 1978 by Champion Paper). 
WN: There's something in the phone book now. 
FL: Hm? 
WN: You look it up in the phone book, there's still something. 
FL: (If there is), I'll tell you what it is, then. There's a young attorney here by the name of 
Hulton. (They had tried to) liquidate everything (but they had) certain properties, certain tract 
developments that still had some life (or unmet commitments in them) . They kept (Hulton) 
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who had been working for the development company. They kept him on. And I think they 
finally made some arrangements with him to carry it on. And so maybe the Lewers & Cooke 
name is in the telephone book today (as a reference to Champion's operations and as an 
access number to reach Mr. Hulton). 
WN: It is in there. It's under (Lewers & Cooke). It's just got an office-suite something, you know 
what I mean? 
FL: Check. What it amounts to is the company, Lewers & Cooke was (substantially closed down). 
That I know. Because-if you want a little interesting story here on it, as to how I know-1 
know it was liquidated because of the newspaper, but there were two paintings of two sailing 
vessels of Lewers & Cooke. There's one on the wall there, and there's one behind you. And 
I'd seen these paintings since I was, you know, old enough to remember them. And I'd 
always loved these two paintings. They were done by a Mr. Coulter, who was a very 
prominent marine artist way back in 1889 and 1891. So they're both now a hundred years 
old. And I had told (Champion) that I wanted these paintings (if they were ever going to give 
them up). And I got this telephone call one day, the president said, "We're going through the 
final liquidation of the company. You told me at one time that you'd like to have first crack at 
the paintings. " 
And I said, "I feel that way. Let me know what your price is on them and if I can handle it, 
I'll buy them." Well, I got the price, it really knocked me over. 
(Laughter) 
FL: But I said, "Damn it, I want those paintings." So I bought them. I didn't argue with them on 
the price of the two paintings, but there were actually three. The third painting was a painting 
of the schooner Commodore, which the company had bought in the early twenties, and then 
had sold (it) sometime in the early thirties, because it was no longer a profitable venture to 
bring lumber in by sailing vessel. Your lumber came in (one and one-halt) million feet 
quantities, (about) four times a year, because that's the total number of trips a sailing vessel 
could make. And that meant your inventory went up-skyrocketed four times a year and then 
dropped way down and skyrocketed again. You never knew when the inventory was coming. 
The trip would take as few as nineteen days to as long as forty days to make the trip south. 
So you never knew when it was coming. I made one trip on the Commodore. It took thirty-
three days and the only reason it wasn't thirty-five, thirty-six, or thirty-seven was they needed 
the lumber that we had aboard, not me. (We were becalmed off Kalaupapa.) 
(Laughter) 
FL: And they sent the tug clear to Kalaupapa, off Moloka'i, to pick us up and tow us in. 
(Laughter) 
FL: And so the trip was short(ened) by (the tow). Anyway, so the picture of (the Commodore) had 
hung in Jim Lovell's office for many years. And (it was) part of this deal. And so I said to 
him, "Look, they valued that painting less than the others. I'll pay you your asking price for 
the two Coulter's paintings if you'll give Jim Lovell that painting that was in his office. 
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Because," I said, "Jim loved that picture and, you know, he was president of both companies 
(from September 1972 to February 1974) between (the several) other presidents that 
(Champion) had." 
And he said, "That's a fair offer. Let me call you back." And about fifteen, twenty minutes 
later I got the call back, and he said, "We'll accept your offer on the two Coulters and we'll 
give Jim Lovell the other painting." So I felt good about that, because, I don' t know, I just 
felt that Jim had liked it and that this was something that they'd done for Jim. So anyway, 
Jim has that picture. (These museum-quality paintings will perpetuate the Lewers & Cooke 
name for maybe another 100 years.) 
WN: That's a great story. 
FL: So, the time---I remember when I bought the painting. It was in 1978, so that's when 
(Champion Paper had begun to cut back substantially everything they could, but there are 
always loose ends to clear up, especially in tract development programs). (Hulton has taken 
that over so it should be well-handled.) 
WN: Lewers & Cooke was no more (as you know it). 
FL: (You are correct.) After 1965, Plywood and the Champion managers had actually increased 
developments substantially. But now, sometime before 1978 (thirteen years later), those 
policies had been changed. I cannot give you an answer. I was not privy to their history after 
1965 of results or their objectives during these twelve years. Please remember I had resigned, 
as described, in (early) 1966. 
END OF SIDE ONE 
SIDE TWO 
WN: Okay. In conclusion I'd like you to just wrap up your life and your reflections on your 
experiences with Lewers & Cooke. I know-as I said this is a project basically on World 
War II . . . 
FL: Yes, it's sort of gotten quite a way off. (Laughs) 
WN: Well, no. That's probably it. I mean that's really what the war was. It was a turning point in 
everyone's life ... 
FL: (Yes, but we here were far better off than those who had to go to war and fight. We had 
problems but nothing like they did. We actually had more difficult problems as a result of the 
foreign ideologies, which seemed to come as a result of the war. Socialistic, non-productive 
ideas, popular at the time, have now been disproved by USSR results. Their standard of 
living has proved these socialistic theories non-productive.) 
WN: Would you say that all of this is--it's sort of interrelated though, from the pre-war to the 
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post-war. I mean wartime to the dock strike ... 
FL: (More time is needed to sort out the constructive or destructive components of socialism and 
the seemingly failure of the U.S. to develop productively and in a sound financial way. Our 
problems have grown gradually, but very persistently worse in many, many ways right up to 
1992 in the United States.) 
WN: As you look back, would you have done anything any differently? 
FL: Oh god. Well, that brings in the problem of hindsight. (Yes, but I'm going to pass that 
question.) 
(The war years demanded the complete restructuring of the Lewers & Cooke organization to 
meet the needs of the military effort. I have briefly outlined some of what we did to aid their 
effort and to survive the period as an organization so we could begin again to perform the 
housing job Hawai'i needed as the war effort tapered off.) 
(The building game is a very complicated one involving the coordination of many parts: land, 
zoning and many governmental permits, and requirements. It requires imagination, architects, 
engineers, many tradesmen, several separate unions, financing, insurance, and bonding 
requirements. To put it all together requires sub-contractors and general contractors to coordinate 
everybody to produce the type of structure and shelter the market in each case demands.) 
(Up to the time of the war, Lewers & Cooke produced a substantial part of the housing 
inventory and much of this still exists today, serving its owners as it was built to do. The war 
years, and the strike which followed, interrupted this addition of new housing inventory. But 
as Lewers & Cooke was able to re-establish its "residential home building organization" and 
cooperative contracting functions for the individual home builder, and also begin the joint 
venturing of tract developments, they again played an important role in building Hawai'i's 
housing inventory. Most of this inventory still stands today, 1992, and will for many years to 
come, giving satisfaction to its many thousand owners for whatever purpose it was built. 
Lewers & Cooke also sold many kinds of building materials to non-residential structures, 
office buildings, hospitals, most kinds of building structures. These components function 
today and will for years to come.) 
(So what Lewers & Cooke assisted in still stands today and makes up a large percentage of 
Hawai' i' s building inventory. I am proud of the part the Lewers & Cooke people played over 
many years and the satisfaction of those who are left knowing they contributed in this effort. 
Together we accomplished much for the satisfaction and happiness of the community, but 
much will remain to be done as housing demands increase and change over the years to come. 
In 1956, we established our basic mission: "To Build a Better Hawai'i through Service to 
Builders." Together we met that objective.) 
END OF INTERVIEW 
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1948 1947 1946 1945 
13,205 13,209 8,040 6,467 
12,629 12,926 7,838 5,878 
457 437 323 233 
119 Ill 154 111 
261 256 170 121 
.66 .63 .39 .26 
.32 .3S .3S .34 
1.9:1 1.9:1 6.2 :1 7.8:1 
6,015 6,382 4,148 3,976 
3,623 3,S39 3,435 3,035 
8 .45 8.22 7.94 6 .86 
1944 1943 
6,810" 5,904• 
5,919 5,053 
600 720 
461 S93 
139 127 
.38 .34 
.27 .27 
3.9:1 3 .4 :1 
3,825 3,481 
2,797 2,407 
7 .57 6 .51 
1942 
6,688 
6,016 
1,107 
818 
289 
.78 
.31 
2.6 :1 
3,476 
2, 170 
5 .87 
1941 
7,733 
7,582 
&IS 
392 
422 
1.14 
.34 
3.4:1 
2,887 
2,021 
5 .47 
Ul 
w 
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L & C, Limited 
(Lewers & Cooke, Limited Prior to May 21, 1965) 
Summary of Changes in Capital Stock - 1941 to 1967 
SHARES 
INCREASED 
YEAR TYPE OF CHANGE IN SHARES IN 
ISSUED AliTHORIZED ISSUED OUI'ST ANDING TREASURY 
1967 No cbloote SOO,OOO 493,923 6,000 487,923 
1966 Stoclt dividend 
-S" 23,234 soo,ooo 493,923 6,000 487,923 
1965 . 
-S" 21,938 SOO,OOO 470,689 6,000 464,689 
1964 . 
-S" 20,893 soo,ooo 448,751 10,000 438,751 
1963 . 
-S" 20,374 SOO,OOO 427,858 10,000 417,858 
1962 . 
-S" 19,404 SOO,OOO 407,484 407,484 
1961 . 
-S" 18,480 SOO,OOO 388,080 388,080 
1960 Stoclt 1plit, 2 for 1 184,800 SOO,OOO 369,600 369,600 
Stoclt dividend 
-S" 8,000 250,000 184,800 184,800 
1959 Stoclt 11plit, 2 for 1 88,000 250,000 176,000 176,000 
1958 Nochante 125,000 88,000 88,000 
1957 Stoclt dividend 
- 10" 8,000 125,000 88,000 88,000 
1ncreMe 8Uiborized capital 125,000 80,000 80,000 
1956 No clwl&e 80,000 80,000 80,000 
19SS . 80,000 80,000 80,000 
1954 . 80,000 80,000 80,000 
I 1953 . 80,000 80,000 80,000 
I 
19S2 . 80,000 80,000 80,000 
1951 . 80,000 80,000 80,000 
19SO . 80,000 80,000 80,000 
1949 . 80,000 80,000 80,000 
1948 . 80,000 80,000 80,000 
1947 . 80,000 80,000 80,000 
1946 . 80,000 80,000 80,000 
1945 Additional oharea oold 3,818 80,000 80,000 80,000 
1944 . 3,697 80,000 76,182 76,182 
1943 No cban1e 75,000 63,485 63,485 
1942 . 75,000 63,485 63,485 
1941 . 75,000 63,485 63,485 
• In 1938 lbcre- a *>cit oplit of S for 1 iocreMiD& aulborized lbarel from 15,000 to 75,000. 
In 1944 aulborized ohuea were iDcrcMed by S,OOO ohuea to 80,000 ohuea. 
PRICE RANGE 
ADJUSTED FOR ACTUAL DnnDENDSANDSP~ 
IDGH ww HIGH ww 
37-112 lS-112 37-112 25-112 
32-1/8 23 32-1/8 23 
27-S/8 19-112 26-3/8 18-S/8 
25 19 22-3/4 17-1/4 
23-1/4 16-1/4 20 14 
28 tS-S/8 23 12-7/8 
34-112 18 27 14-1/8 
19 15-7/8 14-1/4 11-718 
37-3/4 19 13-3/8 6-3/4 
36-3/4 23 6-112 4-1/8 
29 23 S-1/8 4-1/8 
25-1/4 18-112 4-1/8 3 
19 12 3-1/8 2 
12 9-S/8 2 1-1/2 
13-112 9 2-1/8 1-1/2 
16-3/4 13-1/4 2-3/4 2-1/8 
17 IS 2-3/4 2-3/8 
16-112 14 2-S/8 2-1/4 
19 16-112 3-1/8 2-S/8 
22-112 18-112 3-S/8 3 
30 22 4-7/8 3-1/2 
33 26 S-3/8 4-1/4 
31 27-112 s 4-1/2 
27 24 4-3/8 3-7/8 
25 21-112 4 3-1/2 
15-3/4 15-112 2-112 2-1/2 
19 17 3-1/8 2-3/4 
I 
I 
VI 
~ 
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NEW SUBSIDIARIES OF LEWERS & COOKE, LTD. 
1965 ORGANIZATION 
LEWERS & COOKE MERCHANDISE CORPORATION 
F. D. Lowrey 
E. Benner, Jr. 
F. P. Lowrey 
DIRECTORS 
R. S. Lowrey 
G. K. Nakagawa 
E. L. Paris 
OFFICERS 
C. D. Pratt 
R. H. Rice 
P. E. Spalding, Jr. 
President . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F. P. Lowrey Secretary-Treasurer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . H. B. Hocking 
Vice President-Manager ............. J. W. Lovell Assistant Secretary-Treasurer . . . . . . . . A. J . Spielman 
Vice President . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . R. G. Rietow Assistant Secretary ................. H. L. Gaut 
Assistant Treasurer ............. R. N. Bebb 
ASSIGNMENTS 
Product Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A. J . Spielman 
Lumber & Construction Materials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . J. H. Johansen 
Architectural Materials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . W. P. Jenkins 
Tools & General Hardware . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . P. V. Menezes 
Plumbing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . T . A. Replogle 
Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E. F. Bond 
Commercial Sales . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . S. A. Cooke 
Contract Furnishings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . L. A. Inman 
Sales Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . H. L. Gaut 
Contractor Sales . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E. N. Iwamoto 
Inside Sales . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . K. C. Litater 
Bidding & Estimating . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . R. W. Levy 
Advertising . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . H. V. Beazlie 
Hilo Branch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . P. S. Chapin 
Administrative Assistant to Manager . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C. X. Kufferath 
Financial Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . R. N. Bebb 
Personnel Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . T . W. DeCrow 
LEWERS & COOKE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION 
F. D. Lowrey 
E. Benner, Jr. 
F. P. Lowrey 
DIRECTORS 
R. S. Lowrey 
G. K. Nakagawa 
E. L. Paris 
OFFICERS 
C. D. Pratt 
R. H. Rice 
P. E. Spalding, Jr. 
President . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F. P. Lowrey 
Vice President-Manager . . . . . . . . . . . . R. G. Rietow 
Vice President . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . J. W. Lovell 
Secretary-Treasurer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . H. B. Hocking 
Assistant Secretary-Treasurer . . . . . . . . . . R. I. Oshiro 
Assistant Secretary ...... ... ..... R. C. Longmire 
ASSIGNMENTS 
Tract Development & Tract Promotion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Project Coordinator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Building ....... ............ ..... .. . ............................ .... . 
Plan Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
R. C. Longmire 
W. S. Hogarty 
G. H. Fredholm 
J. W. H. Chock 
, 
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LEWERS & COOKE, LTD. 
404 PIIKOI PARKWAY e HONOLULU 2, HAWAII 
T£L£1'HON£ Sl·961 
L &: c I LIMITED 
(Levers &: Cooke, timlted Prior to May 21, 1965) 
SUMMARY OF CHANGES IN CAPITAL STOCK - 1941 TO 1967 
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L & C, LIMITED 
(Successor to Lewers & Cooke, Ltd.} 
SELECTED FINANCIAL DATA1 
BOOK NET ASSET PRICE RANGE 
EARNINGS DIVIDENDS VALUE VALUE2 HIGH LOW 
1967 $0.80* $0.80 $20.38 $30.23 37-1/2 25-1/2 
1. 92** 
$2.72 
1966 $ .55* • 71 18.46 28.60 32-1/8 23 
~·· $ • 61 
1965 $ .52* .548 18.55 29.74 26-3/8 18-5/8 
4.08** 
$4.60 
1964 $1.67 .450 15.32 22-3/4 17-1/4 
1963 1.12 .436 14.11 20 14 
1962 1.13 .418 13.93 23 12-7/8 
1961 1.51 .398 13.26 27 14-1/8 
1960 1. 75 .379 12.14 14-1/4 11-7/8 
1959 1.20 .361 10.34 13-3/8 6-3/4 
1958 1.08 .451 9.50 6-1/2 4-1/8 
1957 0.86 .336 8.87 5-1/8 4-1/8 
1956 0.70 .312 8.34 4-1/8 3 
* Operations. 
** capital gain. 
Notes: 
1. Based on 487,923 shares common stock outstanding. 
2. Includes land valued at $6,700,000. 
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For over 100 years LEWERS & COOKE has made important contributions toward ... 
BUILDING A BmER HAWAII THROUGH SERVICE TO BUILDERS 
Just as this has been our purpose for the past 100 years, so it continues to be our basic purpose 
today. 
To achieve this goal in our community we must bring together a team of four "people-groups" 
who presently are: ?00 Stockholders, whose savings have purchased the land, buildings, equip-
ment, and inventory needed to create jobs for 400 L & C People. The L & C People add service 
values to the merchandise, purchased from 500 Suppliers, by performing the many tasks neces· 
sary to bring this merchandise from supplier to 20,000 Builder Customers. 
Further, to achieve this goal we must coordinate and balance the interests of each of these four 
"people-groups" who are dependent upon each other for its complete success. Each group must 
prosper and each group is free to withdraw. The balancing of interests must be achieved while 
L & C competes successfully with many companies who have similar goals. This is free enter-
prise. 
ln this free enterprise system, the degree to which we succeed in achieving our purpose of 
"Building Hawaii" is measured by the concept of profit. Therefore, to achieve our goal we must 
produce profit. And to produce profit we must provide services for our 20,000 Builder Cus-
tomers by offering ideas and by adding service values to the merchandise we sell. These added 
values must produce income; and the income bring profit that will be sufficiently large ... 
(1) to pay for the merchandise from Suppliers- and to pay 
for all merchandising expenses including government 
costs-
(2) to provide job opportunities for L & C People, and-
(3) to pay L & C Stockholders a return on the value of their 
property, sufficiently large to induce them to put addition-
al funds into L & C. 
Only then can we grow to contribute toward our purpose ... 
B U I L D I N G A I E. T T E R H A W A I I TH R 0 U G H S E R V I C E T 0 B U I L D E R S 
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